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ABSTRACT
ON SECURE COMMUNICATION IN INTEGRATED INTERNET AND
HETEROGENEOUS MULTI-HOP WIRELESS NETWORKS
Bin Xie
April 13, 2006

Integration of the Internet with a Cellular Network, WMAN, WLAN, and MANET
presents

an

exceptional

promise

by

having

co-existence

of

conventional

WWANslWMANslWLANs with wireless ad hoc networks to provide ubiquitous
communication. We call such integrated networks providing internet accessibility for
mobile users as heterogeneous multi-hop wireless networks where the Internet and
wireless infrastructure such as WLAN access points (APs) and base stations (BSs)
constitute the backbone for various emerging wireless networks (e.g., multi-hop WLAN
and ad hoc networks).
Earlier approaches for the Internet connectivity either provide only unidirectional
connectivity for ad hoc hosts or cause high overhead as well as delay for providing full
bi-directional connections. In this dissertation, a new protocol is proposed for integrated
Internet and ad hoc networks for supporting bi-directional global connectivity for ad hoc
hosts.

v

In order to provide efficient mobility management for mobile users in an integrated
network, a mobility management protocol called multi-hop cellular IP (MCIP) has been
proposed to provide a micro-mobility management framework for heterogeneous multihop network. The micro-mobility is achieved by differentiating the local domain from
global domain. At the same time, the MCIP protocol extends Mobile IP protocol for
providing macro-mobility support between local domains either for single hop MSs or
multi-hop MSs. In the MCIP protocol, new location and mobility management
approaches are developed for tracking mobile stations, paging, and handoff management.
This dissertation also provides a security protocol for integrated Internet and MANET
to establish distributed trust relationships amongst mobile infrastructures. This protocol
protects communication between two mobile stations against the attacks either from the
Internet side or from wireless side. Moreover, a secure macro/micro-mobility protocol
(SM 3p) have been introduced and evaluated for preventing mobility-related attacks either
for single-hop MSs or multi-hop MSs. In the proposed SM 3p, mobile IP security has been
extended for supporting macro-mobility across local domains through the process of
multi-hop registration and authentication. In a local domain, a certificate-based
authentication achieves the effective routing and micro-mobility protection from a range
of potential security threats.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND
Recent advances in communication and computing technologies clearly indicate
that future wireless networking environments will be heterogeneous in terms of
diversified access technologies [1]. While some wireless technologies are already part of
our everyday lives, such as Wireless WANs (e.g., 2G, 2.5G and 3G cellular systems),
Wireless MANs (e.g., IEEE 802.16), WLANs (e.g., IEEE 802.11aJb/e/g), and Wireless
PANs (e.g., Bluetooth), the emerging IEEE 802.15.3/4 WPANs and IEEE 802.22
technologies are expected to provide even more exciting and efficient services. The
available services would include voice, multimedia, messaging, e-mail, information
services (e.g., news, stocks, weather, and travel), M-commerce, entertainment, locationbased public utility and health-care services, and so on. Availability of a multitude of
wireless technologies has motivated research efforts towards the next generation of
wireless and mobile communication systems, usually called "Beyond 3G" (B3G) or "4G"
networks that are expected to have integrated heterogeneous wireless networks that
would enable users equipped with either multi-interface or SDR-based wireless devices
to use the appropriate network that meets their service levels and cost requirements, in a
transparent and seamless way. In heterogeneous wireless networks, different types of
network have distinctive underlying features, for example, WLAN provides higher
bandwidth. On the contrary, the cellular system can only support low bandwidth.
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However, the cellular network can cover larger area, and can possibly provide worldwide
seamless connection. Also, integrating ad hoc networks with infrastructure networks can
be beneficial for extending the service coverage of wireless networks via multi hop
communication. In this case, wireless access points or base stations (APs/BSs) employ
different radio spectrums to provide Internet accessibility for mobile stations (MSs) or
wireless networks (e.g., a MANET network) to access the Internet.

An ad hoc MS

outside the coverage of any BS or AP may obtain the Internet services by way of multihop relaying. Ad hoc networks can be used to extend the coverage of not only the cellular
networks, but also the high frequency Wireless LANs as well as other wireless networks
[2]. This phenomenon is totally different from a pure mobile ad hoc network where a
self-configurable network capability is provided by communication among ad hoc MSs
without any Internet-based infrastructure (e.g., BS/AP) for mobility and security support.
Once attached to the Internet, the MANET communication is not isolated anymore, but is
an integral part of the infrastructure-based networks for Internet access. In such an
integrated network, a given MS of the ad hoc part needs to relay data packets hop by hop
before they can reach a BS or another mobile station having access to a BS, which acts as
a communication bridge between wireless network and the Internet.
Our investigation in Chapter 2 shows that an integrated heterogeneous multi-hop
network may be attacked from the Internet or wireless side for the purpose of
endangering the MANET and other multi-hop communications. Firstly, the potential
security vulnerability of the wireless infrastructure may impede the Internet accessibility
of such wireless networks, thus destroy the civilian or other applications from these
wireless networks (e.g., an ad hoc network). Secondly, mobility-related attacks may

2

occur in an integrated network and result in that a MS cannot find a correct BS/AP for
Internet connection. Thirdly, a communication route may be distorted by an adversary
with a routing attack. Because of these, infrastructure and information protection for
secure communication is a crucial design issue in integrated heterogeneous multi-hop
network. The security design and implementation should take the heterogeneous
communication path into account, which could span the Internet, cellular networks,
WLAN, and MANET. Therefore, many security issues in integrated networks should be
reconsidered in this integrated environment rather than only as an individual cellular
network, WLAN or MANET. It is obvious [64] that the current authentication protocols
of UMTS, IEEE 802.16 and IEEE 802.11 security are not applicable to the integrated
networks because these protocols are developed based on the assumption that a MS can
connect to a BS directly and exchange authentication packets. Since the internet mobility
protocol (i.e., mobile IP [33] [34]) in the conventional cellular and WLAN lacks security
support for a multi-hop MS, new security features should be developed for the multi-hop
MS to access the network with mutual authentication at every hop. In the integrated
networks, possible non-cooperative behavior in MANET may significantly and adversely
affect the performance of network in the case of multi-hop packet relaying. Therefore,
collaborative protocols are needed in the integrated network to encourage cooperation
during multi-hop packet relay.
The design of such integrated Internet and heterogonous multi-hop wireless
networks involves two fundamental problems with many sub-issues for each problem,
which are addressed in this dissertation.
•

Problem 1: Secure communication for integrated Internet and MANET
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A. Integrated protocol for Internet and ad-hoc network communication
B. Secure interconnection protocol for integrated internet and ad-hoc
networks

•

Problem 2: Secure mobility management in heterogeneous multi-hop wireless
networks
A. Macro/Micro-mobility approach to heterogeneous wireless networks
B. Secure Macro/Micro-mobility protocol

The following subsections give an overview of significant contribution made by this
dissertation and describe the background as well as related work regarding the two
problems in heterogonous multi-hop wireless networks.

1.1

Secure Communication for Integrated Internet and MANET
The dissertation in part A addresses the development of secure communication

framework for integrated Internet and MANET. In an integrated Internet and MANET [310], each ad hoc MS executes a MANET routing protocol to construct a communication
path between two network stations (source and destination). The basic process of ad hoc
route discovery such as AODV [16] and DSR [17], involves two messages: route request
and route reply. In the beginning, the source MS broadcasts a route request if it has no
route to a destination. The route request will be forwarded by intermediary node until it
reaches the destination. Then the destination station (e.g., a BS or ad hoc MS) responses a
route rep Iy message carrying the reversed route. The process of ad hoc route discovery
enables the ad hoc MS with the capability to reach a FA. Through the established route to
the FA, a separate protocol [3-10] coordinates mobile IP [33] [34] and the MANET
routing protocol to obtain the Internet connectivity for ad hoc MSs. Ad hoc routing
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protocols can be coarsely divided into two groups: proactive and on-demand routing
protocols. In the proactive routing protocols, each node keeps one or more tables that
contain the routing information about the other nodes. The tables are created and updated
through network routing control messages. The routing table in each MS maintains
consistent and up-to-date routing information. This kind of protocols includes
Destination-Sequence Distance-Vector (DSDV) [11], Wireless Routing Protocol (WRP)
[12], Global State Routing (GSR) [13], Hierarchical State Routing (HSR) [14], Fisheye
State Routing (FSR) [21], and Zone-based Hierarchical Link State (ZHLS) [15], etc. On
the other hand, in an on-demand routing protocol, each node creates a route when
communication is needed. When a MS in a MANET requires a route to a destination, the
host initiates a route discovery process. The protocols in this category are Ad Hoc Ondemand Distance Vector (AODV) [16], Cluster Based Routing Protocol (CBRP) [18],
Dynamic Source Routing (DSR) [17], Temporally Order Routing Algorithm (TORA)
[19], Associativity Based Routing (ABR) [20], and Signal Stability Routing (SSR) [22].
A detailed survey and performance comparisons of the above ad hoc protocols can be
found in papers [23][24].
The approaches discussed in [3-10] address the work of integrating MANETs with
wired networks by extending mobile IP. In the approach [5], the MSs run a modified
Routing Information Protocol (RIP) Daemon (routed) for dealing with mobile IP
messages. Also a mobile IP routing daemon (mipd) runs on each MS. The routeds of the
mobile hosts under the coverage of a FA receive and handle FA's agent advertisements
and related mobile IP messages. These routeds relay the mobile IP messages to the mipds
of the MSs that are outside the transmission range of the FA. The MIPMANET [7]
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provides the global Internet connectivity by using mobile IP with FA's care-of-address
and reverse tunneling. A FA periodically broadcasts its advertisement. The advertisement
message spreads through the whole ad hoc network. This approach uses AODV protocol
for communications in ad hoc network. The performance of this approach has been
improved by more recent approaches given in papers [8] [25]. The approach used in [25]
extends mobile IP to ad hoc networks using the on-demand AODV protocol; therefore
each mobile node registers with a FA only when it requires the global Internet
connectivity. The paper [8] further improves the performance of the approach given in
[25] by reducing the mobile IP overhead. This approach minimizes the number of FA
advertisements by using controlled flooding in the ad hoc network.

In Chapter 3, the dissertation proposes an integrated protocol for internet and ad hoc
network communication. Compared to the aforementioned integrated protocols, my
protocol has four advantages (i) bi-directional internet connection for ad hoc host that
means the Internet (i.e., BS) and each ad hoc host can reach each other all time, (ii) less
control overhead in maintaining the bi-directional connection for ad hoc hosts, (iii) high
throughput communication for ad hoc host to access the internet, (iv) less delay for
packet forwarding.
Since protocols mentioned above are based on a benign environment, these protocols
may suffer from security threats in an adversarial environment. Security of ad hoc routing
protocols has become an important issue. The Secure Routing Protocol (SRP) [26] uses
message authentication codes (HMAC) with pairwise shared keys to ensure the packet
forwarding between any two MSs without violating the routing protocol. The
computation of HMAC with a shared secret symmetric key between two MSs is very
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efficient. SRP initiates a trustworthy relationship between sender and destination. Both
the Secure Efficient Distance Vector Routing Protocol (SEAD) [27] and the ARIADNE
[28] are one-way hash MAC based security protocols. The authentication of routing
message in SEAD and ARIADNE depends on TESLA [29] hash-chain-based protocol for
key management. The SEAD is an ad hoc secure routing protocol that uses efficient oneway hash functions to guarantee the routing safety on DSDV [11]. With the assumption
of using a trusted node to sign public keys for each node and to distribute those keys,
SEAD authenticates the sequence number and metric of a route table by using hash chain
elements. ARIADNE [28] copes with the security in on-demand routing protocols by
point-to-point authentication of routing message. One-way hash chain is less expensive
than asymmetric cryptography. However the drawbacks of one-way hash MAC are: (i)
one-way hash-based authentication requires clock synchronization at granularities that is
hard to reach, (ii) delayed key disclosure results in the delay in the verification of routing
message.
ARAN [30] and SAODV [31] are the protocols based on digital signature with
asymmetric key cryptography. ARAN assumes a trusted certificate server to maintain
fresh certificates for nodes. Based on the public key of the trusted server, the source node
begins a route discovery by initiating a packet with the signature of its private key.
Mandatory end-to-end authentication, using certificate, timestamp and nonce are policies
to guarantee the authentication, message integrity and non-repudiation during the
processing of routing recovery. The drawback of the digital signature is that it involves
more computation overhead.
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A detailed overview of these ad hoc security protocols can be found in paper [32].
These ad hoc security protocols in [26-30] are based on the standalone MANETs. All of
these security protocols endure a serious problem that there are no prior trust
relationships among MSs because of the absence of central authority in the MANET. It is
difficult to consistently identify a MS with a unique identifier because it is easy for a MS
to change its identity. Therefore it is difficult to establish the trust relationships among
MSs. A malicious ad hoc node can use a forged ad hoc identity and then makes feigned
trust relations with other nodes and then attacks the MANET internally. In the integrated
Internet and MANET, it is critical that a MS can be identified in a consistent and unique
manner. This dissertation in part A provides a security protocol for the integrated Internet
and MANETs by tightly combining Mobile IP security and ad hoc security. The
dissertation further develops the trust relationship for MANET through the authentication
from the Internet authorities.

1.2

Secure Mobility Management in Heterogeneous Multi-hop
Wireless Networks
The dissertation in part B addresses a new mobility protocol and its Secure Mobility

in integrated Internet and heterogeneous networks. Mobile IP [33] [34] provides
continuous mobility functions for MS with two entities on the Internet: home agent (HA),
and foreign agent (FA). A HA is the server on the mobile host's home network that
maintains the information about the host's current location, as identified as care-ofaddress (CoA), and security credentials. On the other hand, FA is the server on the
visiting network providing the CoA and security administration of the visiting network.
Mobile IP handles the mobility of MSs, but is inadequate for mobile wireless networks
because of its high update latency, large Internet signaling load, and lack of support of
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micro-mobility. The standard mobile IP protocol addresses the processes of discovery,
registration, and tunneling. FAlHA periodically send out an advertisement message
indicating its presence to mobile stations (MSs). From the advertisement, a MS obtains a
CoA (care-of-address) or co-located CoA for registration. The registration of a MS
informs its HA to update the mobility binding of the MS. A registration reply message
issued by FA indicates the status of registration request. Only upon successful
registration, datagram can be tunneled between CN (correspondent node) and MS.
Recently a variety of enhancements have been proposed to overcome the shortcomings of
the base mobile IP [35], e.g., MIP-RO, MIPv6, HMIPv6, IDMP, HAW All, TeleMIP,
Cellular IP, Fast handoffs, EMA, and Proactive Handoff. For example, Cellular IP [36]
[37] differentiates the global domain and the local domain, and thus supports micromobility. Also, the Telecommunication Enhanced Mobile IP (TeleMIP) [38] is a scalable
and hierarchical IP-based architecture that provides lower latency and signaling overhead
in comparison with the standard Mobile IP. However, all above mobility protocols can
not support heterogeneous multi-hop communication in an integrated Internet and
heterogeneous multi-hop wireless networks. A new mobility management protocol is
needed to support the migration for both single and multi-hop MSs in an integrated
network. Each MS has a multi-hop paging/routing cache maintaining the necessary
information for location management and connection management. In Chapter 5, a new
mobility management protocol is proposed to support the multi-hop communication.
When a single hop or multi-hop MS is in an idle state, the location management of the
protocol provides micro-mobility management while is moving in the local domain. On
the contrary, when the MS have packets to send or receive the MS moves to active state

9

and a connection management scheme enables the MS to maintain the high performance
route for connecting the Internet.
Although the basic mobile IP protocol defines an Authentication Extension (AE) to
support authentication in registration (secret-key based authentication), there are some
deficiencies in this protocol [40] [41]. Since the protocol only requires authentication
between HA and MS, network may be attacked unless overall authentications are
enforced between the FA and HA and between the FA and MS. To enforce an overall
authentication, besides the secret-keys between MS and HA, extra heavy secret-key
management is necessary between MS and FA. The Mobile IP protocol doesn't prevent
replay attack between FA and either MS or HA. The MoIPS [39] implements a public
key management system that supports the mobile IP as well as the route optimized
mobile IP. The system is built upon a DNS-based X.509 public key infrastructure in order
to supply cryptographic keys to authenticate mobile IP registrations and to establish IPsec
tunnels for mobile IP redirected packets.

Public-key based authentication [40] provides a strong, scalable authentication
strategy for MS, HA, and FA to authenticate one another based on asymmetric or public
key cryptography. The protocol enables mobile IP to work exactly the same way as
secret-key-authentication. The minimal public-key based authentication [41] protocol
uses secret key cryptography in order to minimize the requirement of computing power,
as well as the administration cost imposed on MS. In addition, the protocol provides the
scalability and non-repudiation that are likely to be demanded by the users.
In an integrated Internet and heterogeneous multi-hop wireless network, however, all
of these authentication protocols suffer two serious problems:
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•

A multi-hop MS, which is outside the direct coverage of a BS and connects to the BS
with a multi-hop route, doesn't have the capability of verifying the authenticity of the
advertisements that are forwarded by an intermediate node.

•

The existing mobile IP protocol cannot provide security protection for the registration
of a multi-hop MS. Current mobile IP security is deployed on single wireless hop in
which each MS can exchange registration and authentication directly with the FA.
Therefore, above authentication protocols cannot be used for an integrated multi-hop

network to support authentication of a multi-hop MS.
In a single hop network, the above authentication protocols [39] [40] [41] have no need to
maintain a multi-hop cache for each MS. Data packets are sent between each MS and the
FA directly. However, in a multi-hop network, a multi-hop routing cache at the BS is
required for maintaining the path to each multi-hop MS [2] [10] [42]. Thus, beside the
mobile IP registration security, it is very important to create and update a multi-hop
routing cache in a way to prevent it from poisoning.

1.3

Dissertation Structure
The rest of this dissertation is organized as follows. After illustrating the network

architecture of heterogeneous multi-hop networks, Chapter two provides a detailed
investigation of potential vulnerability in heterogeneous multi-hop networks and then
develops a security thread model covering a variety of security attacks, including Internet
connectivity attacks, MS mobility attacks, multi-hop routing attacks, packet forwarding
attacks, and specific protocol attacks. Then, the dissertation is divided into two parts:
•

On secure communication for integrated Internet and MANET,

•

On secure mobility management in heterogeneous multi-hop wireless networks.
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Each part has two chapters. In part A, Chapter three provides a design and
implementation of an integrated Internet and MANET protocol for providing bidirectional Internet connectivity for ad hoc hosts. Our extensive experimental results
show the protocol achieves higher packet delivery rate and less latency in multi-hop
communication in comparison with other leading protocols. Chapter four proposes an
effective authentication and multi-hop routing protocol between ad hoc MSs and their
accessing IP networks in a heterogeneous multi-hop wireless network. Our authentication
protocol is different from other mobile IP authentication protocols in two important ways
(i) the protocol supports the authentication request from a single hop or multi-hop MS, (ii)
the protocol uniquely identifies each MS to enhance the trust relationship between MSs
and provides identity and integrity protection for multi-hop communication. Based on the
authentication protocol, a secure routing protocol is further developed to provide
protection for the process of route discovery for multi-hop communication. The security
analysis, comparisons and performance studies show the effectiveness of secure multihop communication in integrated Internet and MANET.
Part B has two chapters illustrating the Secure Mobility Management in
heterogeneous multi-hop wireless network. In Chapter five, a proposed mobility protocol,
called Multi-hop Cellular IP (MCIP), integrates mobile IP and cellular IP in support of
heterogeneous multi-hop communication for ad hoc MSs. This protocol supports the
migration for both single and multi-hop MSs in heterogeneous multi-hop networks. In the
architecture of a MCIP network, a heterogonous multi-hop network is divided into
multiple domains. For each MS in a local domain, a HAlFA acts as the administrator with
a multi-hop paging/routing cache to maintain necessary information for location
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management, connection management as well as multi-hop routing reconfiguration. Then,
in Chapter six, a secure macro/micro-mobility protocol (SM 3p) is introduced for mobility
security of the MCIP. In the proposed SM 3p, mobile IP security has been extended for
supporting macro-mobility across local domains through the process of multi-hop
registration and

authentication.

In a MCIP local

domain,

a certificate-based

authentication achieves the effective routing and micro-mobility protection from a range
of potential security threats. Our evaluation and simulation demonstrates the
effectiveness of the SM 3P.

13

CHAPTER II

SECURITY SURVEY IN INTEGRATED INTERNET AND
HETEROGENEOUS MULTI-HOP WIRELESS NETWORKS
It is widely recognized that many new wireless technologies have been introduced to
cater ever growing demands for diversified services [1]. WLANs (e.g., IEEE
802.11a/b/e/g and HiperLANI2), MANs (e.g., IEEE 802.16), and WANs (e.g., IG, 2G,
2.5G, 3G, GSM, the proposed IEEE 802.20, etc.) employ different operating radio spaces
for satisfying various communication scenarios. A multitude of architectures and
protocols [3-10] [43-52] can extend traditional cellular and WLAN to multi-hop
communication using the revolutionary paradigm of MANET (mobile ad hoc network).
In these approaches, a MS outside the coverage of a BS may access the Internet through
ad hoc relaying with the help of other MSs. Moreover, mesh network technology [53],
"opportunistic MANETing", intends to integrate wireless PAN (i.e., IEEE 802.15),
WLAN, MAN, and WAN with MANET as a commodity multi-hop MANET. Integration
of wireless Cellular (MANIWAN), WLAN, and MANET (lCWM) implies providing
ubiquitous Internet connectivity for MSs. A remarkable characteristic of the
aforementioned ICWM networks is that the MANET communication is not isolated
anymore, but is an integral part of the infrastructure-based networks for Internet access.
Research in ICWM networks is increasingly gaining popularity due to availability
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of multi-mode MSs. The Third Generation Partnership Project (3GPP) has recently taken
an initiative to develop a cellular-WLAN interworking architecture to enable 3GPP
system operators provide public WLAN as an integral component of the services offered
to cellular subscriber [54]. Thus, ICWM networks provide flexible and effective
communication where a MS can communicate with the Internet either by a single hop or
by a multi-hop path. These networks also support peer-to-peer connection when the
source and destination are in close vicinity [1] [53]. These proposed ICWM architectures
expectedly offer one or more of the following benefits in terms of ubiquitous Internet
connectivity:
•

An ICWM network provides heterogeneous wireless network access (e.g., cellular,
IEEE 802.11, IEEE 802.16) to multi-mode MSs;

•

An ICWM network supports the Internet connectivity to the MSs, which are
located outside the radio coverage of the BSs, and thus extends the network
coverage to multi-hop MSs;

•

In a ICWM network, a single cellular transmission between a MS and a BS can be
broken into multi-hop HDR (Higher Data rate) communication links for the
purposes of supporting higher communication speed and reduced co-channel
interference;

•

An ICWM network improves the communication throughput and reduces packet
transmission latency, based on availability of different types of radio network in
the roaming area (cellular, WLAN or MANET);

•

An ICWM network can enhance the capacity of a BS by using multi-hop relaying
and diverting the traffic from a congested BS to a neighboring BS and the
network provides load balancing among BS, thereby increasing the effective
network system capacity; and

•

An ICWM network allows MANET communication between two MSs without
going through the BSs, and these results in saving radio bandwidth of the BSs
thereby increasing the overall capacity of BSs.

15

Because of ICWM's deployment flexibility, it is very attractive from a commercial
perspective [2] [3-10] [43-52]. However, before practical applications of ICWM
networks become widely available, such networks need to have adequate built-in security.
Various security threats are possible in ICWM networks due to the vulnerability of
heterogeneous communication and relaying by the MANET. Existing ICWM
architectures are based on the assumption that all MSs trust each other where each MS
honestly participates in the process of route discovery, and faithfully forwards all data
packets to their respective destinations. In multi-hop communication, however, a
malicious MS may attack a network just by injecting or modifying the messages. The
malicious MS may also masquerade itself as someone else. A forged wireless
infrastructure (such as BS) may imperil the trustworthiness between a MS and the
Internet. A multi-hop route may be modified intentionally during the process of route
discovery. These attacks certainly degrade the efficiency of packet relay, increase packet
delivery latency, lower packet delivery rate, mislead packets, or even tum the Internet
connectivity down. As opposed to research on routing protocols and internetworking
architectures, research on ICWN network security is still in its inception stages and has
gained attention recently [54][55]. It is an important issue to investigate the security
properties of ICWM networks so that comprehensive security control protocols can be
developed.
The goal of this chapter is to provide a better understanding of the security threats and
challenges in this emerging field. Our main contributions in this chapter can be divided
into four groups.
•

We discuss the unique characteristics of ICWM networks to better understand
security attacks and solutions.
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•

We provide significance of and the nature of security attacks against ICWM
networks. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first comprehensive
investigation that identifies security weaknesses associated with the ICWM
architectures.

•

We introduce several possible attacks against ICWM networks and provide novel
solutions.

•

We provide an insight into the research challenges and latest developments on
ICWM security protocols and present various open research issues that need to be
explored in a much greater depth.

The reminder of this chapter is structured as follows. Section 2.1 investigates the
ICWM architecture and its communication protocols. We particularly emphasize these
network characteristics that impact the secured communication. Then, in Section 2.2 the
security model provides a comprehensive study of ICWM security threats. Section 2.3
describes open challenges for designing and implementing security protocols. Finally,
the concluding remarks are included in Section 2.4.

2.1 The Architecture of Integrated Cellular, WLAN and MANET
Before studying the possible attacks and evaluating any ICWM security solution, it is
necessary to have a clear understanding of the network architecture as well as possible
breaches in the network security.

2.1.1

An Overview of ICWM Network Architecture

The architecture in Figure 1 depicts a simplified ICWM network that integrates
infrastructure and wireless multi-hop networks covered in [3-10] [43-52]. As can been
seen from Figure 1, an ICWM network is divided into domains/subnets (e.g., domain 1
and 2) and the basic components of this network are MSs, BSs/APs, Home Agent
(HA)/Foreign Agent (FA), and the core IP network. A BS is an access point and serves as
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Wireless Link
Wired Connection
AP: Access Point
BS: Base Station
HA: Home Agent
FA: Foreign Agent
CN: Correspondent Node
IGW: Internet Gateway

(1)

Multi-hop Cellular

Multi-hop WLAN

}

J;1 Dual-mode MS (i.e., cellular, IEEE 802.11)

•

Integrated Internet and
MANETNetwork

Single mode MS (cellular)

Figure I. A Simplified ICWM network Architecture.
the communication bridge between wired and wireless networks for MSs. A BS provides
one or more wireless radio access interfaces (i.e., cellular, IEEE 802.11, and IEEE
802.16) to MSs. The communication path for a MS spans through wireless link (link d as
shown in Figure 1) and wired/Internet (a->b->c and c->d as shown in Figure 1). The BSs
can be connected in many different ways [36] [53]. A BS can be connected to the Internet
by cables or connected to other BSs through wired [36] or wireless connection [53]. A BS
and an AP can be co-located in the hot-spot area where the traffic is high, as shown in
Figure 1. A multi-mode MS possesses multiple radio interfaces, i.e., cellular interface or
WLAN interface. The MS can connect to a BS with a single hop or multi-hop path, using
an appropriate radio interface. In the multi-hop communication, a MS operates in
MANET communication mode and can move in an arbitrary direction and speed. At a
given instance, a particular MS can be either located within or outside the coverage of

18

BSs. If a MS moves outside the coverage of direct transmission from BSs, multi-hop
relaying is needed for MSs to obtain services from BS to communicate with the Internet.
When the MS is visiting a foreign network, it registers with the FA for the purpose of
creating a mobile binding at its HA so that upon receiving packets from a CN
(correspondent node), the HA can deliver them to the FA, which further forwards the
packets to the destination by single hop or multi-hop path. In an ICWM network, multihop route discovery protocol is needed for supporting multi-hop communication.
According to routing protocols, ICWM architectures can be divided into three categories:
multi-hop cellular networks, multi-hop WLANs, and integrated Internet and MANET as
illustrated in Figure 1:
•

Multi-hop WLAN networks,

•

Multi-hop cellular networks, and

•

Integrated Internet and MANET networks.

The Multi-hop WLAN networks allow the MSs to obtain services from the Internet
through WLAN. A WLAN AP provides a higher communication speed to MSs at the
expense of smaller radio coverage as compared to a cellular BS. For example, MS5 in
Figure 1 accesses WLAN and obtains services from the Internet with the help of MS4
using the IEEE 802.11g link. The routing protocols for multi-hop WLAN networks
include Two-Hop-Relay [50], HWN [51], I-hop and 2-hops Direct Transmission [52].
The mUlti-hop cellular networks provide the Internet connectivity to MSs through
WAN/MAN BSs such as GSM, IEEE.802.20, and IEEE 802.16. For example, as shown
in Figure 1, MS3 connects to the Internet with the path MS3- MS2-MSI-BSl. A cellular
BS may be connected to the Internet directly or via cellular infrastructure gateway such
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as a TCP/IF gateway. The routing protocols for multi-hop cellular networks include AGSM [43], MCN [44], iCAR [45], MADF [46], UCAN [47], ODMA [48], and
SOPRANO [49].
In an integrated Internet and MANET networks, each ad hoc MS runs a MANET
routing protocol [32] such as DSDV, AODV, or DSR. The MANET routing protocol is
used to construct communication path between two MSs. Meanwhile, a separate protocol

[3-10] coordinates mobile IF and the MANET routing protocol to obtain the Internet
connectivity.

2.1.2

ICWM Network Traits

Similar to other wireless systems (single hop cellular, WLAN, and MANET), an
ICWM network has the basic characteristics such as open wireless medium, mobility and
constrained terminal power capability. However, as shown in Figure 1, an ICWM
network differs from other distributed mobile systems in some important ways:
infrastructure-support, multi-hop, and multi-mode terminals with multiple radio
interfaces. Many security preconceptions must be discarded because of these differences.
Table 1 illustrates the crucial distinctions between ICWM networks with other networks.

2.2.1

Infrastructure-support vs. Ad Hoc

A MANET is a self-configurable network with the capability of communication
among ad hoc MSs without any infrastructure or any centralized administration. The
traffic in MANETs is typically between any pair of MSs. ICWM networks share
similarities with MANETs: multi-hop networking and multi-hop communication. The
dominant distinction between ICWM networks and MANETs is infrastructure-support in
ICWM networks. In contract, the Internet and wireless infrastructure provides the
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centralized administration for MSs in ICWM networks. In an ICWM network, most of
the traffic goes through BSs. It is difficult to establish any distributed trust relationships
among MSs as a central authority is absent and MSs' have ability to forge identity. A
malicious MS can use a forged ad hoc identity and then makes feigned trust relations
with other MS to attack the network internally. However, in an ICWM, a MS can access
the Internet by way of single or multi-hop connectivity through a BS or an Internet
Gateway. The wireless and Internet infrastructure (i.e., Authentication, Authorization,
and Accounting - AAA server [74]) can serve as an authentication authority and a
security administrative center for ICWM security. The infrastructure-supported security
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deployment has a fundamental impact on ICWM security implementation in comparison
with pure ad hoc security.

2.2.2 Single Hop vs. Multi-hop
A MS in an ICWM network communicates with a BS or another MS by using single
hop or multi-hop path with the help of other MSs. On the contrary, a MS in traditional
cellular or WLAN connects to Internet through BS using single wireless hop. Multi-hop
imposes many new challenges such as open network architecture, shared wireless
medium, limited resource constraints, and dynamic network topology that have a
significant impact on security. All possible attacks found in MANETs can be easily
mounted on ICWM networks due to the common characteristic of multi-hop route. In
cellular or WLAN, security solutions only provide protection for one hop connectivity
between a MS and BS by securing MAC/link-layer protocols. However, in an ICWN
network, the security solutions should extend beyond the single hop to multi-hop routing
security at the network layer. Therefore, traditional cellular and WLAN security
protocols are not applicable to multi-hop communication between a MS and a BS.
Although the security protocols for MANETs provide routing security, unfortunately,
they can not be adopted for ICWM networks directly because these protocols are based
the assumption of the absence of infrastructure-supported authentication.

2.2.3 Single Radio Interface vs. Multi-mode
Another distinguishing characteristic of ICWM networks is multiple radio interfaces
in MSs. A dual-mode MS equipped with two radio interfaces may switch from one radio
interface to another (e.g., redirecting a flow from a cellular radio interface to WLAN
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radio interface when a dual-mode MS moves to the WLAN area) as network accessibility
or topology changes. Cellular, WLAN and MANET security protocols are based on a
single radio interface and do not have any provision for protection when communication
migrates from one radio interface to another. It is necessary to develop integrated
schemes for security interworking between multi-mode radios. For example, a 3GPP
subscriber MS, which is equipped with cellular-WLAN radio interfaces, may handoff its
service from a 3GPP network to a public WLAN network. Here, in order to provide
security features to the MS while accessing the public WLAN network, it is necessary for
the public WLAN network to reuse the 3GPP subscription and 3GPP-based
authentication/authorization as well as 3GPP-based security key agreement using
SIMfUSIM card [1] [55]. In the case of multi-hop route, the infrastructure security
protocols (e.g., 3GPP cellular security, mobile IP security for WLAN) must coordinate
with multi-hop routing protocols for multi-hop MSs. At the same time, it is important for
the security protocols to minimize the authentication latency induced by the multiple
radio interfaces (e.g., networking selection) and multi-hop route.

2.2 Security Threat Model
Several types of attacks are possible on the Internet including Domain Name Service
(DNS) "hacking", routing table "poisoning", packet "mistreatment" and denial-of-service
(DoS) attacks. Numerous approaches have been developed for defending against these
types of attacks. An excellent survey of various types of attacks can be found in [56]. In
an ICWM network, the security issue is more complex than that of individual cellular,
LAN or MANET. Because of multi-hop transmissions, BSs have the task to locate a
destination MS, and then forward packets to the destination MS. For this purpose, it is
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necessary for each BS to record the routes for the destination MSs. In this case, a
malicious MS may poison the multi-hop route, resulting in a packet loss. Most of the
attacks against ICWM networks fall into one of the following categories:
•

Eavesdropping and traffic analysis, unauthorized Internet access, Internet-wireless
DDoS, Wireless-Internet DDoS,

•

Registration attacks (registration poisoning, bogus registration, registration replay
attack), forged BS, BS cache poisoning,

•

Avoiding tracking by having unknown mobility, avoiding tracking by changing
identity,

•

Multi-hop routing attacks (modification, impersonation, routing loop, duplication,
selfishness and other denial of services),

•

Packet forwarding attacks (modification, selfishness, and power drain), and

•

Mobility handoff attacks, specific wireless protocol attacks (WLAN, UMTS, and
IEEE 802.16).

This section provides a general discussion on these types of attacks and emphasizes
the specific attacks that differ from other wireless networks or remain undocumented in
the literature.

2.2.1 Eavesdropping and Traffic Analysis

Figure 2. Eavesdropping and Traffic Analysis.
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The broadcast nature of the wireless transmission medium renders radio links
msecure m ICWN networks. An attacker can easily eavesdrop on all ongomg
communication. In addition, an attacker in an ICWN network may reside on the multihop path and present itself as an intermediate relaying MS. The data packets can be
copied and distributed by the attacker when it forwards packets to next hop (e.g., MS2 is
the intermediary relaying MS for MS4, MS5 and MSl).

The attacker can read the

transmitted data, and also gather information by examining the monitored packets such as
address, size, number and time of transmission. The attacker can seize the information of
BS such as location and IP address. Also the attacker can know the critical MSs, which
provide the Internet connectivity for other MSs (e.g., MS2). The information obtained is
useful for many attacks. As an example, consider Figure 2. When the MS3 (an attacker or
attacker conspirer) knows that MS2 is the critical MS for providing the Internet
connectivity for MSl, MS4 and MS5, the attacker can launch the attack towards MS2 for
the purpose of turning down the Internet connection of MS 1, MS4 and MS5.

2.2.2 Unauthorized Internet Access and Attacks
A malicious MS may access the ICWM network and enjoy free network usage by
way of single hop or multi-hop communication. Wireless Internet service providers (lSPs)
may be accessed by an unauthorized MS because of the lack of correct ISP configuration.
As for the network devices without having adequate security measures, the security
threats may come from within the network itself. A registered MS of the network may
access, read, copy and distribute data file that is no business of the MS.
When the Internet is accessed by way of a multi-hop, the malicious MS consumes
precious resources like power and bandwidth. Although the free network usage may not
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be a significant threat to the Internet, an authorized access is the first step for the MS to
control the Internet infrastructure and to attack these components. After entering the
Internet, the attacker may use some techniques like Medium Access Control address
spoofing to gain access to the network infrastructure. For instance, in Figure 3 MS I
implements the man-in-the-middle attack between MS3 and its default network router
(Router shown in Figure 3) from which MS I sees all the traffic between MS and Router.
First MSI connects to the Internet and sends a malicious ARP (address resolution
protocol) reply to Router, associating MSI's MAC address with MS3's IP address. With
such access, the Router assumes MSI to be MS3. Next, MSI sends a malicious ARP
reply to MS3 associating MSl's MAC address with the Router's address. In this case, the
MS3 believes MSI is its router (Router). Finally, MSI can access the session between
MS3 and Router. Thus, all data packets from MS3 will be delivered to MS I first and then
MSI forwards the received data packet to Router. Finally, the router sends the packets to
destination (e.g., MS4 as shown in Figure 3). In the opposite direction, all the packets
from MS4 will be forwarded to MSI by Router and MSI sends the packets to MS3. In
this manner, MS 1 intercepts the traffic between MS3 and MS4.

Figure 3. Unauthorized Network Access and Man-in-the-middle Attack.
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2.2.3 Internet-Wireless DDoS

We introduce a common attack that could be disastrous against ICWM networks as
Internet-Wireless DDoS (distributed denial-of-service) and shown in Figure 2. An ICWM
network may be crippled by the attacks from the Internet. Such attacks are referred to as
from the internet as the Internet-Wireless-DDoS. Compromising a BS or wireless router
can disable or congest the wireless communication in a domain. As a typical example, an
attacker first initiates the control over one or several computers on the Internet by using
some kind of automatic intrusion software to hack them [56]. After getting control of the
computers, the attacker synchronizes them to send traffic in bulk towards one or more
multi-hop MSs that are associated with the same BS. The traffic first travels through the
Internet toward the BS. The BS is not aware of the illegality of the packets. Then, the BS
forwards the traffic towards the destination MSs (e.g., MS4 in Figure 2) according to the
address given in each packet header. In the end, the packets travel through the multi-hop
wireless network. This process can achieve the following goals.
•

Exhausting the wireless resources of the BS: Limited availability of BS radio
spectrum is always a bottleneck in the Internet-wireless communication. When
the compromised MSs transmit a huge number of packets to a BS, the BS may
exhaust its radio resource by forwarding the packets on its air interface. Therefore,
the attack can immediately block a large number of MSs that are communicating
through the BS.

•

Depleting the wireless resource of MSs (power, radiolbandwidth): A MS has
limited communication capability as compared to fixed devices in terms of
available power and bandwidth. The packets transmitted by compromised
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computers travel through multi-hop wireless network definitely cause the power
and

bandwidth consumption at each intermediate MS.

The multi-hop

transmissions can simply disable or slow down other communications along the
multi-hop path. It can be observed from Figure 2 that the traffic from the
compromised MSs consumes the bandwidth of the intermediary relaying MS2.
The attack at least slows down the communication between MSS and eN because
MSS uses the same intermediary relaying MS2 as the attack. Moreover, if the
power of MS2 is exhausted, then the Internet connections for MS 5 and MS 4 will
also be turned down because MS2 is the only MS to reach BS from MS 5 and MS
4.

2.2.4 Wireless-Internet DDoS

This section introduces a new attack called wireless-Internet DDoS which could be
initiated at the wireless side to the Internet and the multi-hop wireless network. It can
attack the BS radio spectrum when a number of wireless devices around a BS send
packets simultaneously in bulk to the BS by single or multi-hop routes. In this case, at a
given instant the BS may be disabled after using up all spectrum resources. At least the
bandwidth for normal traffic may be significantly reduced when a number of junk
packets take up the majority of communication channels.

Figure 4. Wireless-Internet DDoS.

28

The attacker accessing the Internet through a BS by single hop or multi-hop can
impair the Internet infrastructure and its communication. As shown in Figure 4, the
attacker, which operates in an ad hoc mode and runs the ad hoc routing protocol,
connects to BS via the MANET. In this case, attacker attacks wired network using its ad
hoc identifier. The attacker can attack the cellularlWLANlinternet infrastructure
including router, DSN server, TCP/IP gateway etc. In a similar manner, an attacker can
also access the wired network with an invented or spoofed IP address through multi-hop
cellular or WLAN network. Moreover, the attacker can collude with other attackers or
compromised internet components for implementing more sophisticated attack on the
Internet or wireless network. For example, to execute DDoS, the attacker from the
wireless network can compromise several computers on the Internet as attacking "agents".
Then the attacker directs the "agents" to send a huge number of packets (i.e., UDP, TCP,
or ICMP packets) to disable a target (e.g., a server). The compromised "agents" may also
launch the "Internet-Wireless DDoS" to attack an ICWM network as illustrated in
Section 2.2.3. Since the attacker has accessed the Internet by multi-hop path and a
temporary ID (e.g., an ad hoc ID), it is very difficult for victim to trace back the source of
the attack (see Section 2.2.8 and 2.2.9).

2.2.5 Registration Attacks
Mobile IP provides continuous Internet accessibility for MS when it visits a foreign
network. When switching between networks, the MS has to create a mobility binding at
home network through a registration procedure with visiting network. The registration
procedure occurs immediately after the MS is switched on or moves to a visiting network.
Although the specific registration procedures for different wireless networks (cellular
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roaming, IPv6) are different, the general registration procedure in ICWM networks is as
follows:
1. In case when a MS is single hop away from the BS, the MS obtains the
connection to the BS directly. On the other hand, if the MS is outside of all BSs'
transmission range, then the MS establishes the connection to the BS with a multihop route.
2. After obtaining the connection to the Internet, a MS sends a registration request to
the foreign network. The registration request contains the MS's identity, the home
network address etc.
3. Upon receipt of the registration request, the foreign network forwards the request
to the MS' s home network for the purpose of creating a mobility binding for the
MS.
4. After the mobility update for the MS, the home network replies the foreign
network with a registration reply message carrying the registration result.
5. In the end, the foreign network forwards the registration reply to the MS with a
reversed route.
The registration procedure provides the desirable property of mobility, but results in
several serious security threats. Three typical types of registration attacks are possible
including registration poisoning, bogus registration, and replay attack.

•

Registration Poisoning: Malicious MS in the ICWM network can poison the
registration procedure. In the ICWN registration procedure, a MS registers with
the foreign network through a multi-hop route with the help of some intermediate
MSs. A malicious MS can entice a multi-hop MS to choose the malicious MS as
an intermediate MS by claiming to have a short or fast route to a BS. When a
malicious MS is selected as the intermediate MS for a registering MS, the
malicious MS can modify or drop the MS's registration request/reply. When the
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malicious MS modifies or rejects the registration request, the MS cannot correctly
register with the foreign network. If the malicious MS modifies the registration
result in a registration reply, the MS cannot access the Internet as if its registration
request is rejected. For instance, in Figure 2, when MS4 moves to the ICWM
network, it initiates a registration by sending out a registration request. When
MS2 receives the registration request from MS4, MS2 modifies the address of
MS4's home network in the registration request before forwarding the request to
BS. Based on the modified request, the foreign network will forward the request
to a wrong home network so that the foreign network cannot obtain a successful
registration reply. Registration poisoning prevents multi-hop MSs from obtaining
services from the wired network.
•

Bogus Registration: This occurs when a malicious MS does a fake registration
by spoofing an IP address and masquerading itself as someone else. The bogus
registration causes a wrong mobility binding at the home network so that all
packets are tunneled to the illegitimate MS, in place of the correct MS. By bogus
registration, the attacker obtains the right to access the Internet so that it can
implement further attack on the Internet such as Wireless-Internet DDoS. For
instance, in Figure 2, MS3 does a forged registration by masquerading itself as
MS5. Thus, all packets coming from Internet for MS5 are forwarded to MS3. In
this case, MS5 cannot receive any packet from the Internet.

•

Registration Replay Attack: In a replay attack, an attacker captures a legitimate
registration request and replays the message to a BS. Even through the
registration request message may be signed or encrypted and the attacker may not
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know what the actual security keys are, the retransmission of the valid request is
sufficient to gain access to the network if mechanisms to make the request unique
(e.g., nonce or timestamp) are not used. In this case, the attacker gets a valid
session with the right of the victim. In Figure 2, MS3 may forward a copy of the
registration request originated from MS5. Without protection, the MS3 could
perform a valid registration in the name of MS5 and obtain the right to access the
Internet. Such attacks are more prominent in cases where tunneling is not used
while carrying out the authentication.

2.2.6 Forged BS

In an ICWM network, an attacker can attack the multi-hop wireless network by
advertising itself as a genuine BS using some forged messages or duplicate beacons
recorded from a correct BS procured by eavesdropping. When a MS hears the fraudulent
beacons from the malicious MS, it assumes that it is within the radio coverage of a
genuine BS and then initiates a registration procedure. A registration request is issued
from the MS to the forged BS. The forged BS replies with a bogus registration reply
carrying the acceptance of the registration request. After receiving the registration result,
the MS assumes that it has obtained the Internet connection through the forged BS and
disconnects its communication from the genuine BS. One by one, the forged BS could
entice a number of MSs to disconnect from the genuine BSs and establish connections
with the forged MS either by single hop or multi-hop route. However, the MSs cannot
obtain any Internet service correctly from the forged BS. This attack is valid in cases
where the BS is not authenticated by the MS. For instance, in Figure 2, malicious MS3
advertises a high-speed connectivity to the Internet by sending bogus beacons to its
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neighbor. After hearing the beacons from the forged BS (MS3) but without realizing the
fraud, MS2 and MS5 register with MS3 by a single hop. After registrations, MS2 and
MS5 believe that they are connected with a BS with a higher speed, and thus disconnect
the connection with genuine BS (BS 1).

An attacker using forged BS achieves the

following:
•

The forged BS captures registration information of MSs such as their home IP
addresses, home network IP addresses.

It can also break a proper Internet

connection and can cause unwarranted registration delay.
•

The forged BS can act as the gateway to the Internet and can seize the data packet
or capture sensitive personal (e.g., password) or network data of MSs.

2.2.7 BS Cache Poisoning

In a single hop wireless network, it is difficult for a malicious MS to modify the radio
mappings from which MSs enter a BS because each MS and the BS interact with each
other directly. On the contrary, the BS in ICWM suffers from possible BS cache
pOIsonmg as multi-hop communication is now allowed. To support multi-hop
communication, the routing cache is needed at each BS for the purpose of recording the
multi-hop routes between the BS and each multi-hop MS. The multi-hop routing cache of
a MS may be poisoned in several ways. For instance, when a multi-hop MS sends a
multi-hop route update packet for creating or updating its multi-hop paging cache at a BS,
the malicious MS may modify the packet that could result in multi-hop routing cache
poisoning. Also, a malicious MS may send a wrong route-update packet on behalf of a
genuine one. And the BS updates the routing information for the genuine MS with the
wrong information sent by the malicious MS. To locate a multi-hop MS, the BS finds the
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first hop MSs in routing cache that can reach the destination MS. The data packet from
the BS is forwarded, hop-by-hop, to the destination in accordance with the multi-hop
route. When a multi-hop route is poisoned, the BS is unable to locate the destination MS
by following the multi-hop route provided in the BS cache. For instance in Figure 2, MS3
sends a multi-hop route-update packet to the BS on behalf of MS5, and the BS updates
the multi-hop routing cache from MS5-MS2-BS to MS5-BS. In this case, the packets of
MS5 from the Internet will be lost due to the incorrect routing information. Note that
cache poisoning has to be accompanied by address spoofing.

2.2.8 Avoiding Tracking by Mobility

The ability to avoid tracking is important to an adversary when it uses spoofed
addresses during attacks. Many technologies, including link testing, logging, ICMP trace
back, and IP trace back [57]; have been developed to enable the victim to trace back the
source of the attacker. For example, link testing iteratively checks the upstream link until
the source is reached [57]. It is a challenge for a victim to track the malicious MS in the
ICWM network because: (i) the multi-hop route from a MS to a BS may change when the
mobility forces network topology to alter in an ICWM network (ii) the visiting BS
(network attachment) may change due to the mobility of MS. The tracking back
technologies based on the fixed network may be invalid in the ICWM networks because
of the change in multi-hop path. Meanwhile, the attacker can take advantage of the flaw
of mobility protocol to implement some sophisticated technology so as to hide its IP
address from being tracked. As for mobile IP mobility protocol, a MS has two IP address:
the home address and the care-of-address. The care-of-address is temporarily assigned by
foreign network and used as the current address for communication. The Non Disclosure
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Method (NDM) [57] prevents against traceability of network connections

III

mobile

environment by hiding the source and destination addresses of an IP packet from every
forwarding device except the packet destination.

2.2.9 Avoiding Tracing by Changing Identity
Avoiding identification tracking is another important issue for attackers but remains
unexplored in ICWM networks. MANETs may use different addressing solutions [32];
AODV, DSR, and TOR A use Node ID; HSR has a hierarchical addressing solution;
ZLHS use <zone id + node id> as MS's ad hoc address. When a MS enters a MANET,
the MS will be automatically configured with an identity by the ad hoc protocol, using
one of the above address solutions. For example, a DSR network will assign a MS with a
Node ID (e.g., 001) when the MS enters the DSR network. If the MS leaves the DSR
network and enters the DSR network again, the MS will be assigned a new available
Node ID (e.g., 002). In the integrated Internet and the MANET, a malicious MS can
participate in a MANET and establish its Internet connectivity by using its ad hoc
identification. In this case, the malicious MS can easily implement its attacks to the
Internet or wireless network over and over again by masquerading itself. When the
malicious MS enters the Integrated Internet and MANET, the network configures the MS
with an ID. If the malicious MS leaves the network, and enters the network again, the
network will automatically configure the malicious MS with a new ID without knowing
its last ID. The network cannot track and monitor the history of the malicious MS
because each MS does not have a unique and consistent ID while leaving and entering the

network. When malicious MS exhibits illegal actions on the Integrated Internet and
MANET, the malicious MS can clear its bad record by reentering the network and
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reinitiating a trust relation with network by using a new 10. As shown in Figure 5, the
attacker exhibits its Wireless-Internet attack by using ID A. If the network finds the
attack from ID A, the malicious MS reenters the network with a new ID (ID B), and
could attack again. The ability of the malicious MS to modify packets to spoof MAC
addresses prevents a detection mechanism to quickly identity the malicious MS.

~!!.tt:,cJ'<"rwith ID B

Figure 5. Wireless-Internet DDoS.

2.2.10 Multi-hop Routing Attacks

Almost all ad hoc routing attacks in a MANET can be carried to ICWM networks
because of the common characteristic: multi-hop communication. Multi-hop route
discovery is responsible for detecting the multi-hop routes between MSs and BSs. An
. attacker may exhibit its intentions by refusing to participate fully and correctly in a multihop route discovery process, without following the principles of integrity, authentication,
non-duplication, confidentiality, and cooperation. Therefore, multi-hop routing attacks
can be grouped into five categories: anti-integrity, impersonation, duplication, anticonfidentiality, and anti-cooperation [58] [32].
•

Anti-integrity is the action of breaking away the integrity of a message.
Modification is a typical example of anti-integrity. The malicious MSs modify,
inject or delete some fields of a routing packet, and then forward the packet with
falsified values in the packet field s. These fields may include the source or
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destination address, hop count, sequence number, etc. A typical example is the
routing loop attack wherein, a malicious MS creates incorrect routing information
at the routing table of each node. This is done by modifying the correct route
packets destined to the victim MS in such a manner that a loop is created. Routing
loop results in the consumption of power and bandwidth at the traveled MSs.
•

Impersonations are those actions in which a malicious station spoofs an existing
or forged IP address, or uses broadcast address to generate or duplicate one or
more messages, and then forwards them to other MSs. In Figure 2, MS3 may
masquerade itself by spoofing an invented address or an IP address of another MS.
With the spoofed address, MS3 could entice MS5 to use MS3 as the shortest route
for reaching BS 1. Once MS5 starts sending packets to the BS, MS3 can easily
compromise MS5's communication.

•

In a duplication attack, a malicious MS sends a legitimate message more than
once. These duplicated messages cause multiple receptions and processing
overheads on adjacent MSs.

•

In the anti-confidentiality attacks, an attacker may reveal sensitive information,
such as the private key. Stealing, eavesdropping, guessing, brute-force and
cryptanalysis are common ways for an attacker to identify sensitive information.

•

Anti-cooperation includes dropping of packets or colluding with other attackers to
disrupt a routing process. Selfishness is an example of anti-cooperation that a MS
does not participate in the routing protocol or perform packet forwarding for the
purpose of conserving its own energy.
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2.2.11 Packet Forwarding Attacks

The protection for routing security cannot guarantee that each MS forwards the data
packet in accordance with the routing table. It is possible that a MS honestly participates
in the route discovery but mishandles data packets during packet forwarding. For instance,
a MS participating in a route discovery may become a selfish MS during the multi-hop
packet transmissions. In the packet forwarding stage, several types of security threats are
possible.
•

Modification: A MS may intentionally modify, drop, or inject data packets.

•

Selfishness: A MS may drop all or a fraction of packets for the purpose of saving
its power.

•

Power drain: A malicious MS sends unnecessary packets or broadcast packets to
drain the battery of the other MSs.

2.2.12 Mobility Handoff Attack

As stated earlier, when a MS visits a new network, it initiate the process of mobility
handoff, indicating its willingness to redirect its data flow to the new network. When the
mobility handoff is between two different BSs, but in the same type of network, the
migration is horizontal handoff. A vertical handoff is the migration between two
heterogeneous components, i.e., from a BS to IEEE 802.11 WLAN. Also, a vertical
handoff involves the migration between two different radio interfaces at a multi-mode
MS. A typical procedure for a vertical handoff includes three stages:
1. Detecting a single or multi-hop route to a new BS in a new radio interfaces,
2. Interworking either from a cellular to WLAN and vice versa, and
3. Flow redirection.
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When a MS detects a new BS with better performance for the route (e.g., less delay,
higher speed) than the current BS, the MS initiates a migration procedure to move from
the current BS to the new BS. However, as seen from Section 2.2.10, the multi-hop
routing could be easily misled. When a cellular subscriber MS migrates from a cellular
service to a WLAN network, the WLAN network has the responsibility for securing
interworking for the MS so that the data flow over a cellular network can be safely
redirected to the WLAN network. In the mobility handoff attack, a malicious MS may
entice a MS to initiate a false multi-hop handoff by
•

Claiming a higher speed or better multi-hop route metric to a new BS from the
malicious MS,

•

Impeding interworking by dropping or modifying the registration packets, and

•

Advertising forged beacons or replaying the stale beacons of a legal BS to cause
the forged BS attack as illustrated in Section 2.2.6.

2.2.13 Specific Wireless Protocol Attacks
IEEE 802.16 is a standard for constructing wireless metropolitan area networks
(MANs). The IEEE 802.16 security is implemented as a privacy sub-layer below the
MAC protocol. It provides protection in terms of one-hop connection between a MS and
a BS. However, the IEEE 802.16e security cannot prevent a MS from the BS forgery or
replay attacks due to lack of a BS certificate. Like IEEE 802.16 security, most of the
wireless protocols suffer from various security threats. For instance, the GSM security
protocol may suffer from the attacks on authentication algorithm like cloning,
confidentiality attacks like brute-force attacks, crypt analytical attacks, and attacks using
loopholes in the protocol as illustrated in [59]. It is well known that IEEE 802.11 WEP
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protocol is vulnerable to many attacks. For more information, please refer papers [54] [55]
[59].

Securing Interworking
Protection {
at the
Network
Layer

Securing Packet Forwarding
MUlti-hop Routing Security

Protection {
at Layers I

&2

802.11

Cellular

Figure 6. Security Protocol Stack and Security Challenges for a Dual-mode MS in an
ICWM Network.

2.3 Open Challenges
Research in ICWM network security is still in its early stage and many issues remain
unexplored. The security protocol stack for a dual-mode MS is given in Figure 6. As can
be seen, the dual-mode MS has two Physical, Data Link and MAC layers for the cellular
and IEEE 802.11 radio interfaces respectively. The network layer selects a radio interface
according to the performance requirement [1]. As illustrated in Section 2.1, the
fundamental vulnerability of an ICWM network comes from its distributed environment,
open wireless medium, and heterogeneous multi-hop wireless communication. In such
system, the distributed trust relationship (DTR) is the base for the security framework as
shown in Figure 6. A robust security solution should include a DTR scheme that has a
cross layered structure and executes over the Internet and wireless domains. Securing
Internet (e.g., DSN, internet router) and wireless infrastructure (e.g., BS) prevent attacks
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such as unauthorized access or physical seizure. ICWM security should provide an endto-end communication protection to MSs. However, end-to-end communication
protection cannot be achieved easily because of the intricacies of the networks and
communication protocols. As shown in Figure 6, the ICWM security issues at network
layer include multi-hop routing security, secure packet forwarding, and interworking
security.

2.3.1 Distributed Trust Relationship Establishment
Trustworthiness is the foundation of security. Almost all attacks in ICWM networks
infringe the trust relationship in some form or the other. For the ICWM security, a DTR
model across wired and wireless networks is desired. The DTR model considers the
nature and basis of the trust relationships. It enables an inter-component authentication
(e.g., BS-MS or MS-MS) based on legal binding. An ICWM network should require each
single or multi-hop MS to provide authentication information upon entering the network.
If a MS does not have a security binding with the network, the MS must register with the
BS to get its identification verified before communication. On the other hand, before
entering a network, the MS must verify the authenticity of the network (the accessing BS).
When a MS visits a foreign network, the foreign network and home network must be
mutually verified. In general, the DTR model provides the capability to mutually validate
two components and construct trust relationship between them [55] [59] [64] [65]:
DTR l.A MS (single or multi-hop) +-+ Home network,
DTR 2.A MS (single or multi-hop)

+-+

Visiting network,

DTR 3.Home network +-+ Visiting network, and
DTR 4.A MS (single or multi-hop)

+-+

Another MS (intermediate or destination).
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Figure 7, ICWM Network OTRs.
The OTRs in an ICWM network are illustrated in Figure 7. The horne network with

.

which the MS has legally contractual agreement (OTR 1) is supposed to be the most
trusted domain for ICWM security [1] [SS] [S9]. OTRI and OTR2 preclude a MS without
credentials to participate in the network,

~his

is achieved by verifying the identification

of the MS at its horne network. The attacks including unauthorized Internet access,
wireless-Internet OOoS , and avoiding tracking by changing identity, violate the principle
of correct identification to access the network. OTR 1 and OTR2 also provide each MS
with the capability to authenticate the accessing network (visiting BS) in order to prevent
BS forgery, OTR3 establishes the trust relations between two different domains, and
OTR4 constructs the trust relations between any two MSs.
A plethora of security protocols focus on the above OTR establishments based on

various single hop wireless networks. These security protocols include GSM security,
UMTS security, Mobile IP security, HiperLan/2, IEEE S02.1S, IEEE S02.11, IEEES02.16,
and IEEE S02.20 etc. The essential scheme with regard to OTR establishments is a
procedure from which the single hop MS and the visiting network implement the mutual
authentication. This is achieved with the help of horne network and the negotiation of
encryption keys for communication. In a cellular network. the GSM security
(recommendations GSM 02.09 and GSM 03.20) enables the foreign network to

42

authenticate the identity of a MS through the home network, and establishes the
encryption keys, which are required for providing the confidentiality services. In a
WLAN, the IEEE 802.llx security (e.g., IKEv2 EAP-IKEv2) authenticates a single hop
MS and establishes the keys that are used for encrypting/decrypting messages according
to the IPsec security specification. IEEE 802.16 security implements X.509 certificatebased authentication for MSs and ciphering key-based data association for confidentiality.
However, it is a new and critical issue to support DTR establishment for multi-hop
MSs. This has two essential challenges [59J [64J 165]:
•

A multi-hop MS ..... Home/visiting network: How can a BS trust a multi-hop MS
such as MS I in the foreign network as shown in Figure 7, and vice versa?

•

A multi-hop MS ..... another MS (intermediate or destination): How can a multihop MS trust another MS in an ICWM network (How can MSI trust MS2, and
how can MS2 trust MS 1 as shown in Figure 7)?

The current mechanisms in the literature to establish DTR for a multi-hop MS have
three steps 1641 159 J:
1) The multi-hop MS sends its credentials to the network (BS) so that the BS can
authenticate the MS,
2) The multi-hop MS validates the BS so that the MS can trust the BS for accessing
the network, and
3) After the mutual authentication, the BS creates a security binding for the multihop MS. The security binding provides keys further used for multi-hop routing
security and packet forwarding security.
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The CAMA (cellular-assisted mobile wireless ad hoc network) security mechanism
[64] implements DTR establishment with a mutual authentication scheme through
cellular channel. After authentication, a key assignment scheme establishes the security
binding for multi-hop WLAN communication on the IEEE 802.11 channel. A security
protocol in [591 provides DTR for integrated Internet and MANET. In this approach, the
FAiHA serves as the authentication center to check the credentials for each MANET MS.
Upon receiving a registration request, the FA and HA carry out a series of authentications.
Registration reply indicates the result of the registration. If the registration is successful,
the FA binds the identity of MS with its public key in a certificate. Thereby, the MS can
initiate a MANET route discovery for communicating with the other MSs by using the
certificate.
Open Research Issues:

The process for DTR establishment is a nontrivial process during the multi-hop
registration. DTR protocol for ICWM is largely open for study:

• Although a lot of network architectures for multi-hop cellular and multi-hop
wireless LAN have been proposed 143-521, research on DRT establishments for
multi-hop cellular and multi-hop LAN is very weak. It is a critical issue for a
multi-hop MS to establish DTRs in a multi-hop WLAN or a multi-hop cellular
network.

• The private/public key-based DTR protocols [59] cause heavy computation delay
as compared to secret key-based HMAC. It is necessary to develop secret keybased DTR between a multi-hop MS and the visiting network.
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•

How to facilitate the process of DTR establishment and provide enough
protection in a multi-hop registration.

2.3.2 Infrastructure Protection

In case of the Internet infrastructure, a detailed investigation of the possible attacks
and existing solutions can be found in 156 j. Wireless infrastructure including cellular BS
and WLAN AP serves as the communication bridge connecting the multi-hop wireless
network and the Internet. With regard to the ICWM security, each BS typically runs as
the centralized authority and administrative center to provide security support for single
and multi-hop MSs. A single or multi-hop MS establishes a DTR with the deployed BS
and creates a security association.

Moreover, a BS also provides support for route

management 143-521 to enable the process of multi-hop route discovery for multi-hop
MSs. To accomplish these functions, the BS should be sufficiently powerful to defend
itself against security threats from the Internet or wireless networks. However, BS is
vulnerable to various threats such as eavesdropping and traffic analysis, InternetWireless-DDoS, Wireless-Internet DDoS, forged BS, and BS cache poisoning. As a
result protocols must be implemented to withstand attacks that can lead to failure of the
BS. The BS/AP protection primarily includes access control, and resource and
identification protection.
•

Access Control: A BS may be accessed and reconfigured according to the
attacker's convenience. The multi-hop routing or other information stored in a BS
may be read or modified by an adversary. The sensitive information such as secret
keys may be disclosed. Thereby the BS should have the capability of security
access control scheme to prevent unauthorized access and operations.
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•

Resource Protection: Another mandatory requirement

IS

to improve the

capability of resource (radio spectrum) management and resilience to the junk
packets. Internet-Wireless DDoS, Wireless-Internet DDoS and attacking BS radio
spectrum can be used to drain the radio spectrum resource in a BS by a batch of
junk packets. The network (BS) should have the capability to identify the
authenticity of packets for the purpose of filtering trash packets either from
wireless networks or from the Internet.

•

Identification Protection: It is necessary to provide identification protection for
critical BSs. Identification information includes BS' s IP address, physical location
and physical link connection, etc. By using a directional antenna with a Global
Positioning System (GPS), the adversary not only knows that there are BSs in that
area but also know its physical position. An adversary can easily know the IP
address of a BS by capturing an IP packet from the BS either on the Internet or by
wireless eavesdropping.

The personal communication device, such as a multiple air interface MS, should be
properly protected. The identification (IP address), secret keys, certificates and other
sensitive information should be stored in a proper manner so as to prevent getting
compromised and running as a malicious MS. As for a multiple radio interface MS, the
MS should properly manage the resource related to different air interfaces such as home
IP address and the transition between different air interfaces.

Open Research Issues
A BS or a MS is often required to execute multiple distinct protocol standards so that
security operation for various protocol layers and inter-working among different
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networks (e.g .• cellular and wireless LAN) could be easily supported. The design of an
efficient BS or a MS platform with security enhancements is still open for further
investigation.

• Development of security specific platform for a BS or a MS to accommodate the
implementations of different security protocols.
•

Improving the security of the local wired networks, where the BSs arc located,
and enhancing the BS security features to prevent unauthorized operations on the
BS configuration and system sensitive data.

• Speeding up the MS's processing capability and optimizing cryptographic
algorithms to increase the security operating capability of the MS.

2.3.3 Multi-hop Routing Security
Different routing protocols 13-101 143-52J have been developed to implement the
procedure for MSs to effectively discover and maintain routes in ICWM networks. There
are three types of basic routes in ICWM networks: the route from a BS to a MS, the route
from a MS to a BS, and the route between two MS without BS. The notorious issue in the
multi-hop network could be said to be the multi-hop routing security. Corresponding to
the three types of routes, multi-hop routing security should provide security to all the
above types ofroutes.
As illustrated in Section 2.2.1, a major advantage of the ICWM routing security in
comparison with the MANET security is the accessibility of the Internet through the BS,
thereby having a mechanism for centralized security management. The MANET security
has no explicit line of defense to distinguish a MS as trusted or non-trusted due to the
absence of infrastructure-based authority. On the contrary, in an ICWM network, the
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Internet infrastructure and BS acts as the security authority for multi-hop routing. For
instance, a BS can verify the credentials of a single or multi-hop MS when required. By
way of registration and authentication, the MSs can be divided into: registered MS and
unregistered MSs. It is necessary to execute the required principles to enforce registered
MSs to participate in honest route discovery and maintenance and to exclude the
unregistered MS from the routing paths. In order to achieve authentication,
confidentiality, integrity, cooperation and availability in routing security, some proposed
fundamental principles [64] [59] are as follows.
•

Uniqueness: Identification uniqueness even if a MS enters an ICWM network
many times.

•

Access Control: An ICWM network only provides routing and communication
services to the trusted MSs which have established the DTR with the network.

•

Exclusion: Only the trusted MSs can serve as the intermediary relaying MS in a
multi-hop route and not-trusted MSs are excluded from the route discovery.

• Authentication: Only the authenticated routing messages can be used to update
the BS caching.

• Integrity: An appropriate cryptographic scheme to effectively protect routing
messages by way of encryption/decryption or signature/verification.

• Credentials: The home network has the capability to operate MS' s billing and
credential when a MS has any malicious action.
In the integrated Internet and MANET [59], the FA acts as the distributed CA
(certificate authority) server. Thus it issues a certificate to an ad hoc MS which has a
successful DTR process. The certificate is uniquely bound with the MS's home address.
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The certificate is also used as a pass for accessmg the network as well as the
authentication of its routing messages. Therefore. any MS without a legal certificate is
excluded from any multi-hop route discovery process. On the other hand, the CAMA
security implements these principles for cellular-assisted WLAN networks by a set of
keys such as secret key, public/private key, group key, and session key, etc.
The next challenge is to execute the above defined principles across wireless and
wired network. The enforcement of the defined principles is a complicated procedure,
spanning different layers in the protocol stack and crossing multi-hop wireless network
and wired network. In the transport layer, DTR establishment provides multi-hop MSs
with security authentication and association based on celtification service as specified in
the public key infrastructure (PKI) or other security technologies. One of the immediate
results is that the process creates a binding that envelope the MS' s identification with the
keys used for route discovery at the network layer as well as the keys used for encryption
at the link layer. Only the MS having a legal binding is marked as a trusted MS on the
network layer. Also, the encryption at the link layer is needed for the purpose of
confidentiality. During the execution of the above defined principles, an appropriate
identification binding procedure

IS

required to prevent a non-trusted MS from

participating in routing activities. On the other hand, the process of route discovery
across the multi-hop network should be executed without a high control packet overhead
and computation of each MS. The security in the routing maintenance stage should be
able to accommodate fast network topology changes. In the integrated Internet and
MANET, the execution is divided into five stages [59]: key creation, FA discovery,
secured registration, certificate issuance, and secured route discovery.
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Another important challenge is the evaluation of the aforementioned principles and
their executions. The measure need to include quantitative and qualitative evaluation of
the security and performance of the defined principles. An important task in security
evaluation is to check whether vulnerabilities are still incurred after defining and running
the principles on the multi-hop network. The evaluation can be used for the further
enhancement of routing security principles and execution until routing security protocol
can have adequate robustness.

Open Research Issues:
In an ICWM network, MSs are generally cheap devices having less computation
capability. The exchange of routing message with digital signature is based on
asymmetric key cryptography (e.g., RSA) and the routing process consequently involves
much more computation overhead in signing/decrypting or validating/encrypting
operations. If a malicious MS feeds a MS or BS with a large number of bogus routing
messages with false signatures, it can easily exhaust the computation resource of a MS or
BS. The open challenges for routing security for multi-hop cellular networks are:

•

Defining, executing and evaluating desirable security routing principles,

•

Developing secret key-based HMAC (message authentication codes) routing
security to facilitate the efficiency of route discovery and maintenance, and

• Developing a protocol for DTR establishment and secured route discovery in
supporting other different routing protocols (i.e., AGSM, UCAN).

2.3.4 Securing Packet Forwarding
Because of multi-hop communication, an intermediate relaying MS may correctly
participate in a route discovery but improperly forward data packets in an ICWM
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network. There are several challenges [61-71] in secured multi-hop packet forwarding.
Few of these are (i) detecting and reporting misbehaviors, (ii) penalizing or isolating
malicious MSs, and (iii) charging and rewarding scheme to encourage the packet
forwarding.
Several selfishness prevention schemes have been reported since Marti et al. [61]
proposed a method to detect misbehaving nodes in August 2000 by dividing the strategies
into three groups: reputatio/J-based scheme, credit-payment scheme, and game theory

scheme. As the ratio of selfish MS increases, the packet delivery rates get drastically
reduced. To detect misbehaviors, an approach in 1611 proposes a scheme where all ad hoc
MSs maintain a set of matrices to record the past misbehavers of other MSs, and a MS
selects well-behaved MSs as the intermediate relaying MS for packet forwarding. In
addition, each MS 1621 creates a secure association in order that it can authenticate
misbehavior reports before isolating a malicious MS. On the other hand, a set of rules and
protocols 1661 are proposed as incentive for packet forwarding by the exchanges of
fictitious currency called Nugget. In the ICWM context, which is infrastructure-based
packet forwarding, BS collects the report of the misbehaviors including packet dropping,
reduplication of packet, packet filtering, and packet modification etc [65].
Based on the reports from multi-hop network, the network (BS) decides which
accounts should be charged or credited. To implement misbehavior reporting, two
schemes are needed: authentication and packet acknowledgement 165]. An authentication
scheme provides the capability for (i) authentication of the source and destination, (ii)
authentication of the forwarding MS. The authentication of any message depends on the
DTR establishment from which the necessary authentication keys are created and
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uniquely bound with the MS. An acknowledgement scheme is the process for destination
to acknowledge the reception of every packet either in per packet basis or batch basis.
The BS can maintain the records of all activities of packet forwarding for each
participating MS. The destination reports to the BS every time when it receives a data
packet from the source [65]. In order to save resource, the destination acknowledges all
received packets in a single batch at the end of packet tnmsmission. Such credit-payment
approach requires global participation and a variety of heterogeneous MSs may exist in a
practical MANET. Furthermore, some MSs may not earn enough credits not as they may
just be badly positioned. Raghavan et al. 168] address this by proposing two layered
forwarding service: priced priority.f{lrwarding andjree best-efj(Irt.f{lrwarding.
A charging and remuneration scheme manipulates the accounts of all participating
MSs. The manipulation of account depends on several factors: the number and size of
packets, the number of hops of wireless route, and the transmission time. In the process
of charging and remuneration, it is necessary to protect the network from cheating,
refusal to pay, incorrect reward claims, free-riding, and invasive adversary. The tradebased scheme in 158 J enforces the cooperation in mobile ad hoc WANs by two
approaches: packet purse and packet trade. The natural idea of the trade-based scheme is
that a MS used a service should be charged and a MS providing a service should be
remunerated. The charging and remuneration scheme in [65] achieves the collaboration
of packet forwarding in multi-hop cellular networks. Upon receiving the upstream
packets which are from a source MS in the multi-hop network, the BS credits their
collaboration after authenticating each relaying MS. In the opposite direction of upstream
packets, the destination MS in the multi-hop network acknowledges the receipt of packet
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from the BS, and then BS makes the credits for each relaying MS. Sprite (a simple, cheatproof, credit-based system) [69] with a central authority server called CCS (Credit
Clearance Service) also utilizes credit to give incentive to the MSs that forward packets
to the source. However, the amount of credit charged to the source is not always equal to
that given to other MSs. Yau et a1. 170] identifies many problems which make
CONFIDANT and CORE impractical to be used in actual MANETs and propose a
simple reputation system to enhance the robustness of a MANET by MS utilizing only its
own experience about all neighboring MSs. Huang et a1. 171j address drawbacks and
impracticality of both the reputation and the credit-payment incentive methods.
Open Research Issues:

The infrastructure-based scheme for detecting various misbehaviors is an important
issue in ICWM networks but has been neglected in current security designs. A lot of
issues about securing packet forwarding in ICWM network remain unexplored:

• How to enforce service availability and cooperation in a ICWM network with a
secure mechanism to stimulate MS to participating in packet forwarding, to
refrain from overloading the network, and to thwart the "selfish" MS.

• How to implement fair charging and rewarding for the cooperation between MSs
in packet forwarding protocol and a reasonable fine for misbehavers.
2.3.4 Interworking Security

A dual-mode MS equipped with two radio interfaces discovers and selects an access
network (GSM, GPRS, UMTS, and WLAN) from the available networks. The
interworking of 3GPPIWLAN enables the provisioning of public WLAN access service
to 3GPP system subscribers [I] [55]. Interworking security is a basic prerequisite for
providing a cellular subscriber MS with WLAN IP Internet connectivity.
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Figure 8 illustrates simplified cellularlWLAN interworking security architecture [54]
[59]. When a cellular MS visits a foreign WLAN network. the 3GPP AAA interconnects
WLAN security system and cellular (e.g .• GSM, UMTS) security system. To reuse
SIM/USIM-based authentication in WLAN interworking, two new EAP schemes, EAP
SIM and EAP AKA, have been specified for 3GPP-WLAN interworking. The EAP SIM
encapsulates GSM SIM authentication and key agreement algorithms within EAP. And
the EAP AKA specifies UMTS mutual authentication and key agreement (AKA) on EAP.
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Figure 8. Security Architecture for Cellular/WLAN Interworking.
Open Research Issues:

The AAA framework is chosen as the basis of the WLAN and 3GPP-WLAN. The
possible AAA protocols include RADIUS or Diameter.

Many challenges remain in

securing the cellularlWLAN interworking:

• Extending AAA protocols to allow cellular (e.g., GSM, GPRS and UMTS) MS
roaming from cellular system toward the WLAN system.

• Instead of GSM family system, how to support WLAN interworking such as
IEEE 802.16 in which X.S09 certificate is the basis of access security for MSs.

• Since the proposed 3GPP-WLAN can not support multi-hop access, protocols are
needed for the interworking security system to support multi-hop communication
and routing.
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2.4 Conclusion
Many possible security threats against ICWM networks have been presented in this
chapter, along with other open issues. The security attacks such as wireless-Internet
DDoS may seriously degrade the performance of Internet services for multi-hop MSs.
However, the current security solution for ICWM networks is only the first step toward
tackling various security attacks. In this chapter, the lCWM security challenges of such
schemes are discussed for providing ubiquitous and secure Internet services for mobile
users in support of heterogeneous multi-hop communication. For the practicality of
lCWM networks, robust and efficient security schemes have to design across
heterogeneous multi-hop wireless networks and the Internet.
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PART A

ON SECURE COMMUNICATION FOR
INTEGRATED INTERNET AND MANET
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CHAPTER III
AN INTEGREATED PROTOCOL FOR INTERNET
AND AD-HOC NETWORK COMMUNICATION

The integration of infrastructure networks and ad hoc mobile networks can be used to
eliminate dead zones in wireless LANs and cellular networks, and can also be used to
extend the coverage of wireless networks. Earlier approaches for the integrated networks
either provided only unidirectional global connectivity for ad hoc hosts or caused high
overhead and packet delay for full bi-directional connections. In this chapter, a protocol
of integrating mobile IP and enhanced DSDV (EDSDV) is proposed to provide full bidirectional Internet connectivity for ad hoc hosts. A detailed performance comparison is
conducted between the proposed approach with a leading integration approach based on
different network sizes, mobility of ad hoc hosts and other network parameters. The
experimental results show that the proposed approach has smaller overhead for full bidirectional connectivity and shorter average packet delay compared to the leading
integration approach.
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The spectrum of wireless networks can be classified into infrastructure (e.g., wireless
LAN and wireless MAN) networks and infrastructureless (ad hoc) network. In
infrastructure networks, a base station or an access point serves as a communication
bridge for mobile hosts. Mobile users obtain their services under the coverage of a base
station or an access point. A base station or an access point has both a wireless and a
wired interface and acts as a gateway between two types of networks [25]. Mobile IP has
been successfully extended to cellular networks and wireless LANs for providing global
internet connectivity [3] [4]. In contrast to infrastructure networks, ad hoc nodes are
mobile terminals connected in a dynamic and arbitrary manner without any infrastructure
device. The existing wireless LANs and cellular networks only provide a single hop
wireless extension to access points and base stations. Integrating ad hoc networks with
infrastructure networks can be beneficial for extending the coverage of wireless networks
via multi hop communication of ad hoc hosts. Many communication scenarios may
benefit from multi-hops networks with the desirable properties of larger coverage and
freedom of mobility. Integrated ad hoc and infrastructure networks can be used to
eliminate dead zones in wireless LAN. This chapter proposes an efficient approach that
provides bi-directional Internet connectivity to ad hoc hosts via mobile IP protocol
implemented on infrastructure networks.
Two important issues for providing the global Internet connectivity for ad hoc
networks are bi-directional communication and the total overhead of Mobile IP as well as
ad hoc routing protocol. Previous approaches [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [25] for the integrated
Internet and ad hoc networks were developed by extending the mobile IP to ad hoc
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networks. But these approaches cause high mobile IP and ad hoc network routing
overhead for full bi-directional connectivity. The approaches discussed in [5] [7] [25]
proactively flood agent advertisements through the entire ad hoc network. In approach [5],
the ad hoc hosts run a modified Routing Information Protocol (RIP) Daemon (routed) to
deal with mobile IP messages. Also a mobile IP routing daemon (mipd) runs on each ad
hoc host. The routeds of mobile hosts within the coverage of a foreign agent (FA) receive
FA's agent advertisements and related mobile IP messages. These routeds can relay the
mobile IP messages to the mipds of the ad hoc hosts that are outside the transmission
range of the FA. The MIPMANET [7] provides Internet connectivity for ad hoc hosts by
using mobile IP with foreign agent's care-of-address and reverse tunneling. FA
periodically broadcasts its agent advertisements. Agent advertisements spread through the
whole ad hoc network. This approach uses AODV [16] protocol for communication in ad
hoc network. The performance of this approach has been improved by more recent
approaches given in [8] [25]. The approach used in [25] extends mobile IP to ad hoc
networks using on-demand AODV protocol; therefore each mobile node registers with
FA only when it requires internet connectivity. However, on-demand approaches only
allow unidirectional Internet connectivity from the ad hoc hosts to wired network hosts.
Implementing bi-directional connectivity with these routing protocols incurs a significant
overhead in maintaining IP registration with the FA. The scheme in [8] further improves
the performance of the integrated approach given in [25] by lowering the mobile IP
overhead. This approach reduces the number of FA advertisement by using controlled
flooding among the ad hoc nodes. However, the mobile IP overhead and related AODV
overhead are still very high [8]. The approaches in the [9] [72] involve agent discovery
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which results in more overhead for full bi-directional connectivity and introduces
significant connection delay.
The full bi-directional Internet connectivity for mobile user is very important
especially in the integrated Internet and ad hoc networks. The implementation of bidirectional connectivity has not been clearly addressed in the existing approaches.
Moreover, the existing approaches have higher packet latency because they are mostly
using either AODV or some extension of AODV. These approaches have high route
discovery latency compared to the proposed approach. The integration of the mobile IP
with table-driven (proactive) protocols, lends itself very well for providing bi-directional
internet connectivity: either a host in infrastructure (wired) network or a host in the ad
hoc network can initiate a global connection. In this chapter an enhanced DSDV
(EDSDV) protocol is proposed that improves the performance of standard DSDV
protocol. In the proposed integrated approach FA acts as one of the ad hoc nodes
participating in the enhanced DSDV routing protocol. Also the FA serves as the mobile

IP proxy for ad hoc hosts.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.1 describes the basic model
of combining ad hoc and infrastructure (wired) networks. Section 3.2 discusses why
DSDV protocol [11] has poor throughput at higher mobility of ad hoc hosts. It then
discusses an EDSDV protocol for overcoming the problem of lower throughput. In
addition, this section proposes a protocol for full bi-directional connectivity by using FA
as the mobile IP proxy for ad hoc hosts. Section 3.3 discusses the experimental
configuration for integrating the infrastructure (wired) and ad hoc network. The
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experimental results obtained from the simulations under different scenarios are also
discussed in this section. Some conclusions are included in Section 3.4.

3.1 Internet Connectivity for Ad-hoc Networks
The goal of the proposed approach is to integrate ad hoc and infrastructure (wired)
network by using mobile hosts, which are located under the coverage of a foreign agent
(FA), as the communicating bridges between two heterogeneous networks. Mobile IP and
ad hoc routing protocol coordinate with each other to build the connectivity across the
heterogeneous networks as shown in Figure 9. There are only two alternatives for a
mobile host to obtain the global Internet connectivity. In the first case, ad hoc hosts,
which are under the transmission range of a FA, can communicate directly with the FA.
In the second case, ad hoc hosts, which are outside the coverage of a FA, communicate
with the FA using multi-hop ad hoc links. The key challenge in providing connectivity is
to minimize the overhead of mobile IP and ad hoc routing protocol between infrastructure
and ad hoc networks. Figure 9 illustrates an example of cooperation between the wired
network and the ad hoc network. The inside area of dash circle represents the coverage of
a FA; as shown in Figure 9, mobile host 1 and 3 are located in the coverage of the FA.
The left side of Figure 9 represents a wired network that consists of Home Agent (HA),
Correspondent Node (CN), FA, and the Internet. The right side is the ad hoc network
using EDSDV. The ad hoc host 1 and FA can reach each other directly. Assume that all
mobile hosts work in a promiscuous receive mode, therefore, each mobile host would
deliver every packet received from its neighbors without filtering any information.
Meanwhile ad hoc host 4 and 5 are neighbors allowing ad hoc host 5 to communicate
with the FA using ad hoc routing protocol via ad hoc host 4 and 1. In the end, a path can
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be established between eN and ad hoc host 5 via the Internet, FA, ad hoc hosts 1 and 4.
Each ad hoc host registers with HA and creates a mobility binding at HA by mapping its
home address to the care-of-address (eOA) provided by FA. Upon receiving data packets
sent by eN and tunneled via Internet, FA delivers the data packets to the ad hoc host 5
through the previously established path. On the other hand, after receiving data packets
sent by the ad hoc host 5, FA delivers them to eN using IP routing in the infrastructure
network.

Wired Network

Figure 9. An Integrated Internet and Ad hoc Network.

3.2 Design of Integrated Framework
3.2.1 Motivation for Enhanced DSDV

The DSDV [11] routing protocol is based on classical Bellman-Ford Routing
Algorithm for finding shortest paths between ad hoc nodes with some improvements. In
DSDV protocol, each mobile host maintains a routing table that stores the number of
hops and the sequence number assigned by the destination mobile host for all the
destinations. The routing table updates in DSDV could be time-driven or event-driven. In
time-driven routing table update, mobile hosts periodically transmit their routing tables to
their immediate neighbors. The interval between two updates is referred as the DSDV
periodic route update interval. On the other hand, in the event-driven routing table update,
the mobile host notifies its routing information if a significant change has occurred in its
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routing table since its last update. There are two ways of performing routing update: "full
dump", in which an ad hoc host transmits the complete routing table to its neighbors, and
"incremental update", in which an ad hoc host sends only those entries from the routing
table that have changed since the last update. A sequence number is used to distinguish a
stale route from a new route to avoid the formation of loops in the routing process.
At higher rates of mobility in ad hoc networks, the performance of DSDV protocol is
worse than many other ad hoc routing protocols. The packet delivery fraction can drop up
to 70 percent with 50 nodes and a maximum mobility of 20 m1s (average speed 10). The
low packet delivery rate results from the fact that an ad hoc host uses stale routes to a
destination to send packets. Higher mobility rate results in higher number of broken links
in an ad hoc network. These broken links result in the creation of stale routes in the
routing tables. In our extensive simulation studies, we have found that packet dropping
occurs due to traffic forwarding via a stale route generated by a broken link between two
ad hoc hosts. Figure 10 illustrates how many packets are dropped during 600 seconds at a
source node due to the broken links. The size of DSDV network is 50 nodes. A source
node sends packets to a destination at the rate of 10 packets per second. As seen from
Figure 10, the average number of packets dropped at the source node increases when the
mobility of ad hoc increases. For example, at 50 m1sec mobility, 765 packets were
dropped out of 6000 packets due to broken links at the source node.
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Figure 10. Number of Packets Lost due to Broken Links.
In DSDV, a stale route at an ad hoc node doesn't mean that there is no valid route to a
destination. Packets can be forwarded to some other neighbors that may have routes
leading to the destination. When an immediate link from an ad hoc host A to destination
D is broken, the proposed EDSDV protocol creates a temporary link via a neighbor that

has a valid route to the destination D in its routing table. In EDSDV protocol, a
temporary link is created by one-hop ROUTE REQUEST and ROUTE ACK messages.
The ad hoc host A having the broken next hop link to the destination broadcasts a onehop ROUTE REQUEST message to all its neighbors. The neighbor returns a ROUTE
ACK message if it has a route to the destination and the ad hoc host A is not the next hop
on the route from the neighbor to destination D.
In the proposed EDSDV protocol, each entry in routing table has an additional
element for recording the route update time. This route update time is sent in ROUTE
ACK message and is used for choosing a temporary route. After ad hoc host A broadcasts
ROUTE REQUEST, there may be more than one neighbor that responds with ROUTE
ACK. The ad hoc host A chooses a route that has least number of hops to the destination
and the latest update time. The EDSDV protocol maintains all the desirable features of
standard DSDV but reduces the packet loss due to broken links. The EDSDV protocol
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uses the following approach to overcome the stale route problem of standard DSDV
routing protocol:
•

If the link from host A to next hop link in route to a destination is broken, then
in-coming packets are buffered; the maximum packets buffered at an ad hoc
host for each destination is N.

•

When host A identifies that the next hop link in route to a destination is
broken, the host A suspends forwarding packets to this next hop. In order to
find a temporary next hop leading to the same destination, host A immediately
broadcasts a one-hop ROUTE REQUEST to its neighbors. ROUTE
REQUEST includes the host ID, and the destination. If a neighbor has a route
leading to the destination in its routing table and the route does not take use of
A as the next hop, then the neighbor responds by sending a ROUTE ACK
message. ROUTE ACK includes its host ill, the destination, the hop count
metric for the destination, and the last updated time for this path to destination.

•

The host A chooses the best neighbor as the temporary next hop, and then
resumes forwarding the buffered and in-coming packets via the temporary
route. The logic of choosing the best neighbor for the ad hoc host is to select a
neighbor with the least number of hops to the destination. If there are several
next hop nodes leading to the destination with same hop count, then host A
chooses the neighbor having the latest routing update time.

• Later, regular DSDV protocol updates the route to the destination in the
routing table of host A. An updated route from the host A to the destination
replaces the stale route. At this time host A switches from the temporary route
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to the updated route for sending the in-coming packets. Also during creation
of a temporary route, if the routing table entry from host A to the destination is
updated by the regular DSDV protocol, then host A stops creating the
temporary route and sends packets via the updated route.
Figure 11 illustrates how host A creates a temporary route to destination D after the
immediate link from A to B is broken. When the link from host A to destination D is
broken because of its own or host B' s movement, host A suspends sending packets
(Figure 11 (a». Then host A immediately broadcasts a ROUTE REQUEST to its
neighbors( C, E, G and I). As an example, Table 2 represents the current routes leading to
destination D at each neighbor. Because the next hop in routing entry of the neighbor I is

A, the ad hoc host I does not respond to A's request. Ad hoc hosts C, E, and G respond
with ROUTE ACK messages along with hop count metrics and the route update time to
ad hoc host A (Figure 11 (b».

Neighbor
C
E
G
I

T abl e 2 The snapshot 0 f current rou t es
Metric (hops) Next Hop Route
Route updated time
2
H
1005
C->H->D
2
F
1010
E->F->D
3
905
E
G->E->F->D
1002
3
A
I->A->B->D

The ad hoc host C and E have the same value for hop count metrics, but the latest
routing update time for E is greater than that of C, which indicates that the path through E
is updated more recently. So host A chooses E as the next hop to the destination D. Host

A resumes sending packets to the destination D (Figure 11 (c». Therefore, the packets in
host A are forwarded to the destination D via E and F. After a while, the route entry in
host A to the destination D is updated by the regular DSDV process, then host A switches
its route from the temporary route to the updated route. In the Figure 11 (d), C moves

66

close to D, and the DSDV routing process updates the route at A. Therefore, ad hoc host

A uses the updated DSDV route <A->C->D> for sending packets to D.
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Figure 11. Creating a Temporary Route in Node A.
3.2.2 Integrated Mobile IP and Ad hoc Network
Mobile IF protocol [33] [34] provides a continuous connectivity for mobile hosts, in
which discovery, registration, and tunneling processes are involved. In mobile IP
mechanism, a mobile host uses a fixed home address. The home address is bound to a
care-of address (COA) provided by a FA while the mobile host visits a FA. This mapping
is available at home agent for forwarding packets to FA which can deliver packets to a
roaming ad hoc host. However, the role of FA is extended in the proposed approach:

•

FA takes part in the routing protocol just as other ad hoc hosts do .

• FA acts as the mobile IF proxy for the ad hoc hosts. The detailed information on
registration process for ad hoc hosts is provided in the following sections.
In the proposed integration approach, FA participates in ad hoc routing protocol as ad
hoc hosts, thus FA doesn't broadcast agent advertisements for the purpose of integrating
ad hoc hosts. This FA broadcast has been a significant source of overhead in earlier
approaches [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [25]. In the proposed EDSDV protocol, ad hoc hosts and
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FA automatically know each other's presence via routing update EDSDV protocol. Also
each host doesn't send solicitations to request care-of-address from FA. When a mobile
host H joins the ad hoc network, the host H broadcasts DSDV advertisements to its
neighbors for the first time with a sequence number of O. Each neighbor of the host H
inserts a route entry in its routing table for the host H and broadcasts immediately with an
increased sequence number to its neighbors. The process continues until the
advertisement of the host H has reached all the destinations. Eventually the FA inserts a
route entry for the host H also. At the same time, the host H gets a routing table from
each of its neighbors and creates its own routing table. The route to FA is also included in
the host H's route table via routing update messages from its neighbors. Then the host H
sends FA the registration information, for example, H's home address. Based on the
registration information, FA acts as the mobile IP proxy for the host H. FA sends the
registration request to the host H's home agent. After successful registration at the home
agent, a registration reply message is returned from HA to FA. FA then informs ad hoc
host H about its registration status. In the proposed approach FA keeps the registration
information for all ad hoc hosts and uses it again during re-registrations. FA uses its
foreign agent address as COA to register with the HA for each ad hoc host. The mobile IP
registration lifetime for each mobile host is 2 to 3 times of the DSDV periodic route
update interval.
In the proposed approach, FA serves as the mobile IP proxy for each ad hoc host.
Each ad hoc host registers with FA only once when it joins the network. Mobile IP
maintenance in the proposed approach includes two parts:

• FA re-registration or deregistration for each ad hoc host,
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•

Ad hoc host location management.

FA Re-registration or deregistration: Each ad hoc host doesn't participate in the mobile
IP registration after exchanging registration information at the moment of joining the ad
hoc network. Since FA keeps all the registration information for each node, FA updates
the registration for each ad hoc host before its expiration only if an ad hoc host has a
valid path from FA. FA has the consistent and up-to-date routes for each ad hoc host via
EDSDV so the FA surely knows whether or not an ad hoc host is part of the mobile
network. In case the hop count metric for an ad hoc host in FA's routing table becomes
infinite, it implies that FA has lost its route to that ad hoc host. It may mean that the ad
hoc host has roamed away from the network. If it loses the route to an ad hoc host for 2
times of the periodic EDSDV route update interval, FA assumes that the ad hoc host has
moved away from the ad hoc network. The FA sends the ad hoc host's home agent a
deregistration message to notify the home agent that the ad hoc host has disconnected
with the FA. If the host joins the ad hoc network again, the host needs to res end its
registration information to FA.

Ad hoc host location management: The location and route to each destination ad hoc
host can be identified from an ad hoc host's routing table. If the route from an ad hoc host
to FA is reachable (the hops from the ad hoc host to FA is finite), it means that the global
connectivity is possible to the ad hoc host. If a mobile host roams away from the ad hoc
network, it will be reflected in routing table of the mobile host because the hop count
metric of FA will be infinity.
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3.2.3 Bi-directional Internet Connectivity
In order to provide bi-directional communication, the framework allows the following
three types of interaction between ad hoc hosts and a eN in Internet:
•

Intra-MANET communication

•

Inter-MANET communication from ad hoc hosts to eN

•

Inter-MANET communication from eN to ad hoc hosts

For the first type of interaction, the ad hoc hosts keep the up-to-date routing
information about other hosts in ad hoc network through EDSDV. To communicate with
another host, an ad hoc host first checks its routing table. If the destination is inside the
ad hoc network, a routing entry leading to the destination will be found in the routing
table and packets will be forwarded to next hop in the route table according to EDSDV
protocol.
The second type of communication occurs between an ad hoc host and a
correspondent node on the Internet, initiated by an ad hoc host. In Figure 9,
communications between an ad hoc host 5 and a eN, initiated by ad hoc host 5, is an
example of this type of communication. In order to communicate with a eN on the
Internet an ad hoc host checks its routing table. If no routing information to the eN is
found, then the ad hoc host checks the routing to a FA. If the routing entry to a FA is
found, then the packets will be forwarded to that FA. Otherwise the packet is discarded.
When a FA receives packets from an ad hoc host for the eN, it forwards those packets to
the destination via Internet following the Internet IP routing protocol.
The third type of communication occurs between a eN and an ad hoc host, initiated
by the eN. For example in Figure 9, communications between the eN and host 5 is
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initiated by eN. If the eN wishes to send packets to an ad hoc host, the packets will be
delivered to HA that the ad hoc host visits. If the ad hoc host registers with HA domain,
HA checks its routing table, finds a route to the ad hoc host, and then forwards the
packets to the ad hoc host. If the ad hoc host is roaming away from its HA, HA maintains
the ad hoc host's current location via FA registration. Using eOA of FA, HA forwards
the packets to FA visited by the destination ad hoc host. The FA checks it's routing table,
and delivers the packets to the requested destination ad hoc host via EDSDV routing
protocol.
Table 3: Simulation Parameter for EDSDV Implementation
DSDV Periodical route update interval
15.0 seconds
DSDV Periodic update missed before link declared broken 3.0 seconds
Initial triggered update weighted setting time
6.0 seconds
Weight settling time weighting factor
7/8
Routing advertisement aggregation time
1 second
Number of times that a ROUTE REQUEST may be resent
2
Time before a new ROUTE REQUEST is sent
1.0 second

3.3 Simulation and Experimental Results
3.3.1 Experimental Configuration

The effectiveness of the proposed integration approach is demonstrated by carrying
out extensive experiments, in which FA acts as mobile IP proxy and combines the
EDSDV protocol with Mobile IP routing. The experiments are conducted using NS-2 [73]
simulator. Different sizes of ad hoc networks (20 and 50 nodes) were tested. In the
integrated network, FA is configured as an ad hoc node as well as mobile IP proxy for ad
hoc hosts. Table 3 lists the constants used in implementing EDSDV protocol in the
simulation. In Table 3, the first five parameters are same as the parameters in paper [24].
When a next hop link from an ad hoc host A to destination D is broken, the ad hoc host A
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sends ROUTE REQUEST message to its neighbors. The decision for temporary next hop
is based on the responses received from the two rounds of ROUTE REQUEST messages.
If there is no response after 1.0 second another ROUTE REQUEST is sent to the
neighbor.
The maximum mobility speed of ad hoc hosts is set between 1 to 50 mls during the
lifetime of simulation runs according to a uniform random distribution. For example, if
the maximum speed of nodes is set at 20 mis, the nodes move randomly ranging from 0
to 20 mls; the average speed is 10 mls. The direction of movement is also changed
according to the random waypoint model [6]. The pause time is consistently 10 seconds
between each movement. Constant bit rate packets are sent for 600 seconds during the
simulation. The ad hoc network size is varied in order to keep consistency in node density.
Experimental scenarios are set with the following dimensions:
•

670m x 670m simulation area with 20 mobile nodes

•

1000m x 1000m simulation area with 50 mobile nodes

Instead of just unidirectional global connectivity for ad hoc hosts [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8]
[25], the proposed approach achieves full bi-directional connectivity. The experiments
here show the full bi-directional communication where CN initiates three calls to three
randomly selected ad hoc hosts, and two randomly selected ad hoc hosts initiate two
separate calls to CN also. The two randomly selected ad hoc hosts send Constant Bit Rate
(CBR) packets to CN. In addition, CN sends CBR packets to three ad hoc hosts selected
to receive packets from CN. The CBR packet size is set as 512 bytes and does not include
the packet head. Figure 12 illustrates the experimental configuration. A router, connected
to HA, CN and FA, represents the delay on the Internet. The FA is located in the center
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of experimental domain. The dash circle represents the coverage of FA. For a mobile host
located in the coverage of FA, a bidirectional connection can be established directly
between the FA and the mobile host. FA and wireless ad hoc hosts use the EDSDV
protocol. For each sampled data point, NS-2 was executed five times under different
random mobility scenarios and each data point shown in the graphs is an average of five
results.
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Figure 12. Experimental Configuration.

3.3.2 Experimental Results and Comparisons
The performance of proposed integrated ad hoc network is analyzed based on the
following parameters:

• Packet Delivery Fraction (throughput)
• Mobile IP overhead and the related ad hoc protocol overhead,

• Packet Latency
The experimental results obtained for the proposed integrated approach are compared
with the leading hybrid approach [8]. In order to lower the mobile IP and related AODV
overhead in ad hoc networks, the hybrid approach [8] sets the TTL-field as N in the IP
header of the advertisements to limit the flooding of advertisements. Advertisements are
only spread within the N-hop neighborhoods directly. Instead of flooding advertisements
through the whole ad hoc networks, any ad hoc host in the hybrid approach can
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eavesdrop and cache fresh agent advertisements for the mobile IP purposes. In the hybrid
approach [8], the ideal TTL value of 2 is used and a best FA beacon interval of 10
seconds is chosen. In the proposed approach in this chapter, it is not necessary to choose
a TTL value and the beacon interval because there are no FA advertisements in the ad
hoc network. The comparison of performance is based on the 50 node network with
different movement patterns as given in [8]. All the results are compared against the
results obtained using ideal TTL and the best beacon interval suggested in the hybrid
approach [8].
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Figure 13. Comparison of Throughput.
Figure 13 illustrates the results of packet delivery fraction in the proposed approach
and in the hybrid approach [8]. The impact of mobility on the packet delivery fraction
was tested by varying the maximum movement speed of the ad hoc hosts. The mobility of
ad hoc hosts is varied from 0 mls to 50 mls in the proposed approach. As seen in Figure
13, the packet delivery fraction goes down as the mobility increases. Figure 13 also
presents the throughput of the hybrid approach with 50 nodes in which the FA beacon
interval is 10 seconds. The throughput of the proposed integrated approach is better than
that of the hybrid approach.
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Figure 14. Comparisons of Overhead.
Figure 14 compares the overhead of the proposed approach with the hybrid scheme
given in [8]. It is evident from Figure 14 (a) that the overhead of mobile IP in the
proposed approach is very low. This is because ad hoc hosts send their registration
information to FA only at the moment of joining the ad hoc network. Figure 14 (b) shows
the overhead of EDSDV for maintaining the routing tables at ad hoc hosts. The overhead
increases when the mobility of ad hoc host increases.
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To maintain the global connectivity for ad hoc hosts, the hybrid approach [8] results
in mobile IP overhead and related AODV overhead. The related AODV overhead is used
for establishing the route between an AODV node and FA to exchange mobile IP
messages. Figure 14 (c) presents the mobile IP and related AODV overhead in the hybrid
approach [8] with different numbers of registrations. The related AODV overhead in
Figure 14 (c) is only the AODV routing overhead generated by exchanging mobile IP
messages between ad hoc hosts and FA for maintaining Internet mobility of ad hoc host.
The overhead of the AODV routing caused by transmitting data packets is not included in
Figure 14 (c). Figure 14 (c) also shows the total overhead to maintain global connectivity
for different registered ad hoc hosts (from 10 to 50 nodes). The size of network is 50
nodes, and the TTL is 2. The maximum speed of movements is 20 mls. The number of
registered ad hoc hosts varies from 10 to 50 nodes. Therefore bi-directional connectivity
is provided for 10 to 50 nodes in accordance with the number of registered nodes. For
instance, if the number of registered ad hoc hosts is 30 out of 50 nodes, it only provides
30 nodes with bi-directional Internet connectivity. To provide data packet transmissions,
the hybrid approach needs more AODV routing overhead to maintain the path from a
source host to a destination host. On the contrary, Figure 14 (a, b) show the overhead
incurred due to Mobile IP and the EDSDV protocol.
It is clear from Figure 14 that the total overhead of the proposed integrated approach

is lower than that of the hybrid approach developed in [8]. If the hybrid approach keeps
the full bi-directional connectivity for all ad hoc hosts (50 nodes), the total overhead will
be much higher than that of the proposed approach. The following conclusions can be
derived by analyzing the overhead of 50 nodes:
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•

The total overhead for maintaining full connectivity for ad hoc hosts in the hybrid
approach [8] is higher than that of the proposed approach.

•

In addition to the overhead for maintaining full connectivity for ad hoc hosts,
extra AODV routing overhead is needed for communication between two ad hoc
hosts in the hybrid approach [8]. The proposed EDSDV protocol causes no extra
overhead for communication between two ad hoc hosts.

•

If AODV hosts don't register with FA, CN cannot reach these AODV hosts. Thus,
the AODV protocol will require additional overhead for full bi-directional
connectivity.
Comparisons of Packet Delay
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Figure 15. Comparisons of Packet Delivery Delay.
Figure 15 compares the average packet delay from ad hoc network to CN in the two
approaches. Figure 15 shows the packet delay in the hybrid approach where TTL is 2. It
can also be concluded from this study that the average packet delivery delay for the
proposed approach is better than the hybrid protocol [8]. The reasons for better packet
delay are:

• The EDSDV protocol uses better routes than AODV so that packet can
quickly reach their destination.
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•

The EDSDV does not need time for Route Discovery before communications
since the routes already exist between the source and destination; but in the
case of AODV, the route is created on demand.

3.4 Conclusion
The proposed EDSDV protocol overcomes the stale link problem that degrades the
performance of standard DSDV protocol at higher rate of mobility of ad hoc host. This
chapter also presents a scheme for providing full bi-directional Internet connectivity for
ad hoc networks. The global Internet connectivity is especially important when it is used
to extend the coverage areas of wireless LAN infrastructure, and to improve the services
in poor coverage of wireless infrastructure in the cellular network. In this paper, instead
of flooding the FA advertisement through the whole ad hoc networks for registration
protocol, FA acts as the mobile IP proxy for ad hoc hosts. The simulations show that the
scheme of integrating the Internet with the EDSDV networks achieves higher throughput
compared to a leading approach [8]. Also the scheme has extremely low mobile IP
overhead for ad hoc hosts while keeping full bi-directional connectivity. The packet delay
in the proposed scheme is also better than the hybrid approach [8].
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CHAPTER IV
SECURE INTERCONNECTION PROTOCOL FOR
INTEGRATED INTERNET AND AD-HOC
NETWORKS

The Integration of ad hoc networks with the Internet provides global Internet
connectivity for ad hoc hosts through the coordination of mobile IP and ad hoc protocols.

In a pure ad hoc network, it is difficult to establish trust relationship between two ad hoc
hosts due to lack of infrastructure or centralized administration. In this chapter, an
infrastructure-supported distributed authentication protocol is proposed to enhance trust
relationships amongst ad hoc hosts. In addition an effective secure routing protocol is
discussed to protect the multi-hop routing for internet and ad hoc communication. In the
integrated ad hoc networks with Internet accessibility, the ad hoc routing security
deployed with the help of infrastructure, has a fundamental impact on ad hoc hosts in
term of internet access, integrity, and authentication. The analysis and experimental
results show the achievements of the proposed security protocol.

4.1 Introduction
A pure mobile ad hoc network (MANET) is a self-configurable network with the
capacity of providing communication amongst ad hoc mobile stations (MSs) without any
centralized administration. In contract, a MS in an integrated internet and MANET can

79

access the Internet by way of single hop or multi-hop connectivity through a base station
(BS) or an Internet gateway [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [25]. In an integrated Internet and
MANET, each MS runs a MANET routing protocol, such as DSDV, AODV, or DSR.
The MANET protocol has the capacity to construct communication path between two
MSs. Meanwhile, a separate protocol [3-8] [25] coordinates mobile IP [33] [34] and the
MENET routing protocol to obtain the internet connectivity.

In such an integrated environment, MSs can obtain various services and applications
from the Internet or the MANET. With the multi-hop internet connectivity, the integrated
networks can be used to extend the coverage of wireless WANs (e.g., GSM, 3G, 4G etc.),
Wireless LANs (e.g., IEEE 802.11a/b/e/g and HiperLANI2), and wireless MANs (IEEE
802.16). A MS in an integrated network, which is outside the radio coverage of all BSs,
may connect the Internet with a multi-hop path. In the integrated network, the MS can
obtain the services from the participating MANET, e.g., sharing files, conference,
multimedia, and games etc. Also, as an everyday experience, through the MS a user may
enjoy the services from the Internet, including email, voice, messaging, information
services (e.g., new stocks, weather, travel).
Similar to a MANET, an integrated network has the basic security-related
characteristics such as open wireless medium, multi-hop route discovery, mobility, and
constrained power capacity. However, an integrated Internet and MANET differs from a
pure MANET in an important way: mobile IP with infrastructure-support. For instance, in
the integrated network, Mobile IP [33] [34] could perform continuous mobility functions
for mobile hosts with two entities: home agent (HA), and foreign agent (FA). A HA is the
server on the mobile host's home network that maintains the information about the host's
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current location, as identified as care-of-address (CoA), and security credentials. On the
other hand, FA is the server on the visiting network providing the CoA and security
administration of the visiting network. Thus, an integrated Internet and MANET has
some crucial distinctions with a pure MANET with regard to multi-hop routing security:

•

In a pure ad hoc network, it is difficult to establish distributed trust relationships
between two MSs as a centralized authority is absent and a MS has the capacity
to forge identity. A malicious host may attack an ad hoc network many times
with different identities. On the contrary, in an integrated network, the wireless
and internet infrastructure (e.g., AAA server) may serves as an authentication
authority and a security administrative center for MANET.

•

In an integrated network, in addition to ad hoc routing security, it is necessary to
enforce the security for mobile IP either for single hop or multi-hop. However,
the existing mobile IP [33] [34] cannot support multi-hop communication as it
is needed in an integrated MANET. Before the initiation of a communication,
the Internet has to authenticate the accessing MS by a mobile IP security.
Meanwhile, the MS should have the capacity to authenticate the visiting Internet
for preventing a forged BS or fraudulent Internet gateway.

Due to the above differences, in the integrated networks, there are several
fundamental questions that have to be addressed with regard to the Internet security and
multi-hop routing security. Some of the critical questions are:
•

How to build a secure FA or Internet gateway discovery protocol for a multihop MS?

•

How to enforce a protected authentication process for the mutual validation
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between a MS and it visiting network, and establish trust relationships amongst
multi-hop MSs?
•

How to uniquely identify a MS and prevent it from changing its identity in the
purpose of attacking the network?

•

How to secure an ad hoc route discovery?

However, the existing approaches [3-8] [25] for the integrated networks are based on
the assumption that all MSs trust one another such that all messages can be forwarded to
various destinations without any modification, drop, or injection. In a trustable
environment, each participating node cooperates honestly during the process of route
discovery. In practice, the Internet connectivity and routing protocols are susceptible to a
wide variety of attacks in adversarial environment. The policies of security for MANETs
and mobile IP have been studied separately in the existing literature and have never been
considered in an integrated environment. To our knowledge no dedicated work has been
carried out to address the problem of securing communication in the integrated MANET
and the Internet. The following specific issues are addressed in the chapter: (i) Providing
secure FA or Internet gateway discovery from MSs to the Internet, (ii) Providing secure
multi-hop authentication to implement the mutual authentication between MS and the
accessing Internet, (iii) Providing secure route discovery between MSs.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows: Section 4.2 describes the background
of the integrated Internet and MANET and the security challenges differing from pure
MANETs. Then, the potential security threats, including the Internet connectivity and ad
hoc route discovery, are discussed in Section 4.3. Section 4.4 gives the details of the
proposed security protocol: global Internet security of mobile IP and ad hoc routing
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security. Section 4.5 analyzes the security achievements on the Internet connectivity as
well as the ad hoc network. The experimental results are also shown in Section 4.5. The
related works about mobile IP security and ad hoc security are addressed in Section 4.6.
Finally, the chapter concludes with Section 4.7.

4.2 Background of the Integrated Network and Security Design
Challenges
4.2.1 Integrated Internet and MANET
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Figure 16. A MANET with global Internet connectivity.
Mobile IP and ad hoc routing protocol coordinate with each other to build the
connectivity across the heterogeneous networks as shown in Figure 16. The inside area of
dash circle represents the coverage of a FA; as shown in Figure 16, MSs 1, 2, and 3 are
located in the coverage of the FA. The left side of Figure 16 represents a wired network
that consists of a HA, a Correspondent Node (CN), a FA, and the Internet. The right side
is an ad hoc network using ad hoc routing protocol, e.g., AODV, DSR. The MS 1 and the
FA can reach each other directly. The basic process of an ad hoc route discovery involves
two messages: routing request and routing reply. In the beginning, the source node
broadcasts a routing request if it has no fresh route to the destination. The routing request
is forwarded by intermediary nodes. In the end, the destination responds with a routing
reply which has the route from the source to the destination. The ad hoc routing protocol
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enables the multi-hop MS with the capability to reach a FA. For example, in Figure 16,
MS 5 may find the FA using ad hoc routing protocol via MSs 4 and 1. Moreover, the MS
can obtain the Internet connectivity using mobile IP with which the MS creates a mobility
binding at the HA through the visiting FA by initiating a mobile IP registration. When the
FA receives a registration request from the MS, it forwarded to its HA through the
Internet. After updating the mobility for the MS, the HA responds the registration with a
registration reply to the MS. There are two kinds of possible communication in the
integrated network. Intra-MANET communication involves interaction between hosts
within the ad hoc network, e.g., in Figure 16, communication between the mobile host 6
and 8. Inter-MANET is the communication that involves infrastructure nodes (like CN)
and ad hoc network nodes (like 1-9). Some properties of the integrated Internet and
MANETare:
•

In the integrated network, the FA can provide ad hoc nodes the capability to
connect to a wired network.

•

A MS that do not have direct wireless connection to the FA can communicate
with the wired network by establishing a multi-hop ad hoc path.

• In the integrated network, MSs can communicate with other MSs using ad hoc
routing protocol. In addition, they can also use a Mobile IP protocol to
communicate with the Internet.
•

Security must be implemented from the MS to the CN and vice versa.
Furthermore, secure routing must also be provided for the communications
between any two MSs.
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4.2.2 Security Design Challenges

The routing security deals with the protection of routing messages exchanged
between the nodes. Before an Intra-MANET communication, an ad hoc route discovery is
needed to construct the route between two MSs. To support inter-MANET
communication, a wired (Internet) route to eN is required by following the mobile IP [33]
[34] that provides the continuous mobility and location management for each MS. There
are two critical issues for providing a secure multi-hop route discovery: Internet
connectivity and ad hoc routing protocol.
In order to obtain the internet connectivity, each MS has to register with the visiting
FA and create a mobility binding at its HA [33] [34]. Before registration, a MS has to
discover a FA and establish a multi-hop route to the FA. If the MS is misled by a forged
FA or a malicious intermediary node, it cannot get a correct Internet connection with
services. During the process of multi-hop registration, the registration messages may be
modified by a malicious intermediary node. This may not allow nodes to register with its
HA. The existing ad hoc routing security approaches cannot provide a secure FA
discovery because all these security protocols are based on the assumption that a
MANET has no any centralized infrastructure (FA). Also, the existing mobile IP protocol
cannot provide the security protection for a multi-hop registration [39][40][41]. It is the
fact that current mobile IP security [39][40][41] is deployed on single wireless hop in
which each MS can exchange registration and authentication directly with the FA. Thus,
for the Internet connectivity, two schemes are required: a secure FA discovery and a
secure mobile IP registration for MS. The security of a FA discovery allows a MS to find
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a correct FA, and the secure mobile IP registration provides the integrity protection to
registration messages across the multi-hop wireless network and the Internet.
In a pure MANET, it has no infrastructure for key management, and it is hard to
verify the identity of a MS [61-71]. An integrated internet and ad hoc network is not
isolated anymore like a pure MANET. The integration with infrastructure has significant
impact on ad hoc routing security. The availability of the Internet enables the possible
validation of MS's identify (i.e., home IP address) and credentials (i.e., billing and
account). This information is generally stored at its HA and thus the routing security
protocols [25-31] for pure ad hoc networks cannot be adopted for the integrated networks.

4.3 Security Requirement for Integrated Internet and MANET
Figure 17 illustrates the connectivity of an integrated Internet and MANET that can
be implemented according to the routing protocols in [3-8] [25]. Figure 17 (a) shows the
integrated network with malicious nodes while Figure 17 (b) illustrates the corresponding
network without malicious nodes. The solid lines represent wired connection while the
dash lines stand for wireless links. In Figure 17 (a), MSs 1, 5 and malicious node (M1)
can reach the FA directly (MSs 1, 5, and M1 are under the coverage of the FA).
Therefore MSs 1,5, and M1 can act as the potential gateways for integrating Internet and
MANET. This section summarizes the possible attacks against the Integrated Internet and
MANET, and identifies the various security requirements.

4.3.1 Attacks on the Internet Connectivity
In general, malicious nodes, which modify, drop, forge or generate mobile IP
messages (e.g., Advertisement, Registration Request, or Registration Reply) to corrupt
mobile IP support for MANET, can cause attacks on Internet connectivity. There are
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mainly three types of attacks on the Internet connectivity at the network layer: bogus
registration, replay attack, and forged FA. The attacks includes

•

Bogus Registration

• Replay Attack
• Forged FA
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(b): The Integrated Internet and MANET
with authorized nodes.

(a): The Integrated Internet and
MANET with unauthorized node.

M: malicious node, S: source node, D: destination node

Figure 17. An example of Integrated Internet and MANET.

4.3.2 Attacks on Ad hoc Routing Protocol

Ad hoc routing protocols are vulnerable to different types of attacks that have been
extensively studied and addressed in Chapter 2. After a multi-hop route is constructed,
various attacks may happen in the stage of packet forwarding as illustrated in Chapter 2.
The attacks include:

• Violating integrity (anti-integrity)
• Impersonations
• Duplication
• Anti-confidentiality
• Denial of Service (anti-cooperation)

• Modification
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4.4 Proposal for Securing Global Connectivity
Tabl e 4 NotatIOns usedfor th e proposed proto co
M,N

Concatenation of two messages M and N in the order specified

MSHM

MS home address

HA id, FAid

HA and FA IP address as its identity

Nx

Nonce issued by X, e.g. HA, MS (a pseudo-random number).

<M>K

MAC value of message M under key K

CA

Certification authority

Kx,K x

Public and private key of X

[MJ K x

Digital signature of message M generated using private key of X

Certx

Certificate of X

Tissue. Texpire

Issuing and expiration time of a MS's certificate

t

Timestamp, current estimated time

MSCoA

MS's Care-of-Address

SMS-HA

Shared secret key between MS and HA

MSHMx

Permanent Home address of Mobile Station X

MSx

Mobile Station X

T abl e 5 M essages £or th e proposed prot oco
Request
Reply
Result
R Request
R Reply
R Error
Advertisement
Solicitation

A bit pattern indicating a registration request
A bit pattern indicating a registration reply
A value indicating the result of registration
A packet indicating a route request
A packet indicating a route reply
A packet indicating a routing error
A bit pattern indicating an advertisement
A bit pattern indicating an advertisement solicitation

This chapter proposes a secure connectivity framework for integrated Internet and
MANET. The securing protocol combines the mobile IP security with ad hoc routing
security. Before developing the security protocol, three assumptions and related
clarifications are made here. Firstly, it assumes that if two entities (e.g., MS, HA, FA)
have security association (public/private key or secret key), and their identities have been
authenticated by authorities, e.g., Diameter [75] and AAA authorities [74], thereby the
two entities are mutually trustable. Secondly, it assumes that each MS belongs to a
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certain administrative domain (HA) and has a security association with its authority [39]
[40] [41] [74]. Otherwise the MS is an unauthorized node. The authorized node and its
HA are mutually trusted after validation. The HA is in charge of a MS for maintaining its
credit, account, service policy, even marking the MS as a malicious node. Thirdly, it
assume that a FA and a HA have a security association [39] [40] [41] [74] [75]. The FA
and HA can be trusted by each other after mutual validations. The trust chain for
integrated MANET, mobile IP, and AAA (Authentication, Authorization, and
Accounting) is provided in Section 4.5.2 (Figure 7). Table 4 and Table 5 list the notations
and messages used for the development of the proposed protocol.
The security protocol for integrated Internet and MANET includes two parts: the
global Internet security of mobile IP and the security of integrated MANET. In order to
communicate with the nodes, a MS performs the following security operations:
1. Key establishment: the MS generates a pair of private and public keys.
2. FA discovery and FA advertisement: the MS finds a route to a FA, sends its public
key to the FA, and obtains FA's advertisement.
3. MS registration with FA and HA: The MS follows an authentication protocol to
register with the FA and HA.
4. Identity Binding at FA: MS's home address, its ad hoc identifier and its public key
are bound by the FA in a certificate for a MS.
5. Certificate issuing: the FA issues this certificate for a MS, and the certificate acts
as the MS' s authenticated pass in the integrated network.
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Figure 18. An Example of Routing Security.
The sequence diagram in Figure 18 illustrates the basic process of security
implementation in the integrated network. The example assumes that it is the first time
for a node (e.g., MSA ) to communicate with a destination (e.g., MS D). Other MSs have
already been successfully registered with the FA. In order to obtain the services from the
Internet and MANET, node MSA must register with the FA first. At first, the MS
generates its private and public keys. The private key is kept secret by the MS. Then MSA
initiates a process of FA discovery to find a route to the FA for registration. FA discovery
starts at node MSA by issuing a routing request message (R_Request) with its signature. In
the route request message, the MS provides its identity and public key to the FA.
R_Request is forwarded to the FA hop by hop. The FA selects a route and replies MSA

with R_Reply. Then node MSA sends solicitation to the FA to request an advertisement
with a CoA. After receiving an advertisement from the FA, node MSA registers with its
HA via the FA by issuing a registration request. The FA and HA finish a series of
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authentications for checking the registration request. Registration reply indicates the
result of the registration. If the registration is successful, the FA binds the identity of
node MSA with its public key in a certificate. Then FA issues node MSA a certificate.
Hereby, node MSA can initiate an ad hoc route discovery for communicating with the
other mobile hosts, e.g., MS D in the integrated MANET or a CN in the Internet.

4.4.1 Global Internet Security of Mobile IP
In the proposed approach, each MS has a local table to record recently received
packet information, e.g., packet source address (MS HM ), nonce (NMS ), and time (t). Each
node shares a secret key with its HA for calculation and validation of MAC (Message
Authentication Code). Certification Authority, HA, and FA have a pair of public and
private keys separately for their mutual authentication.
4.4.1.1 Key Establishment
As a first step in the protocol, a MS uses a key generation function to calculate a pair
of private and public keys. An example of key generation is provided at appendix. The
MS keeps its private key secret. Its public key as well as its identifier (the horne address
of the MS) is sent to the FA via a FA discovery. The MS starts a process of a FA
discovery according to the following subsection.
4.4.1.2 FA Discovery and FA Advertisement
A FA periodically advertises to ad hoc MSs with advertisement: M I, [MIl Kl FA

CertFA; where MJ is advertisement, Sequence, t, FAid and MS coA ' The sequence number is
incremented every time a new advertisement is issued by the FA. While receiving an
advertisement from the FA, the MS decrypts the advertisement by using FA's public key,
and compares the FA's address, timestamp (t), and sequence number with those of
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previously received advertisement in its local table. MS discards the duplicate
advertisements. If it is a fresh advertisement, MS records the FA's certificate, IP address,
timestamp, and sequence number to avoid duplication. The record is also used for
tracking the history of FA's advertisement. A MS may rebroadcast this advertisement on
its interface for the purpose of sending advertisement to the other MSs.
In the beginning, each MS does not have an authenticated public key of the FA. The
process of FA discovery enables a MS to search an available FA and obtains a certificate
of the FA. The public key inside the certificate will be authenticated in the process of
followed registration. If a MS has never received a FA advertisement, but it wishes to
have the knowledge of the route to a FA (i.e., Internet gateway), the MS issues a FA
discovery with a destination address of FA_Address (224.0.0.11); this address is the
mobile agent multicasts group address. Otherwise, if the MS has registered with the FA,
the MS can start its route discovery according to the steps in Section 4.4.2.1 (ad hoc
route discovery). The process for a MS to discover a route to a FA includes two stages as

shown in Figure 19: FA route request and FA route reply.
The process of the FA route request from a MS has four steps as shown in Figure 19
(a). MS initiates R_Request with FA_Address that is signed with its private key. In the
R_Request message, the MS claims its identifier (its home IP address) and its public key
(MS HM , KMS)' When any neighbor A of MS receives R_Request, node A checks against the

local table (MSHM , N MS , and t) to verify whether it has already seen the request and
whether the packet has a valid timestamp. If A has seen this packet before or an invalid
timestamp is found on the packet, A discards the duplicated or invalid request. Knowing
that the destination is FA, the neighbor A cannot verify MS' s identifier because the ad
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hoc MS still has not its certificate issued by the FA. Therefore neighbor A leaves the job
of verification of MS' s signature to FA. The neighbor A rebroadcasts the FA discovery
request after appending its address and signing the packet. All intermediate nodes, e.g., A,
B, and C, must be registered nodes (Figure 19 (a». Aside from above steps, each

intermediate node, except for MS's neighbors (e.g., node Band C, but no A), must
validate the signature of its preceding node with the public key of preceding node, which
is issued by FA and enveloped inside the certificate. Each intermediate node other than
MS's neighbors (e.g., node B and C) but not A, removes the signature of preceding node
before its rebroadcast. In the end, FA receives the route discovery packet. The detailed
message exchanges based on Figure 19 (a) are given below.
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(a) FA discovery: Route Request
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(b) FA discovery: Route Reply
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Figure 19. Steps of FA Discovery.
I.
2.
3.
4.

MS broadcasts route request:
R_Request: [R_Request, MSHM• K MS, FA_Address, N MS • t] Kl MS
A
receives R_Request from MS:
R_Request: [[R_Request, MSHM • K MS, FA_Address. N MS, t] Kl MS. MSHMa ] Kl HMa. CertHMa
B
receives R_Request from A:
R_Request: [[R_Request, MSHM • K MS, FA_Address, N MS • t] Kl MS. MSHMa , MSHMb ] KI HMb. CertHMb
C receives R_Request from B:
R_Request: [[R_Request, MSHM , K MS, FA_Address, N MS , t] Kl MS. MSHMcp MSHMb , MS HMc1 Kl HMc. CertHMc

When a FA receives the route discovery packet from node C as shown in Figure 19
(b), the FA validates C's signature. Also the FA verified MS' s signature using their
public keys claimed in the R_Request message. The FA records the claimed identifier and
the public key of the MS. The identifier and public key will be future verified through the
followed process of the MS's registration (Section 4.4.1.3). If the FA receives several
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valid discovery packets from the same MS, it chooses the best route (e.g., shortest path).
Then, the FA initiates an R_Rep/y packet by using FA's address with a new nonce. FA
returns the R_Reply to MS with the reverse path from MS to FA. Before R_Reply arrives
to MS' s neighbor, each intermediate node validates the signature of the preceding node
and prevents duplication by comparing nonce and timestamp with its local table. Then
each intermediate node rebroadcasts the R_Reply after removing the signature of
preceding node and signing with its own private key. When R_Reply reaches the MS's
neighbor A, A validates the signature of preceding node, and then rebroadcasts the packet
to MS without signing on it. The detailed message exchange based on Figure 19 (b) is
shown below.
5.
6.

FA receives R_Request from C:
R_Rep/y: [R_Rep/y, MSHM , MSHMa, MSHMb • MSHMc • FA id, N FA , tJ Ki FA, CertFA
C receives the R_RepJy form FA:
R_Rep/y: [[R_Rep/y, MSHM , MSHMw MSHMb • MSHMc FA id• NFA , tJ Ki FA, CertFAJ Ki HMco CertHMc

7.

B receives the R_RepJy form C:
R_Rep/y: [[R_Reply, MS HM • MSHMG> MSHM1" MSHMc FA id• NFA • tJ Ki FA, CertFAJ Ki HMb. CertHMb

8.

A receives the R_RepJy form B:
R_Rep/y: [R_Rep/y, MSHM • MSHMa , MS HM1" MSHMc FA id• N FA • tJ Ki FA, CertFA

When the MS receives R_Reply from the neighbor A, it validates the signature of the
FA. Node A doesn't sign R_Reply. It doesn't matter because if any malicious node
provides falsified route information, the MS can detect the falsification by checking the
signature of FA. The MS extracts the route between itself and the FA from the R_Reply.
In the above example, < MSHM , MSHMa, MS HMb , MSHMc FAid > is the route from the MS to
the FA. Now MS can use the route to send a solicitation message to FA. Upon receiving
solicitation message, the FA returns an advertisement to the MS with a CoA. Both the
solicitation and advertisement are protected with signatures. Then, the MS selects the

advertised CoA to register with FA by issuing a registration request message. The
processing of registration has the following steps.
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4.4.1.3 MS Registration with FA and HA
For the purpose of the security of ad hoc network, each node must register with FA
and obtain a certificate from FA before participating in ad hoc routing protocol. There are
two functionalities during registration for a MS: (i) mutually authentication between the
MS and the visiting network (i.e., FA), (ii) mobility binding for the MS according mobile
IP protocol. The scheme assumes that a public key infrastructure (PKI) is available by
HA and FA [74] [75]. Each MS and its HA share a security association to create MAC
(Message Authentication Code) for registration request and reply [41]. A MS performs
cryptographic operation using its secret-key (SMS-HA) to protect the integrity of
registration request. The MS starts its registration by issuing a registration request
carrying the original advertisement as well as its HA address (HA id ) etc. The registration
request message is signed by the MS with the secret key (SMS-HA). Then the registration
request message is forwarded to the FA hop by hop according to the established route
constructed via a FA discovery. Then the registration request is sent to the HA through
the FA after appending FA's nonce. The HA verifies the registration request by checking
the MAC with the associated secret key. The HA further checks advertisement and the
FA by validating the certificate and the signature of FA. After the validation the
registration request and the FA, it returns the registration result to the FA. Then, the FA
validates the HA by checking the certificate of the HA and its signature. After the
validation, it returns the registration result to the MS. Once MS receives a successful
reply from HA, it is guaranteed that FA's certificate is valid. The registration protocol
operates as follows:
(Rl)

MS -> FA:
MS coA'

(R2)

Mb

< M 2> SMS-HA. Where M 2 = Registration Request, FA id, HA id, MS HM ,

NMS , NHA , {Message in advertisement}

FA->HA: {Message in Rl},

NFA
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(R3)

(R4):

(R5):

(R6):
(R7)

HA: (upon receipt of R2):
Validate < M 2> SMS.HA using SMS.HA
Check whether FAid in advertisement = FAid in M2
Validate CertFA based on existing PKI at HA
Validate [MJi Kl FA using authenticated KFA
Continue with the steps in [33][34] (Perkins, Mobile IP support, e.g., updating mobility binding for the MS)
HA->FA: M 3, [M3J Kl HA, CertHA ,
WhereM3=M4,NFA ;
M4= Reply, Result, FA id, HA id, MSHM , MScoA , N'HA, N MS, < M4> SMS.HA
FA: (upon receipt of R4)
Validate NJo"'A
Validate CertHA based on existing PKI at HA
Validate [M3J Kl HA using authenticated KHA
Log this message as a proof of serving MS
Identity binding and certificate creation
Continue with the steps in [8] (Perkins, Mobile IP support, e.g., creating mobility binding for the MS)
HA->MS: M4
MS:
Validate < M4> SMS.HA using SMS.HA
Continue with the steps in [33][34] (Perkins, Mobile IP support, e.g., obtaining registration result)

The process of the secure registrations for all MS creates a trusted integrated MANET.
As shown in Figure 17 (a) the integrated Internet and MANET may have malicious nodes.
The malicious nodes can attack the integrated Internet and MANET by participating in
the activities of routing protocols. The security registration excludes these malicious
nodes by disallowing them from participating in the routing protocols shown in Figure 18
(b). The malicious nodes cannot obtain services from the Internet and MANET. The
detailed information as regards how to achieve it by using certificates and signatures is
discussed next.
4.4.1.4 Identity Binding

Depending on ad hoc network protocols, ad hoc networks may use different
addressing solutions; AODV, DSR, and TORA use Node ID; HSR has a hierarchical
addressing solution; ZLHS use <zone id + node id> as MS ad hoc address. In a
standalone ad hoc network, any MS can easily masquerade itself through changing its ad
hoc identity so that it is difficult for ad hoc network to trace its previous actions.
However, in an integrated network, the proposed security protocol requires each MS uses
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its home address as its ad hoc identifier. Moreover, the home address is bound with its
public key. For each registered MS, the FA issues a certificate to associate the binding.
This binding makes it possible to trace the MS' s history so that the bad credit MS can be
excluded from the ad hoc network routing. A MS claims its home address and its public
key in the process of its FA discovery, and the FA verifies the information through HA
during the MS' s registration. Therefore if a match is found between a claimed home
address and the home address in registration request, the FA associates MS and MS' s
public key to be a certificate as a passport to the MS.

4.4.1.5 Certificate Issuing
Each successfully registered node maintains a copy of certificates of itself issued by
FA as (RS). The certificate (CertMs

= < <MSHM, FAd,

KMSi, Tissue, Texpire»

Ki FA) of an

ad hoc MS includes its permanent IP address (MSHM ), public key (KMS ) , issuing time
(Tissue), and expiring time (Texpire). Because of the uniqueness of the permanent IP address

of the MS, the certificate is unique for each MS. Each certificate has the signature of the
FA, providing the integrity protection from being forged or modified. Since each
registered MS has an authenticated public key of the FA, they can validate the legality of
a certificate using the public key of FA (KFA). The certificate can be used as the passport
for multi-hop routing security. For instance, in the Figure 19, if the registered MS B
receives a routing request packet from the neighboring MS A with the certificate of MS A,
MS B first validates the legality of the certificate of MS A (CertMSa
K MSa, Tissue, Texpire»

= < <MSHMa, FA id,

Ki FA) by verifying the signature of the FA and checking the issuing

and expiration times of the certificate. If the certificate is validated, the MS B reads the
public key of MS A (KMSa ) from the certificate, and uses it to verify the authenticity of
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route request packet. In the next cycle, if MS B receives another packet from MS A with
the same certificate, the MS B can verify the packet directly using the public key of MS A
without validating the certificate again. Before the expiration of the certificate, if the MS
is still on the ad hoc network, it requests the FA with a new certificate and the FA
reissues certificate to the MS with an extended period as (R8).
(R8) FA-> MS, Certificate of MS: CertMs

= <MSHM. FAi<b KMSb Tissue,

Texpire> K JFA

4.4.2 Security of Integrated MANET
Only authenticated MS has a certificate from the registered FA. It guarantees only the
authenticated nodes have the capability to participate in ad hoc route discovery.
Unauthorized nodes cannot obtain services from either the Internet or MANET because
the packets issued by unauthorized nodes are ignored by other nodes. The routing
security for multi-hop communication includes ad hoc route discovery, routing cache,
and routing maintenance.
4.4.2.1 Ad hoc Route Discovery
In order to discover a route to a destination node in the ad hoc network, a MS follows
the steps outlined in Figure 20. If it is the first time for a MS to discover the destination
node, MS creates a pseudo-random number as nonce. Each intermediate node on route to
the destination node validates whether the neighbor, from which the packet is received, is
an authorized one by validating its certificate and the signature. The validation uses the
association between the IP address of the neighbor and its certificate. If in the local table
the

Tissue

and

Texpire

of the neighbor are invalid or expired, the received packet must be

discarded. Each intermediate node records its reverse route, from which the packet is
received, and then signs with its private key before sending a packet out. Ad hoc route
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discovery has two stages: route request and route reply. Figure 20 illustrates the route
discovery with AODV ad hoc routing protocol. In Figure 20, A, B, and C are intermediate
nodes, and X is the destination node. Firstly, MS broadcasts RREQ (Route Request)
marked as R_Request with its signature. The R_Request includes home addresses of the
source and destination node, a nonce, and issue time. The signature of the MS to nonmutable fields (MSHM , MSHMx, NMS , and t) protects the integrity of non-mutable items of
R_Request. The signature of intermediate node is to protect mutable field, such as

hOPJnt, from being modified by other nodes. After receiving the route discovery at the

destination node, the destination node checks the request and replies with R_Repy. For
convenience, in the following example, some route fields, such as route lifetime and
broadcast id, are not shown but those fields should be included in practice.

(a) Ad hoc route discovery: Route Request

@+OIII--{0140111-~@~0111--{@~0111---'@
8

7

6

5

(b) Ad hoc route discovery: Route Reply

Figure 20. Steps of Ad-hoc Discovery.

I.
2.
3.

4.
5.
6.
7.
8.

MS broadcasts:
R_Request: [R_Request, MSHM , MSHMx, N Ms , t] KI MS, CerlMs
A
receives R_Request from MS
1
R_Request: [[R_Request, MSHM , MS HMx , N Ms , t] K 1,fs, hopJnt] KIMSw CertMS. CerlMSa
B
receives R_Request from A
R_Request: [[R_Request, MSHM , MSHMx , N Ms , t] KI MS, hOPJnt] KI MSb, CertMs, CertMSb
C receives R_Request from B
1
R_Request [[R_Request, MSHM , MS HMx , N Ms , t] K MS ' hOPJnt] KI MSco CertMS. CertMsc
Destination node X receives R_Request from C :
R_Reply: [R_Reply, MSHM , MSHM" N x , t, hOPJnt] KIMSxo CerlMSx
C receives R_Reply from destination node X
R_Reply: [[R_Reply, MS HM , MSHMx , N x, t, hOPJnt] KI MSx] KI MSco CertMS:o CertMsc
B receives R_Reply from destination node C
R_Reply: [[R_Reply, MS HM , MSHMx , N x, t, hop_ent] KI MSx] KI MSb, CertMS" CertMsb
A
receives R_Reply from B
1
R_Reply: [[R_Reply, MS HM , MSHMx , N x, t, hOPJnt] K· MSx] KI MSa' CertMsxo CertMSa
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4.4.2.2 Routing Cache
Routing cache is used to provide a faster routing response via intermediate node
before the routing request arrives at the destination node. A MS starts an ad hoc route
discovery by issuing a routing request (R_Request) to search the destination node. If an
intermediate node, which receives the R_Request, has a valid route to destination node in
its route table, the intermediate node issues a route reply (R_Reply) and forwards it to the
source node. In the R_Reply issued by the intermediate node, the original route reply,
which is issued and signed by destination node, should be included. Therefore the source
node can construct a route from the source node to the destination node after checking the
signature of the intermediate node as well as the signature of the destination node. In
Figure 20 (a), for example, when node B receives a route request from MS, if node B has
a valid route leading to the destination node, node B creates a route reply message
(R_Reply) and sends the message to the source node. After checking the signature of

node B and X, source node MS constructs the route from MS to X via B.
9.

receives R_Request from A
R_Reply: [R_Reply, MS HM, MS HM" NMSh , t, [Rx_Reply] Kl MS" hOPJnt] Kl MSb, CertMSh; where Rx_Rep/y is the
routing reply issued earlier by destination node x.

B

10. A

receives R_Request from B
1
1
R_Reply: [R_Reply, MS HM , MS HMxo NMSb, t, [Rx_Rep/y] K MSx, hOPJnt] K MSb' CertMsb

4.4.2.3 Routing Maintenance
A route error message (R_Error) is generated by a node to report the failure of a link
due to the movement of nodes. Based on R_Error messages, the source node reconstructs
a new route to destination node. All R_Error messages must be signed by the issuing
node. For example, when the link from node A to node B is broken in Figure 20 (a), node
A creates R_Error to notify node MS the link failure. Upon receiving the R_Error and
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knowing the link failure at node A, node NN issues a new route discovery to search other
route to the destination. The route error message (R_Error) issued by node A is of the
form: [R_Error.

MS HM, MSHMx, MSHMb,

N b,

tJ KI MSb.

4.5 Security Analysis and Network Performance
This section evaluates the security protocol for the integrated Internet and MANET.
The evaluation has two parts: security and performance analysis. The security analysis
illustrates the security achievements on the Internet connectivity as well as the integrated
MANET. The performance analysis includes the effectiveness of key and certificate
management as well as the communication cost for maintaining the security protocoL
Appendix also includes a discussion on key creation, signature and verification algorithm.

4.5.1

Security Analysis on Internet Connectivity

The long-term shared secret key

SMS-HA

is used for authentication at the MS's home

network. We assume that SMS-HA is kept secret meaning that a malicious MS cannot obtain
SMS-HA.

Moreover, the long term private keys held by FA and HA cannot be obtained by

an attacker. We also assume the security operations at FA and HA are strong enough
from being compromised. For example, HA correctly authenticates the credentials of the
registering MS. The certificates issued by FA are resilient to brute-force and
cryptanalysis attacks. The private keys of FA and MSs are properly kept secret by
themselves from stealing and guessing. It means that the signatures of FA and MS cannot
be broken by an attacker. According to above assumptions, the security protocol achieves
the goals of preventing the attacks of bogus registration, reply attacks, unauthorized
routing, and forged FA. In order to obtain services from the Internet or MANET a MS
first issues a FA discovery to establish a path between the MS and the FA by using
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authenticated nodes. This avoids unregistered malicious nodes to mislead route or drop
registration messages with the intention of hindering MS registration. Then, by trusting
HA for authentication, the security protocol ensures that the MS' s registration request is
legitimately created. Moreover, the security protocol also ensures that the MS's
registration request has not been changed during the forwarding from MANET to F AlHA.
In the end, the certificate issued for the successful registered MS, protects the ad hoc
route discovery.
In this security protocol, all the route creations and communications take place among
the trusted nodes verified by FA (Sections 4.4.1 and 4.4.2). The registered MS ignores all
the control messages from an unauthorized MS. Thus, an unauthorized node cannot
participate in the routing activity of this protocol due to lacking a validated certificate.
The only exception is the route request in the process of FA discovery. The genuineness
of this request is authenticated by verifying the MS' s identity during the registration.

Bogus Registration: When a malicious node in the integrated MANET makes a fake
registration by masquerading itself as someone else, the malicious node issues a forged
registration message with an invented or spoofed address. The forged registration will be
stopped at the step (R3) of Section 4.4.1.3 (Validate < M2 > SMS-HA using
the malicious node does not have the knowledge of secret key

SMS-HA)

(SMS-HA)

because

associated

between the invented or spoofed address and the related HA.

Replay Attacks: The nonce (e.g., N MS, N HA , and N FA ) and timestamp (i.e., t) is used in
all mobile IP and routing messages to ensure that a registration or routing message
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contain a unique data to prevent replay attacks. Each registration or routing request has a
nonce, and a new nonce in the registration or routing reply message indicates the next
nonce for the next request.
Forged FA: When a MS advertises itself as a fraudulent FA, there are two possibilities

for MSs that are under the coverage of the forged FA
1.

the MSs that have not yet registered with HA via a correct FA,

11.

the MSs that have successfully registered with FA and HA.

Assume MS A is in the first case and it starts FA discovery by providing its public
key in the route request message. The forged FA then replies the MS A directly because
the MS A is under the coverage of the forged FA. Then MS A tries to register with the
forged FA. A registration message with a MAC association created by using MS A's
secret key (SMS-HA) is sent to the forged FA. The forged FA cannot reply MS A a
registration reply message with a correct MAC because the forged FA has no knowledge
of the secret key of MS A (SMS-HA). If the forged FA sends the registration message to MS
A's HA, the registration is declined at the step of (R3) in IV.A.2 (Validate CertFA based

on existing PKI at HA, Validate [Mll Ki FA using authenticated

KFA).

If the forged FA

uses an earlier registration reply message in attempt to cheat the MS A, the MS A can
know the trick due to the protection of nonce. Therefore the forged FA cannot cheat MS
A and its HA. Then MS A tries another FA until it registers with a correct FA.

Let's consider the second case. When MS B receives an advertisement from the
forged FA, if MS B doesn't want to leave the integrated MANET, MS B will not go to
register with the forged FA since the MS B has successfully registered with a correct FA.
The worse situation is that MS B tries to make a handoff to the forged FA by registering
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with the forged FA. However, MS B cannot successfully register with the forged FA for
the same reasons as explained in the first case. Therefore, MS B will keep its registration
with the correct FA.
In the next cycle, if MSs A and B receive the fraudulent advertisements again, MSs A
and B just ignore it because there was no successful registration with the forged FA
earlier. The MSs, which are located in the direct transmission range of the forged FA,
will not forward the fraudulent advertisement to other MSs. So the forged FA has no
negative effect on the MSs that are outside the radio coverage of the forged FA.

4.5.2

Security Analysis on Integrated MANET

The important principle in the security protocol

IS

that unauthorized MSs are

excluded from the integrated MANET. Unauthorized nodes cannot obtain services from
the Internet and MANET since the packets from unauthorized nodes will be discarded by
registered MSs. Before participating in ad hoc routing protocol, a MS must register with
FA to obtain a certificate from FA. During registration, the HA authenticates the
registering MS and its visiting FA. Once the MS receives a successful registration reply
from the HA, it is assured that the FA is valid. Meanwhile if MS successfully registers
with FA, it is an authorized ad hoc MS. The proposed registration plays two main roles: (i)
unique mobility and security certificate binding at the HAIFA, and (ii) establishment of
trust relationships amongst ad hoc MSs.

Unique mobility and security certificate binding at HAIFA: Each MS has a unique
home address. Each MS's home address is bound with a public key in a certificate by FA.
No node other than FA can create a correct certificate on behalf of FA because no other
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node has the private key of FA. Hence the identity binding in each certificate is unique
for each MS.

Establishment of trust relationships amongst MSs: Figure 21 illustrates the trusted
model for integrated MANET, Mobile IP, and AAA (authentication, authorization, and
accounting). If there is a security association (SA) between the two entities (e.g., HA, FA,
MS), and the SA has been validated, then the two entities are trusted with each other. For
example, in Figure 21, SA2 can be established after the mutual authentication between
node A's HA and its AAAH server. In Figure 21, node A and HA AAA server of node A
(A's AAAH server) have the SAL If the SAl is verified, then the trust relationship
between node A and A's AAAH server is established. The proposed protocol verifies the
SAl with the process of registration. Node A starts a security authentication by issuing a
registration request with a MAC calculated by using the secret key (SMS-HA). The
registration request messages are protected from being modification during the ad hoc
and internet delivery due to the MAC protection. Therefore, the HA can validate SAl
after receiving the registration request. Also, the A's AAA H checks whether node A has
the acceptable credentials or not. In the wired network, a series of security associations
(SA2, SA3, and SA4) are checked based on the peer trust relations [74] [7S]. The FA
authentication server (AAAF) obtains the authenticating result from the external home
authentication server (AAA H of node A). Finally, if the node A's registration request is
approved, then the node A and FA are mutually trusted. It is because the security
associations constructs a trust chain (SAS) between node A and FA (in Figure 21, if SAl,
SA2, SA3, SA4, then SAS).

lOS

In the same way, when node B is successfully registered, the trust relationship
between node B and FA (SAlO) is established (in Figure 21, if SA6, SA?, SA8, SA9,
then SAlO for node B). Further, node A and B both are authorized nodes, and can be
trusted by each other (in Figure 21, if SA5, SAlO, then SAIl). Similarly, if other nodes
(e.g., C, D, and E) are authorized nodes, these nodes are trusted nodes too. The trust
relations are associated by way of certificates issued by FA.

Figure 21. The Trust Model for Integrated MANET, Mobile IP, and AAA.
The proposed ad hoc route discovery prevents attacks in terms of integrity, impersonation,
confidentiality and cooperation.

Integrity: Each ad hoc routing message is signed by using the private key of each sender.

The receiver verifies the certificate and signature of the sender. Each authorized node
keeps its private key secretly. Therefore, the signature and verification prevent antiintegrity attacks in the ad hoc routing protocol. The attacks of modification and routing
loop can be prevented by the integrity protection of routing messages.

106

Impersonation: In the integrated network, the proposed approach binds the MSs' home
addresses with public key in the ad hoc network. The binding is unique because of the
uniqueness of MS' s home address. The secret key encryption prevents impersonation on
registration by way of MAC. The private key and the certificate prevent impersonation on
ad hoc routing by signing and verifying. Therefore, it becomes difficult for any MS to
masquerade itself by spoofing or inventing an address either in registration or in ad hoc
routing. Fabrication can be avoided by protecting the identity of each MS.

DOS: The access control is achieved by issuing a certificate to each MS by FA in step
IV.A.S of the protocol. Based on the assumption stated at the beginning of Section 4.4,
trusted nodes with valid certificates will participate properly in ad hoc routing and
communication protocol. On the hand, we can consider all MSs are selfish and are not
willing to relay traffic for other MSs in order to save their own resources. Thus, schemes
like [66] [67] [68] [69] [70] are needed to stimulate the active participation of packet
forwarding and deter malicious actions through manipulating

~he

billing or credit account.

Since each MS has a certificate, all nodes on a multi-hop path can be authenticated by the
source or destination. Based on the reports from multi-hop network, the BS can verify the
communication path and keep track of each register MS. According the traffic on the path,
the BS can decide which accounts should be charged or credited [66] [67]. The low credit
node is given less priority in network services such as low internet bandwidth. Even if a
registered MS acts as a malicious node, malicious behaviors can be detected with the
complaints of other MSs.
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4.5.3 Performance Analysis
Analysis and simulations are conducted to evaluate the effectiveness of the proposed
security protocol in terms of computation overhead, communication cost, and security
achievements. The computation overhead depends on many factors, for instance, the
algorithms for key creation, signing and verifying as well as security level. A MS can
pre-create a pair of private and public keys. Currently, there are a number of asymmetric
key cryptosystem in literature, e.g., RSA, DSA, EIGamal, and Elliptic Curve DSA. The
RSA (Rivest, Shamir, and Adelman) is based on the difficulty of factoring large integers.
The EIGamal is the cryptosystem based on the difficulty of solving the discrete logarithm
in the multiplicative group of a field. The ECC (Elliptic curve cryptosystem), which is
based on the difficulty of solving a discrete logarithm problem in the group of points on
an elliptic curve, is a competing system because it offers equal security with a smaller
key size. An implementation of the key creation, signature and verification based on the
DUEC signature techniques is implemented for evaluating the proposed security
approach for integrated network (see appendix).
The communication cost incurred by the proposed security protocol includes two
parts (i): communication cost of FA discovery, registration, and distribution of
certificates, (ii) the communication cost for maintaining the certificates. The overhead of
ad hoc routing is not considered because it is not caused by the proposed security
protocol. We assume that the ad hoc network uses AODV protocol, and there are n MSs
in the integrated MANET, in which n' is the node outside the coverage of the FA.
Therefore, it has (n-n') nodes located inside the coverage of the FA). Let Anh is the
average number of hops from all MSs to FA. Let A'nh is the average number of hops from
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the MSs, which is outside the coverage of FA, to FA (A'nh 2: Anh). Let Aps be the average
package size of all kinds of control packets, e.g., R_Request, R_Reply, Registration
request and reply, and Certificate.

The communication cost for initiating an integrated MANET: It has two stages for
registration and authentication during initiating an integrated MANET. In the first stage,
(n- n') nodes hear the advertisement from FA, and register with the FA. For each
registration, it has 5 messages (advertisement solicitation, advertisement with CoA,
registration request, registration reply, and certificate issuing of the MS). The number of
wireless transmissions needed for (n- n') registrations is 5*(n- n'). In the second stage,
the n' nodes outside the coverage join the MANET one by one. Considering k (k

:s n')

nodes have already joined the integrated MANET, the (k+ 1) th MS joins the integrated
MANET according to the steps illustrated in Figure 18:

• The number of transmissions for a route request during FA discovery is ((n-n')
+ k + 1) for the route request to reach a FA. In this case, the route request
floods through the whole integrated MANET.
•

The route reply message returns to the (k+ l)th node via A'nh transmissions
because the route from the MS to FA has been constructed.

• Each message including advertisement solicitation, advertisement with CoA,
registration request, registration reply, and certificate issuing of the MS, needs
Anh transmissions.
Therefore, the number of transmissions (lnitiating_MANET [(k+ 1) th)) caused by the
(k + 1) th MS to join the integrated MANET is:
Initiatin~MANET [(k+ 1) th]

=«n-n') + k + 1) + 6 A'nh =6 A'nh + (n - n') + k + 1
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The number of transmissions (Initiating_MANET (n'» for initiating an integrated
MANET (n nodes) is:
n'-l

Initiatin~MANET (n')

=I

[6A'nk + (n - n') + k + 1]

=n'(6 A'nh + n -

o.S n' + o.S)

k~

The total number of transmissions

(lnitiatin~MANET

(n» for initiating an integrated

MANET (n nodes) is:
Initiating_MANET (n)

= S * (n-n') + Initiatin~MANET (n') = Sn + n'

(6 A'nh +

n - O.S n' - 4.S)

The total communication cost (lnitiating_MANETcost (n» for initiating an integrated
MANET with n nodes is:
Initiatin~MANETcost

(n) =

Initiatin~MANET

(n)

* Aps =

(Sn + n ' (6 A'nh + n -

o.S n ' - 4.S»Aps

The communication cost for maintaining certificates: For simplicity, we assume each
MS has the same certificate updating interval. Let t is the certificate updating interval for
each node. Before a certificate expires, its MS issues an ad hoc route discovery for
constructing a route from the MS to FA if the MS has no fresh route to FA. The routing
packets are not counted because it depends on routing protocols and mobility of mobile
hosts. After the route from the MS to FA is constructed, the MS issues a certificate
request message to FA. FA broadcasts a new certificate with a new issuing time and an
extended expiration time to other nodes in the integrated MANET.

• A certificate request message is sent to FA via the constructed route.
A' nh transmissions.
•

A new certificate is sent back the MS. It also causes A' nh transmissions.
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It causes

Therefore, the number of transmissions for reissuing a certificate in an integrated
MANET with n nodes (Certificate_MANET (1)) is:
Certificate_MANET (1) = Anh + Anh = 2Anh
The communication cost for reissuing a certificate in an integrated MANET with n
nodes (Certificate_MANETcos t (1)) is:
Certificate_MANETcost (1)= Certificate_MANET (1)

* Aps = 2AnhAps

The total number of transmissions for reissuing n certificates in an integrated MANET
with n nodes (Certificate_MANET (n)) is:
n

Certificate_MANET (n) =

L Certificate_MANET (k) = 2nAnh
k=1

The communication cost for reissuing n certificates in an integrated MANET with n
nodes (Certificate_MANET cost (n)) is:
Certificate_MANETcost (n) = 2nAnh Aps.

Experimental result of Security Achievement:
In order to verify the proposed approach, experiments were carried out to evaluate the
security achievements and the communication cost on the proposed security protocol.
The experiments were conducted by using NS-2 [73] and the tested integrated network is
configured as shown in Figure 2. An integrated network, which has a FA and 100 ad hoc
nodes are tested for various security attacks. The FA was located in the center of
simulation areas and connected to HA by a router. MSs are randomly located in the
simulation area. The AODV protocol coordinates with Mobile IP protocol for providing
global internet connectivity.
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Figure 22. Security Attacks and Security Achievements.
The scenarios with the dimensions 1000m x 1000 m are created with different
percentage of malicious nodes that are randomly distributed in the simulation area. For
the first scenario, the malicious nodes modify registration request from a genuine MS so
that the MS cannot obtain the correct Internet connectivity. As shown from Figure 22(a),
when the percentage of malicious nodes increases, the more MSs cannot obtain the
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Internet connectivity. However, in the secure registration process, most of the MSs obtain
the internet connectivity because of secure registration scheme in the IV.A. Only a few
MSs are isolated and cannot reach the FA with correct intermediary nodes.
In the second scenario, we measure the DOS attack, as described in IILB, with the
metric of packet delivery ratio, which is the percentage of CBR packets received by the
destination in comparison with the number of the CBR packets generated by the source
MS. In the DOS attack, the malicious nodes drop the data packets from a MS when they
are selected an intermediary node for ad hoc communication. In the experiments, five
connections were initiated between five pairs of randomly selected MSs. CBR packets
were sent on each connection with the rate of 10 packets per second. If there is no route
discovery security, as shown in Figure 22 (b), the packet delivery ratios decrease when
the percentage of malicious nodes increases. However, a secure route discovery in
Section 4.4.1.2 circumvents the malicious nodes. In this case, the packet delivery ratios
are almost not affected by malicious nodes as can be seen from Figure 22 (b).
Also, experiments were designed to test the Internet connectivity with the attack of
Forged FA. In the experiments, one, two or three forged FAs are created and randomly
distributed in the simulation area. Each forged FA send advertisements to allure MSs to
register as illustrated in Section 2.2.6. It can be observed from Figure 22 (c) that a very
higher percentage of MS cannot obtain the correct Internet connectivity because of the
forged FAs. By following the secure registration in Section 4.4.1, each MS authenticates
the forged FA, and finally creates the correct connections to the correct FA. Similar to
scenario-I, it also has a few MSs that are temporally isolated and cannot reach any
correct intermediary nodes.
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Experimental result of communication cost: In the following experiments, different
sizes of ad hoc networks (10 to 100 nodes) are tested. The experimental scenarios were
set with the following dimensions (i): 670m x 670m for 10, 20 and 30 nodes, (ii) 1000m
x 1000 m for 50 nodes and 100 nodes. The communication cost is analyzed based on the
following stages:

• Initiating the integrated Internet and MANET with different sizes of networks,
• Certificate reissuing for MSs after initiation .
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Figure 23. Communication Cost in Different Sizes of Ad hoc Network
Each theoretic value in Figure 23 (a) and (b) is calculated based on an estimated value
of Anh and A/nh . For example, observed from a scenario of 20 nodes in a 670 x 670
domain, Anh is larger than 1 but less than 1.5 hops. In the theoretic calculation, 1.5 hops
are used for Anh in this scenario. Furthermore, in the theoretic calculations, the Anh values
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are set as 1.3, 1.5, 2, and 2.25 hops for 10, 30, 50, and 100 nodes respectively. In all
experiments, it is less than 20% experimental area covered by FA. In the theoretical
calculation, we set

A'nh

to 1.25Anh . In Figure 23 (a) and (b), it shows that the overhead

either for initiating an integrated network or reissuing

0

certificates increases when the

size of MANET increases. As shown in Figure 23 (a), to initiate an integrated MANET
without a security has less overhead than the secure scenario because MSs in an
unsecured network may hear, even eavesdrop an advertisement from a neighboring
without going through the FA. With security, as can been seen from the calculation of
Initiatin~MANET (D),

the communication complexity for initiating an integrated

network is 0 (02). However, it could not significantly affect the scalability because each
MS only registers with FA once when it enters the network. The network maintains the
certificates with the communication complexity of 0 (D). This also can be seen from
Figure 23 (b) that the overhead for certificate issuing does not show significant additional
overhead of security. In addition, the certificate for each MS typically is updated just
before the expiration of its certificate.
As seen from Figure 23 (a) and (b), the experimental results are less than theoretic
values. It is because the estimated Anh and A'nh values in theoretical calculation are larger
than experimental values.

4.6 Conclusion
The integrated Internet and MANET provides the Internet connectivity for MSs and
ad hoc communication. The proposed security protocol protects the Internet connectivity
and ad hoc route discovery from various attacks. Compared to the security solution for
pure ad hoc networks, the proposed security protocol takes advantage of infrastructure-
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based Internet authentication to enhance the trustworthiness amongst MSs. On the base of
overall authentications among MSs, FA and HA, malicious nodes can be effectively
excluded from participating ad hoc routing activities. The ad hoc routing security is
achieved by the certificates issued by FA. The certificates exclude those unauthorized
nodes from misleading FA discovery and ad hoc route discovery. The extensive
experiments show the security achievements and the efficiency of the protocol.
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PARTB
ON SECURE MOBILITY MANAGEMENT IN
HETEROGENEOUS MULTI-HOP WIRELESS
NETWORKS
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CHAPTER V
MULTI-HOP CELLULAR IP: A NEW APPROACH
TO HETEROGENEOUS WIRELESS NETWORKS
This chapter proposes a new Heterogeneous Multi-hop Cellular IP (MCIP) network
that integrates multi-hop communication with Cellular IP. MCIP increases the coverage of
the wireless network and improves the network robustness against adverse propagation
phenomena by supporting communication in dead zones and areas with poor radio
coverage.

MCIP includes three

components:

location management, connection

management and route reconfiguration. Location management

IS

responsible for

maintaining the location information for Mobile Stations (MSs)

III

a local domain.

Connection management establishes an initial path for data transmission and a route
reconfiguration mechanism is proposed to take advantage of various multi-hop connection
alternatives available based on terminal interfaces, network accessibility and topology.
Our simulation results show that MCIP performs well in networks of various sizes
including scalability, throughput, and packet delay.

6.1 Introduction
In the near future, a large number of Mobile Stations (MSs) will be equipped with
multiple radio interfaces for wireless access to the Internet. A multi-mode MS with
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multiple air interfaces (cellular interface, Bluetooth, IEEE 802.11 and IEEE 802.16 etc)
and different data rates will be able to access cellular Base Stations (BSs), WLAN or
WMAN Access Points (APs). In this scenario, the integration of multi-hop ad hoc
communications with infrastructure based (or single-hop) wireless networks, such as
wireless WANs (e.g., 2.5G, 3G, and 4G), wireless LAN (e.g., IEEE 802.11 a1b/e/g and
HiperLAnl2) and wireless MANs (e.g., IEEE 802.16), is fundamental to improving the
coverage and performance of the integrated network [2]. In addition, multi-hop
communications can be used to increase the utilization and capacity of a BS by
decreasing the co-channel interference via lowering the transmission power either of the
BS or of the MSs [44] [49]. Also, the integration can be useful in achieving loadbalancing by forwarding part of the traffic from an overloaded cell to a free neighboring
cell [45] [49]. Many communication scenarios may benefit from heterogeneous multi-hop
networks with the desirable properties of ubiquitous coverage and higher data rates. The
integration of multi-hop communications with infrastructure-based networks is not a
simple task, however. It involves numerous challenges including efficient spectrum
utilization, integrated routing, Quality of Service (QoS) support, security, and mobility
management 3. In this chapter we consider the mobility management and routing
problems, which are two basic building blocks required to support the desired seamless
handoffs across heterogeneous networks. The proposed Multi-hop Cellular IP (MCIP)
protocol integrates multi-hop relaying with Cellular IP [36] [37] and Mobile IP [34] [35].
As in Cellular IP, the MCIP protocol differentiates between local and global domains. A
local domain is a local wireless network consisting of MSs, cellular BSs and/or WLAN
APs and an Internet Gateway. In order to simplify the description of MCIP, we use the
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term BS on generic sense to refer to any network attachment point that provides wireless
access to MSs, i.e., a cellular BS or a WLAN AP. Also, we define single-hop MSs as the
MSs that are able to communicate directly, in a single-hop, with a BS, while multi-hop
MSs are the ones that connect to the BS through multi-hop ad hoc routes. MCIP provides
mobility support for single or multi-hop MSs inside a local domain, while mobility
between local domains or networks is handled through legacy Mobile IP. Moreover, the
MCIP maintains the basic features of Cellular IP, as it provides fast and smooth mobility
for single hop MS in heterogeneous multi-hop networks. They key contributions of MCIP
are:

• A micro-mobility management for heterogeneous multi-hop networks;

• A connection and multi-hop routing configuration scheme for increasing
network coverage and capacity.
The rest of this chapter is structured as follows: the background and related work are
discussed in Section 6.2. Then, the heterogeneous MCIP network model is proposed in
Section 6.3. Section 6.4 describes the details of location management, connection
management and route reconfiguration in the proposed MCIP protocol. The MCIP
implementation issues are identified in Section 6.5 and experimental results are provided
in Section 6.6. Finally, the chapter is concluded in Section 6.7.

6.2 Background and Related Work
5.2.1

Mobility Management Protocols

Mobile IP [34] [35] performs its mobility management with two entities: home agent
(HA) and foreign agent (FA). HA and FA advertises their existence by periodically
sending advertisement on the home network and foreign network respectively. When a
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MS visits a foreign network, it picks a care-of-address (COA) from the beacon message
advertised by the FA and initiates a registration procedure by sending a registration
request to FA. The FA then forwards the registration request to the HA. After creating the
mobility binding for the MS, HA responds to FA with a registration reply message
carrying out the registration result. Then, FA forwards the registration result to the MS so
that the MS can receive the packets from the correspondent node (CN) via the HA,
Internet, and FA.
Mobile IP provides a continuous Internet accessibility for a MS at its visiting foreign
network, but it is inadequate in terms of seamless handoff support in micro-mobility
environment where transitions between network attachment points could be frequent.
Every time a MS changes its attachment point, Mobile IP requires the MS to register with
the network and create a mobility binding which causes significant delay during
migration. The Cellular IP [36] [37] protocol provides efficient mobility and handoff
support for frequently moving MSs. In Cellular IP network, a gateway separates cellular
access network from the Internet. In a local cellular access network, there is no need for a
MS to register with FA when MS moves from a BS to another, thereby supporting fast
handoff using HLR-VLR.

5.2.2 Mobility Management in Heterogeneous Networks
Consider the communication scenario shown in Figure 24. As can be noted, MS3 can not
obtain services from the Internet via standard Cellular IP because: (i) MS3 is located
outside the direct transmission range of any BS or it is in a poor coverage area; and (ii)
standard Cellular IP only supports single hop communication from a MS to a BS. In fact,
if MS3 and other intermediate MSs (e.g., MS 2 and MS 1 in Figure 24) were equipped
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with dual-mode radio interface (e.g., cellular and IEEE 802.11), MS3 could connect to
the Internet via a multi-hop route (MS 3-2-I-BS-Internet, as shown in Figure 24). In
order to allow such a communicating scenario, a new architecture is needed for providing
efficient mobility management and routing schemes that support heterogeneous multihop communication.

c

Core IP network with Mobile IP

Internet

Multi -hop Relay: IEEE 802.11

Global Mobility

Multi·hop Cellular IP

Figure 24. Heterogeneous Multi-hop Access Network and Mobile IP.
Existing mobility management protocols

are not optimized

for multi-hop

heterogeneous networking scenarios. Mobile IP can support global mobility, but it is not
designed for micro-mobility management in a local domain as shown in Figure 24. On
the other hand, Cellular IP suffers from two key drawbacks in a multi-hop heterogeneous
scenario: (i) it does not support communication between heterogeneous wireless networks;
(ii) it cannot provide service to MSs that are out of the coverage or have poor signal
quality from a BS. Therefore, it is necessary to design new mobility management
architectures and protocols that exploit the multi-hop communication paradigm and
support seamless mobility in ubiquitous multi-hop heterogeneous scenarios.

If a MS moves outside the coverage of a BS or moves into an area with poor signal
quality, the mobility management protocol should have the capability of detecting the
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possibility of reaching a BS through a multiple-hop path. In general, the integration of
multi-hop communications imposes important challenges including location management,
route creation and maintenance. The location management requires that single hop or
multi-hop MSs periodically report their locations to the network so that they can be
reached when data packets are received from the Intemet. In addition, a single hop or
multi-hop MS must be able to detect and construct a path to a network attachment point
(BS) in order to have connectivity "anytime and anywhere". However, the multi-hop
routes between MSs and BSs could be easily broken due to the mobility of intermediate
MSs. Therefore multi-hop route creation and maintenance are important issues for
efficient integration of multi-hop communication and Intemet accessibility. The key
challenges in this environment can be summarized as follows:
•

How to track multi-hop MSs at the fixed network components (BSs)?

•

How to create communication route from a multi-hop MS to a BS?

•

How to handle route reconfiguration if intermediate nodes in multi-hop route
move away?

•

How to improve connection quality and performance (which is changing due to
mobility) by route reconfiguration?

5.2.2

Mobility Management Related Work

Several routing protocols have been proposed for integration of multi-hop
communication in wireless networks. These protocols can be divided into two categories:
multi-hop cellular networks and multi-hop WLAN networks. The architectures for the
cellular multi-hop networks include A-GSM [43], MCN [44], iCAR [45], MADF [46],
UCAN [47], ODMA [48], and SOPRANO [49], and Two-Hop-Relay [50]. On the other
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hand, architectures for multi-hop WLAN networks include HWN [51], I-hop and 2-hops
Direct Transmission [52].
Multi-hop cellular network (MCN) [44] and Ad hoc GSM (A-GSM) [43] extend the
coverage of a BS by using multi-hop relaying. MCN enables two MSs to communicate
with each other via multi-hop relaying or through a BS. Ad hoc GSM (A-GSM) supports
communication in the dead zones or poor radio coverage areas. Opportunity driven
multiple access (ODMA) [48] breaks a single CDMA transmission from a MS to a BS
into several multiple wireless hops, thereby reducing the transmission power and cochannel interferences. In UCAN [47], MSs with a low data rate in the downlink channel
with the BS can constructs a multi-hop route using relay nodes with better downlink rates
to connect to the BS. The iCAR [45]and MADF [46] address the problem of cellular
congestion due to unbalanced traffic in a cellular system. The iCAR system diverts the
traffic from an overcrowded cell to a neighboring cell that has lower load by making use
of dedicated stationary relay stations. Similarly, MADF diverts the traffic of MSs in a hot
spot BS to its neighboring cold spot BSs by the relaying through other MSs. SOPRANO
[49] advocates self-organization at the physical, data link, and network layers for the
purpose of optimizing the capacity of multi-hop cellular network. The Two-Hop-Relay
architecture [50] exploits the availability of dual-mode terminals that can act as ad hoc
relaying station between a single hop and multi-hop domains.
In I-hop and 2-hops Direct Transmission [52], besides the option to communicate
through the AP, two MSs can directly communicate (one-hop direct transmission), or can
use an intermediate relaying station in a multi-hop transmission. The Hybrid Wireless
Network (HWN) [51] architecture allows each cell (BS) to select the operation mode
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between the typical single-hop or in the ad hoc mode. The motivation for this scheme is
that a single-hop mode performs better for sparse topologies, while the ad hoc mode is
well suited for dense topologies, where in network connectivity can be ensured. The BS
runs an algorithm to decide the operation mode that maximizes the throughput based on
the topology information received from the nodes. A detailed comparison of multi-hop
architectures can be found in 3.
If the Mobile IP protocol [34] [35] is used to support handoffs between BSs in all the
above multi-hop cellular and multi-hop WLAN networks, an update message must be
sent to the MS's home agent (HA). After creating a new location binding for the MS
through the FA, the HA will send the result to the MS via the FA and the visiting BS.
This incurs unacceptable delay in the Internet environment. With a large number of MSs,
the process of registration at every move generates an unacceptable signaling load across
the network. Also, Cellular IP cannot be used for the mobility management scheme
integrated networks. A BS in a standard Cellular IP network can only record single hop
radio mapping of MS, but it cannot do much for multi-hop MS such as recording,
constructing, and maintaining a route.

6.3 Multi-hop Cellular IP Architecture and Design Challenges
5.3.1

Multi-hop Cellular Network Model

This section discusses the architecture of a multi-hop heterogeneous MCIP network,
which is shown in Figure 25. The architecture includes HAIFA, Internet Gateway Router
(IGW), BSs, and MSs. For clarity, the network is divided into global and local domain.
The FA or HA address are used as local domain identifier and IGW address is the CareOf-Address (COA) for local domain. In the global domain, Mobile IP supports the global
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mobility for MSs with the granularity of wireless access networks. An lGW, a FA and a
set of BSs constitute a local wired network. A local domain is connected to global
Internet via an IGW and the BSs are interconnected through wired links and routers. BSs
serve as the communication bridges for MSs. Cellular BSs and WLAN APs can be colocated in the hot-spot area as shown in Figure 25. The deployed MS can be a single
radio mode or multi-mode with multiple radio interfaces. A dual- mode MS can access a
cellular BS by the cellular interface and a WLAN AP by using the WLAN interface.
Furthermore, a dual-mode MS can directly communicate with other WLAN capable MS
in the ad hoc mode. MSs at a given location could be either within or outside the
coverage of cellular BSs and/or WLAN APs. As shown in Figure 25, MS3 is located at
the radio-uncovered-area and a multi-hop route (path MS3-MS2-MSl) is required for
MS3 to communicate with a BS and obtain the Internet service.
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Figure 25. Heterogeneous Multi-hop Cellular IP Network Model.
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5.3.2 Design Challenges
There are three critical issues for providing Internet service for MSs in the MCIP
network of Figure 25, namely: (i) location management for idle MSs, (ii) connection
management, and (ii) multi-hop route reconfiguration for active MSs. Based on the
location management scheme, the fixed network, i.e., BSs, can track the location of each
MS in the local domain, while each MS can record the accessible BSs for Internet
connection. Connection management provides bi-directional Internet accessibility for
MSs. It allows the network to locate a single hop or multi-hop MS when the lOW
receives the first data packet from the Internet to delivery to a MS. It also allows a single
hop or multi-hop MS to set up upstream connection with a CN in the Internet. However,
the bi-directional Internet accessibility cannot be achieved in a straightforward way due
to the mobility of MSs and multi-hop route. For example, in Figure 25, MS3 constructs a
multi-hop route (MS3-MS2-MS1) to BS1 and registers with the FA at a given instant.
After some time, MS3 moves to another location as shown in Figure 25, and the
established multi-hop route (MS3-MS2-MSl) is broken. At this moment, data packets
coming from the Internet for MS3 will be delivered to BS 1 and these packets will be
dropped because the multi-hop route has been broken. In order to maintain up-to-date
location and routing information about all MSs, a significant overhead will incur due to
the mobility of MSs that causes frequent changes in the multi-hop routes. Thus, an
efficient location and connection management scheme is required to maintain bidirectional Internet connectivity for MSs without excessively overloading the network
with location update messages.
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Due to MS mobility in a local domain, there is not only the possibility of having
broken routes, but also the possibility of finding an improved relaying path for
communication. In both cases the original route has to be re-configured to provide
improved connectivity. Thus, a route reconfiguration approach is essential for providing
efficient communication with higher quality route for data transmission, i.e., less delay,
higher speed, or less network congestion. Multi-hop route reconfiguration requires multihop routing detection, construction, and maintenance as MSs are communicating with the
Internet and moving in a local domain.
Routes between MSs and BSs are needed for location reporting for idle MSs, and are
also required for data packet transmission for active MSs. The route used for reporting
MS location may be different from the route used for transmitting data packets. Smaller
overhead in the network and less delay in reporting location can be achieved if the MS
uses a larger range operating air interface. For example, in Figure 27, dual-mode MSs 2
can report its location to BS using cellular radio interface due to longer operating range
and shorter delivery latency. However, MS2 can transmit data packets to BS2 via MS 1
using the IEEE 802.11 air interfaces to achieve higher communication speed. This
separation of routes for location reporting/paging and data packet transmission is
proposed in MCIP to provide improved performance and is described in the following
section.

6.4 Heterogeneous Multi-hop Cellular IP Protocol
In MCIP, MSs operate in one of two states: idle and active. In the idle MSs are
inactive while the active MSs are receiving or sending data packets. Figure 26 illustrates
the state machine of a MS. If there is data to be transmitted or received, the MS
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immediately moves to the active state after starting up the connection management. In the
active state, the MS starts the procedure of route reconfiguration as needed. After
finishing data transmissions, the MS returns to the idle state again, and it only executes
the location management. Figure 26 also shows the basic functionalities provided by
MCIP, namely, location management, connection management, and route reconfiguration.
In addition, MCIP uses the concepts of multi-hop paging and routing caches to
implement location management and route reconfiguration, respectively. Each block in
Figure 26 is described in details in the remaining of this section.

CM

Data
Packet

LM: Location Management
CM: Connection Management
RR: Route reconfiguration

Figure 26. MS State Machine and MCIP functionalities.

5.4.1

Multi-hop PagingIRouting Cache

MCIP uses multi-hop paging caches for maintaining the location of MSs and uses
multi-hop routing caches for keeping the multi-hop routes for data packet transmission. A
multi-hop paging/routing cache stores a single or multi-hop route between the IGW and a
multi-hop MS. The IGW maintains a paging cache with a route to each of its associated
MS. The IGW also maintains a routing cache for each active MS where the route is used
to send data packets. At the same time, each MS keeps paging and/or routing cache
information, depending on its current state. An idle MS periodically reports its location to
its IGW and updates the multi-hop paging cache with the multi-hop route. On the other
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hand, an active MS keeps an additional cache, the multi-hop routing cache, with the route
used for data transmission. Each paging and routing caches have associated timers called
Paging Interval Timer (PIT) and Routing Interval Timer (RIT), respectively. A PITIRIT
is initialized at paging/routing cache creation. When a PIT or RIT expires, the
corresponding paging or routing cache is cleared. Figure 27 illustrates the multi-hop
paging and routing caches stored at the lOW for MS2. As shown in Figure 27, when MS2
is idle, the corresponding multi-h.op paging cache stored by the lOW has the path: IOWBSI-BS2-MS2. In contrast, when MS2 moves to the active state, MS2 or BS2 initiates a
route discovery by IEEE 802.11 interface (if available) for constructing a multi-hop route
for data transmission. Then, a multi-hop routing cache for MS2, with the route IOWBSI-BS2-MS I-MS2, will be created after the process ofroute discovery is completed.
IGW : Cache for id le MS3
Multi-hOp Pagi ng Cache (IGW-BS I-BS2-MS 3)
lOW: Cac he for act ive MS2
Multi-hop Paging Cache ( IGW-BSI-BS2-M S2)
Mu lti-hop Routin g Cache (lGW -BS I -BS2-MSI-MS1)
IGWL~

____~~~~~__~~
BSI

Home/Foreign Agent
Roule for data packet transmission:
Route for location
re art: cellular interface

IEEE 802.11

Figure 27. Multi-hop Paging and Routing Caches.
Each MS creates its multi-hop paging cache when it enters a local domain. In addition,
each MS periodically sends page-update packets to the lOW and updates its multi-hop
paging cache so that the MSs and the network can track each other. The multi-hop paging
cache provides location information for the purpose of downlink connection
establishment between the Internet and the MS. Based on the multi-hop paging cache for
a MS, the lOW has the knowledge of
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•

the wired route from IGW to the BS that the MS is associated with,

•

the single or multi-hop wireless route from the associated BS to the MS and,

•

the number of hops from the associated BS to each MS.

On the other hand, the multi-hop paging cache stored at the MS provides the
following information:
•

the BS the MS is associated with,

•

the number of hops between the MS and its associated BS and,

•

the multi-hop route between the IGW and the MS.

The processes of creating and maintaining the multi-hop paging and routing caches
are discussed in Section 5.4.3 and Section 5.4.4.

5.4.2

MCIP Overview

MCIP supports several connectivity scenarios and involves different procedures for
creating connections in each case. We provide an overview of the protocol's operation in
this section, while the details are described in the following sections.
There are two types of connection establishment for a MS: (i) Downlink (Internet>MS), and (ii) Uplink (MS -> Internet). In the first case, when the IGW receives the first
data packet from the Internet for a MS, the IGW, based on its paging cache, sends the
packet to the BS, where the MS is currently associated. Then, the BS initiates the process
of connection establishment towards the MS (see Section 5.4.4). In the second case, a MS
initiates the process of connection establishment with the Internet if the multi-hop route
from the MS to the Internet stored in multi-hop paging cache is stale. The MS constructs
a route using the range-based search process described in Section 5.4.2. After the
connection is established, the MS creates a multi-hop routing cache by sending a route-
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update packet to lOW. Then, the MS enters into an active state and starts up the route
reconfiguration scheme.
The route reconfiguration scheme is achieved by updating the multi-hop routing
cache for data transmission between the lOW and an active MS, Therefore the path from
the Internet to the MS is kept fresh for data transmission. The following events trigger the
update of the multi-hop routing cache

5.4.2

•

periodic update timer expires,

•

the MS performs a handoff between neighboring BSs and

•

a new higher quality multi-hop route is identified.

BSIMS Search Algorithm

MeIP involves two important route discovery procedures: the BS search algorithm
for locating a MS, and, the MS search algorithm to find the nearest available BS. The
proposed search algorithms reduce the search overhead by limiting the search range
through a TTL (time to live) field in each search packet. When a MS (BS) detects a
broken route to BS (MS) during the transmission of a page-update or data packet, the MS
(BS) starts a search process for a new route to the destination. A search-request packet is
transmitted by the source through the available air interface (cellular and/or IEEE 802.11)
with a search range set by the TTL field. The initial value of TTL is set to the number of
hops recorded in the paging/routing cache. If the first attempt fails, the next search range
is incremented by 1 until the TTL reaches a maximum hop number (M hop )' The interval
between issuing two continuous search-request packets is called the Search Interval.
Upon receiving the search-request packet, an intermediate MS responds with a searchreply packet if it has a fresh route to a BS. Otherwise, it decreases the TTL by 1, and then
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forwards the packet as long as TIL is greater than zero. The search-request packet floods
through the network within the TTL range. When the destination receives the searchrequest packet, it returns a search-reply packet with the reverse route.
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Figure 28. MS Search Process for Locating an Available BS.
Figure 28 describes a MS search process. When MS3 detects that it has lost connectivity
with the BS in Figure 28, it sends a search-request packet with TTL=2, which is the
number of hops recorded in its multi-hop paging/routing cache. If the search-request
packet cannot reach any available BS , as shown in Figure 28, MS3 then enlarges its
search range by setting a larger TTL (TTL=3). The searching process will continue until
the largest search range (Mhop) or a reply message is received from a BS. The BS closest
to the MS (in number of hops) responds with a search-reply packet. The search-reply
packet will be forwarded to the MS3 via the reverse multi-hop route. After the MS search
process, a multi-hop path will be established between the MS and the responding BS. The
multi-hop path can then be used to update multi-hop paging and routing caches.
Figure 29 illustrates a similar search process that is executed by a BS to locate a
destination MS3. As the path stored in the multi-hop paging/routing cache for a MS
becomes stale and the BS needs to send data to the MS, the BS transmits the first searchrequest packet with the search range (TIL) set to 2, as recorded in the multi-hop
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paging/routing cache for MS3 (see Figure 29). If the search-request cannot reach the
destination MS , the BS enlarges the search range (TTL = 3 hops). As MS3 responds with
a search-reply, the BS updates the downlink path to MS 3 (MSI-MS2-MS3).
BS searching range: TIL =2, and the
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Figure 29. BS Search Process to Locate a Destination MS.

5.4.3

Location Management

Location management allows the fixed network (lGW and BSs) to track each MS in
its local domain. If the MS has not yet registered with the HA via the FA, it initiates the
Mobile IP registration process and then sends a page-update packet to the IGW, which
replies with page-reply packet after creating the multi-hop paging cache for the MS. As
illustrated in Figure 30, MS2 constructs a multi-hop route to BS3 via MSI after the
search process is completed. The page-update packet is forwarded to IGW through the
path MSI-BS3-Router-BS2-BSl. After creating a multi-hop paging cache for MS2, a
page-reply packet is sent by the IGW to MS2 via the reverse path.
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Internet Gateway
Router

BSI

BS6

Paging-update packet

3D
HAIFA

MS 2 sends paging-update packet and creates multi-hop
paging cache for MS 2 (IGW-BS I-BS2-Router-BS3MS 1- 2)

Figure 30. A Page-update Packet Creates a Multi-hop Paging Cache.
When an idle MS moves and the path established via a previous BS is lost, the MS
initiates a new search process to locate a new nearest BS and a new multi-hop paging
cache will be created by a page-update packet. The old multi-hop paging cache will be
cleared after the expiration of the PIT. For instance, in Figure 31, when MS2 moves away
from BS3, the route from MS2 to BS3 is broken. Hence, MS2 initiates a search process,
and then receives a reply from BS6, which has the shortest route to MS2. A new pageupdate packet will be forwarded to the IGW via BS6 as shown in Figure 31. A page-reply
packet will be returned to MS2 from the IGW through BS6 after updating its multi-hop
paging cache. The paging routing cache at BS3 and router will be automatically cleared
after the RIT expires.
Internet Gateway

0

BS3

I

2

Paging-update packet
HAIFA MS 2 sends paging-update packet by a new multi-hop route
to BS6 and updates multi -hop paging cache for MS2 (IGWBS I-BS2-BS5-BS6-MS2), IGW replies paging-update packet
carrying the result.

Figure 31. Update of Multi-hop Paging Cache for a Moving MS
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5.4.4

Connection Management

Downlink Connection (Internet 7 MS): When a data packet for a MS arrives at IGW
via the Internet for the first time, the location information in the multi-hop paging cache
is used to establish the downlink connection with the MS. First, the IGW forwards the
data packet to the BS through which the MS is currently accessing the network. Then, the
BS delivers the packet to the destination MS by following the multi-hop paging cache
route for the MS. However, the route in the multi-hop paging cache for the MS may be
,
stale, because of the mobility of MSs. In this case, the BS initiates a BS search process,
as described in Section 5.4.2, to find a new route to the destination MS. For example, in
Figure 31, the data packets for MS2 are" initially forwarded to BS6. However, MS2
moves to a new position before the connection is established, as shown in Figure 32, and
BS6 cannot reach MS2 directly as recorded in its multi-hop paging cache for MS2. Then,
BS6 uses the search procedure to find a new route to MS2. Eventually, the data packets
will be delivered to the destination as a new multi-hop route is created via MS3. Then,
after receiving the first data packet from the Internet, MS2 turns to active state and sends
a route-update packet to the IGW for creating multi-hop routing cache for MS2.
Meanwhile, MS2 starts up the route reconfiguration scheme described in the next section
for exploring an improved path.
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Figure 32. Creating Multi-hop Routing Cache at the First Data Packet from the Internet.
Uplink Connection (MS -7 Internet): In the case of uplink connections, the MSs
forward the packets to their IGW by following its multi-hop paging cache. The IGW
forwards the packet to the destination by following the Mobile IP protocol. Because of
the mobility of MSs, the route in the multi -hop paging cache for the MS may have been
broken since the last update. In this case, the MS initiates a search process to find a path
to the nearest BS. After a new route is found, the MS turns to active state and creates its
multi-hop routing cache by issuing a route-update packet to the IGW. The IGW responds
to the MS with a route-reply packet after creating the multi-hop routing cache for the MS .
Consider the example in Figure 32, where MS 2 tries to establish an uplink connection
with the Internet, but its paging routing cache has stale information, which indicates BS6
as the next hop to forward uplink packets (MS2 was under coverage of BS6, as shown in
Figure 31, but it has moved to the new position shown in Figure 32). Because of the stale
routing information , BS6 cannot receive the packets sent by MS2 , and the link layer of
MS2 can detect the link breakage and report it to network layer. Then MS2 initiates a
search process to find a path to an available BS. After a new route has been constructed
as illustrated in Figure 33, the data can be delivered to the IGW, which forwards the data
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to the corresponding node in the Internet. Meanwhile, MS2 creates a multi-hop routing
cache by issuing a route-update packet, to which, the IGW responds with a route-reply
packet that is forwarded through the reversed path obtained from the route-update packet.
Thereafter the multi-hop routing cache is maintained by route reconfiguration scheme
during the period of packet transmission.
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Figure 33. Creating Multi-hop Routing Cache at the First Data Packet Sending to the
Internet.

5.4.5

Route Reconfiguration

A multi-hop route may include wired and multi-hop wireless links. The wired part of
the route is the path between the IGW and the BS that the MS is currently associated with,
and the wireless part of the route is the path between the BS and the MS. The route
reconfiguration procedure periodically updates both the wired and wireless parts of a
route in the multi-hop routing cache. To update a multi-hop routing cache, a MS sends
out a route-update packet to the IGW before the expiration of the RIT. After updating its
multi-hop routing cache, the IGW replies to the MS with a route-reply packet. The route
reconfiguration has two main goals:
•

To keep the multi-hop routing cache fresh and,
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•

To improve the quality of connection between the multi-hop MSs and BSs if
possible.

Recall that the multi-hop route stored

III

multi-hop routing cache is used for data

transmission. If this multi-hop route becomes stale, data packets will be lost. The route
reconfiguration has the responsibility of rediscovering a new path if the current route is
broken. The multi-hop routing cache is updated after the route discovery process and the
data packets are redirected to the new path. The discovery of higher performance path
during route reconfiguration is based on BS's accessibility, terminal interfaces, and
network topology. For instance, if a dual-mode MS detects a higher speed transmission
path via IEEE 802.11 interface, then it can construct a new and improved path for
communication. As shown in Figure 32 and Figure 33, MS2 establishes an initial
connection through path MS2-MS3-BS6. When a route reconfiguration scheme is
performed after the arrival of MS4, MS2 detects a higher speed route through MS2-MS4MS5-BS6 as shown in Figure 34.
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Figure 34. Update of Multi-hop Routing Cache During Packet Transmission.
In order to maintain the connection for data transmission, the following events result
in an update process of the multi-hop routing cache of a MS:
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Link Broken: When a link breakage toward a BS (MS->Intemet) is detected at the link
layer and reported to the network layer, the MS suspends the process of packet
transmission and initiates a MS search process to construct another multi-hop path to an
available BS. After receiving the search-reply from a BS, the MS sends out a routeupdate packet for the purpose of updating its multi-hop routing cache. If new BS is
different than the old BS, the new data migration process implements handoff in local
domain. On the other hand, if a link toward a destination MS (Intemet->MS) is lost, the
BS suspends the process of data transmissions and issues a BS search process to locate
the destination MS. The MS responds the BS search process with search-reply. At the
same time, the MS initiates the process of updating its multi-hop routing cache by
sending a route-update packet. In the end, the BS restarts the process of packet
transmission.
New BS: A moving MS keeps a record of available BSs, even though the current data
transmission path may be fresh. For a single hop MS, it keeps listening to the beacons
from BSs and determines whether a migration to a different BS should be encouraged or
not. For a multi-hop MS, it detects an available BS by a MS search process. If a BS with
fewer numbers of hops is found, the MS updates the multi-hop routing cache so that the
data packets could be forwarded through the new BS. If a multi-hop MS receives a
beacon directly from a BS, it switches the current connection from multi-hop to single
hop. At the same time, the MS updates its multi-hop routing cache. In this case, a multihop hop communication has been migrated to single-hop. The processes of BS detection
and data packet migration implement the hand-off in the local domain.
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Higher quality multi-hop route: Due to the dynamic nature of multi-hop networks, the
initial path determined by the connection management may not provide the desired
performance. Therefore, it is essential to have a route reconfiguration protocol for MCIP,
which will be responsible for: (i) exploring the path with higher performance; (ii)
redirecting dataflow from a path to another. Four possible connection alternatives
between a MS and a BS are proposed for higher performance in the MCIP network.
Figure 35 illustrates various connection alternatives (I-IV) for data transmission.
I.

MSs located inside the radio coverage of a BS may communicate with the BS
directly, e.g., MSl, MS2, MS3, MSll, and MS14 in Figure 35.

II. MSs (e.g., in Figure 35, MS4, MS5, and MS6) located outside the radio coverage of
a BS can established multi-hop routes to the BS with the help of other MSs. This
kind of multi-hop route extends the service coverage of the BSs. For example, in
Figure 35, MS5 contacts BSI via the path <MS5, MS4, MS2, and BSl>.

III. A single hop connection from a MS to a BS can be broken into several wireless
hops. For example, in Figure 35, MS7 is under the coverage of BS 1; and the path
from MS7 to BSI can be broken into a multi-hop route <MS7, MS3, BSl>. This
connection alternative could reduce the transmission power and co-channel
interferences.
IV. A MS located inside BS's coverage area may communicate with a neighboring BS
by using multi-hop relaying. For example, in Figure 35, if BSI is overloaded and
BS2 has a small traffic load, MS8 could communicate via BS2 using the multi-hop
path <MS8, MS9, MSlO, BS2>. Otherwise, the communication of MS8 would be
blocked in the BSl. The intermediate nodes (e.g., in Figure 35, MSs 9 and 10)
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could be some user terminals or some stationary relays. This feature relives the
cellular congestion by diverting traffic from an overcrowded cell to a neighboring
free cell.

I-IV: Connection Alternatives

5

Figure 35. Connection Alternatives.
A MS may migrate from one connection alternative to another depending on the
quality of the connection. When a MS detects a connection alternative with higher
performance, the MS issues a route-update packet for the purpose of updating its multihop routing cache. Then, the MS or BS redirects the data packets to the new connection.
If a dual-mode MS experiences low performance using its cellular interface, the MS
initiates a MS search process using another radio interface (e.g., IEEE 802.11). After a
new path is found, the MS updates its multi-hop routing cache and redirects its dataflow
to its new interface. For instance, in Figure 36, MSs 1 and 2 are dual-mode MSs having
cellular and IEEE 802.11 g interface. Initiall y connection management for MS 1
establishes the single hop connection to the BS as shown in (Connection Alternatives I).
As MS 1 moves, the route reconfiguration protocol detects that an AP can be reached
through MS2 via its IEEE 802.11 interface. Then, MS 1 constructs a multi-hop route to
the AP (Connection Alternatives II). After updating the multi-hop routing cache, the data
flow of MS 1 migrates from its cellular interface to IEEE 802.11 interface.
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While mov ing, MSI fmd s a higher quality
route via MS2 for data transmission .

Figure 36. Connection Alternative Migration.

5.5 Protocol Implementation Issues
In MCIP, the lGW maintains a multi-hop paging cache for each idle MS at all time.
On the other hand, an active MS maintains its multi-hop routing cache fresh. The MS
also takes advantage of various communication alternatives for interacting with the
heterogeneous MCIP environment. The implementation of such architecture is influenced
by many design factors. The design factors considered here include the interaction with
BS beacon advertisements, control packet overhead, mobility and PITIRIT selection. This
section provides an overview of these design factors and their impact on our
implementation.

5.5.1

BS Beacon Advertisement

A BS in the MCIP network advertises its presence periodically with beacons carrying
FNHA address, IGW address, and its BS address with a sequence number. The MSs in
the transmission range of a BS can directly receive the beacons. The MS outside the radio
coverage could obtain beacons by flooding. However, the flooding of beacon may result
in the overhead of relaying beacons periodically. Instead of this proactive solution, in
MCIP, MSs obtain beacons in an on-demand manner. MSs outside the radio coverage of
any BS obtains the BS information by querying its neighboring MSs. For instance, when
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a MS outside the any BS is switched on, it sends a BS-query packet out. The neighboring
MSs having the fresh BS information responds the MS with BS-query-reply packet and
the route to the BS.

5.5.2

Control Packet Overhead

MCIP uses eight control packets: page-update packet, page-reply packet, route-update
packet, route-reply packet, search-request packet, search-reply packet, BS-query packet,
and BS-query-reply packet. These packets are regular IP packets with new options so that
the packets can be understood in a local MCIP domain. The packets never reach outside
the local domain. These packets have the MS identifier, which can include the MS's IP
home address. Because the search-request and search-reply are broadcast packets, they
have a broadcast identifier to avoid duplicate transmission and reception during
forwarding. When an intermediate MS receives search-request packet, it appends its
address in the packet for the purpose of constructing the reverse multi-hop route to the
destination. The overhead of control packets in a multi-hop communication is influenced
by many factors, including mobility of MS, PIT/RIT, BS/MS search algorithm and its
parameters (e.g., the maximum search range), the network topology, and density of MSs.
Following strategies are used in our implementation to control the overhead including:
•

Not only paging/route-update packets but also registration/routing/data packets
are used to create or update multi-hop paging/routing caches.

•

A single paging/routing/data packet updates multiple paging and routing cache
not only for the sending MS but also for all the intermediate relaying MSs. For
example, in Figure 30, the page-update packet sent by MS2 can result in the
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multi-hop paging updates for both MS2 and MSl. In this case, MS1 has no need
to send an extra page-update packet until the next PIT expiration.
•

When a MS is powered on without any BS information (e.g., beacon), it starts
up a query process to obtain BS information. In order to reduce the number of
MS searching process, a MS learns BS information from control/data packets
and update its multi-hop paging/routing cache either sent by the MS or other
MSs. For instance, in Figure 32, the BS search process at BS6 results in the
update of multi-hop paging/routing cache of MS2. In addition, MS3 obtains the
path to BS6 from this process and the multi-hop paging/routing cache for MS3
can also be updated since the MS3 acts as the intermediate relaying MS for
reaching MS2.

5.5.3

Mobility and PagingIRouting Interval Timer (PIT IRIT)

PIT and RIT are two key parameters that determine the performance of the MCIP
protocol. The MSs having a higher value of PaginglRouting Interval report their locations
to IGW with less frequency causing smaller overhead in the wireless network. If the
PaginglRouting Interval is large for frequently moving MSs, it is more difficult for the
network to locate the MSs when required. In case of a MS moving away from the
maximum search range of BS without reporting its location, the Internet connectivity will
be lost until the next update of multi-hop paging cache. Compared with a higher value of
PITIRIT, a lower PITIRIT value will result in heavier overhead in the wireless network
because of frequent control packet transmissions. Mobility is the key factor in deciding
the best values for PIT and RIT. The higher the mobility of MS, the lower the PITIRIT
should be.
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Hand-off

5.5.4

In the local domain of a heterogeneous MCIP network, the handoff of MS from a BS
to another is called intra-domain-handoff. The processes illustrated in the Figure 30 and
Figure 31, where MS2 migrates from BS3 to BS6, implement the intra-domain-handoff.
In this case, the MS updates its multi-hop paging cache through a new BS. On the other
hand, for

an active MS, the intra-domain-handoff is

implemented by route

reconfiguration scheme that is illustrated in Section 5.4.5. In this case, the MS updates its
multi-hop routing cache and redirects its dataflow via the new BS. If a MS moves from a
local domain to another local domain, the handoff is called inter-domain-handoff. The
inter-domain-handoff is implemented through regular Mobile IP. In a dual-model MS, the
service migration between two different radio interfaces, e.g., from a cellular interface to
IEEE 802.11 interface, is called vertical handoff. The basic procedure of a vertical

handoff has three steps:

• Improved path detection: A dual-model MS communicates with a BS (BS1)
with an air interface (address: IP1) and detects a single or multi-hop route to
another BS (BS2) in a new air interface (address: IP2), which provides higher
performance such as data rate and power consumption.

•

Address & route binding: The MS issues a routing-paging packet to BS2
including !PI and !P2. If the BS2 accepts the handoff request, BS2 forwards the
request to the IGW so that the IGW can create a mapping from !PI to !P2.
Meanwhile, after creating a multi-hop routing cache that is associated with IP2,
the IGW replies a route-reply packet to the MS through BS2. The multi-hop
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routing page will be cleared after the expiration of the PIT that is associated
with IPI.
•

Flow redirection: After the process of address and route binding, all packets
from the Internet with IP1 will be forwarded to the MS through the new
interface (lP2) and the new BS (BS2).

As illustrated in Figure 35, a MS redirects a connection from its cellular interface to
its IEEE 802.11 interface when the MS obtain a route to an AP.

5.6 MCIP Performance
We have performed a simulation-based analysis of the MCIP protocol, in which we
have measured three commonly used performance metrics:

•

Routing Overhead: The average number of transmitted control packets for
maintaining the bi-directional Internet accessibility per MS in the network
during a given period.

•

Packet Delivery Fraction: The percentage of data packets received by the
destination in comparison with the number of data packets generated by the
source.

•

Average Packet Delay: This is the average packet delay between a MS and
the IGW, which includes the wired routing delay and wireless transmission
delay in a local domain.

5.6.1

Experimental Configuration

The experiments were conducted in the NS-2 [73] simulator. In the experimental
implementation, a link is considered as broken when three continuous transmissions fail
over the link. The link layer detects the link state and reports the network layer when a
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link is broken. Figure 37 illustrates the experimental scenanos considered. The
dimensions of each scenario are as follows:
•

Scenario -1, 1500m x 1500m simulation area with 5 BSs,

•

Scenario -2, 1774m x 1774m simulation area with 7 BSs,

•

Scenario -3, 2000m x 2000m simulation area with 9 BSs.

As shown in Figure 37 (A), (B) and (C), a router represents the Internet with certain
delay. Each router connects to HA, eN and IGWIFAIBSl. In all scenarios, the BS1 is not
only configured to act as an access point, but it also implements the functionalities of the
IGW and the FA. In each local domain, the BSs are interconnected by wired interfaces
with a fixed delay. The three different domains (scenarios) represent the different sizes of
multi-hop networks. Each domain has several BSs (5, 7, and 9) and different number of
MSs (75, 105, and 133) so that the three cases have the same MS density. The MSs move
according to the random waypoint mobility model and the maximum speed of a MS is set
between 1 to 25 mls during the lifetime of simulation runs according to a uniform random
distribution. The pause time is consistently 10 seconds between each movement. The
transmission ranges of each MS and BS are set as 250m. Table 6 shows the summary of
some simulation parameters used in the experimentation. Each data point shown in the
following figures is averaged over five runs with different seeds and random node
distributions. Each hop-wise wireless transmission of a packet is counted as one
transmission in all experiments. In all experiments the simulation runs for 600 seconds.
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M: mobile hosts
Scenario-I: 1500m x 1500m

(A): Experimental Scenario -1: 5 BSs in the 1500m x 1500m domain

Scenario-2: 1774m x 1774m

(B): Experimental Scenario -2: 7 BSs in the 1774m x 1774m domain

Scenario-3: 2000m x 2000m

(C): Experimental Scenario -3: 9 BSs in the 2000m x 2000m domain
Figure 37. The Experimental Configurations.
T abl e 6 E xpenmen taI paramet ers
Parameters
BS beacon Interval
BS/MS Search Interval
Paging Interval Timer (PIT)
Paging timeout (for clearing multi-hop paging cache)
Routing Interval Timer (RIT)
Raging timeout (for clearing multi-hop routing cache)
Number of MSs
Maximum Search Range (M hou)
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Setting
10.0 s
1.5 s
30s, 45s, 60s
60s, 90s, 120s
3s
6s
75,105,133
4 hops

5.6.2

Overhead for Bi-directional Internet Connectivity

The first goal of this experiment is to measure the overhead for maintaining bidirectional Internet accessibility under different mobility levels (maximum speed varying
from Im1s to 25m1s). It can be observed from Figure 38 (a), (b) and (c) that when
mobility increases the routing overhead per MS increases. For the same paging interval in
each scenario, the routing overhead per MS increases sharply at lowers mobility. It can
also be observed that when MSs move faster than 15 mis, the routing overhead saturates.
This occurs because at higher speeds, the topology changes significantly during the
paging intervals. Thus, there is no significant different in control packet overhead
between speeds of 15 mls and 25 mls.
The next goal of this experiment is to test the effect of paging interval on the routing
overhead of maintaining the bi-directional accessibility. In the three scenarios (see Figure
38), the paging cost is highest when the paging interval is 30 seconds while the paging
cost is lowest when the paging interval is 60 seconds. Mobility is the key factor affecting
the paging interval. Higher mobility MSs should have a smaller paging interval, while
lower mobility MSs can have a larger paging interval. The value of the PIT of a MS is
typically on the MS mobility time scale.
The third goal of this experiment is to test protocol scalability. Scalability refers to
the property of maintaining the routing overhead per MS constant, as the size of a MCIP
network increases. In a local domain, there may be many BSs but the overhead for each
MS to maintain its route should not increase with the growth of the network. Because the
proposed MCIP limits each BSIMS search range by setting a TTL value, the MSs outside
the search range have no impact on the BS/MS search overhead. In the experiment,
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different sizes of networks (l500m x 1500m < 1774 m x 1774 m < 2000m x 2000m)
were used and the MSs were randomly distributed over the simulated area. In order to test
the network scalability, these networks are set with same MS density and BS radio
coverage rate. Also these networks run with the same MCIP parameters (e.g., Paging
Interval).

It can be observed from Figure 38 CA) (B) (C), the average number of

transmission per MS in each network is almost the same when the PIT and maximum
speed are the same. It can be seen that when the maximum speed is 5 m1s and the PIT is
60s, the average number of transmission is about 60 in each of the three scenarios in spite
of the different sizes of networks.
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Routing Overhead over Mobility (5cenarlo-3 965s 133 MSs)

Maximum Speed

(C) Scenario -3

Figure 38. Overhead for Bi-directional Internet Connectivity.

5.6.3 Performance of Data Transmission
In order to observe the performance of data transmission

1Il

the MCIP network,

connection alternatives I, II and IV (see Figure 35) are analyzed in each scenario. Five
constant bit rate (CBR) traffic flows from a source to a destination node were simulated.
The CBR data packets size is 512 bytes and the sending rate is 10 packets per second. In
the five connections, two connections are initiated by the CN and three randomly selected
MSs start three connections. As shown in Figure 39, the packet delivery fraction in each
scenario drops when mobility increases. High mobility causes more frequent connection
breaks and routing paths changes. However, in general, multi-hop connections achieve a
very high packet delivery rate. It can be observed from Figure 39 that there is not a
significant difference in packet delivery fraction for the three scenarios of our
experiments. This shows the scalability of the protocol.
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Figure 39. Packet Delivery Fraction.
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Figure 40. Packet Delay.
Recall that the packet delay refers to the average transmission latency of eBR a data
packet between a MS and the IGW. This includes the wired routing delay between the

IGW and the BS that the MS is associated with. This also includes the multi-hop wireless
transmission delay between the associated BS and the MS , which is affected by buffering
during multi-hop route discovery, queuing at the interface queue, retransmission latency
at the MAC layer, and propagation delay. Figure 40 shows that the average delay
increases slightly as the mobility increases. As described in Section 5.4.5, the MS always
uses the BS having best metrics (the shortest path in the experiments) for communication
with the Internet. When the MS moves, the route reconfiguration detects a new BS (a BS
having shortest multi-hop path) for communication. Therefore, the movement of the MS
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causes no significant increase of the average packet delay. The increase shown in Figure
40 is primarily caused by the buffering during connection establishment. Higher mobility
causes more frequent broken link during the period of CBR transmissions, and the MSs
with higher mobility run the route reconfiguration scheme more frequently. On the other
hand, as can be seen from Figure 40, the scenario 1 has least delay and scenario 3 has
highest delay when MSs have the same mobility. It is because the local wired routing
delay from a BS to IGW in the three scenarios increases when the number of BSs
increases. The wired routing delay is much lower than the Internet delay because all BSs
are within a local domain. The increment of the local wired routing delay is not
substantial in comparison with the Internet delay.

5.7 MCIP Conclusion
The wireless communication in the near future will take advantage of dual-mode MSs,
heterogeneous network accessibility, and multi-hop communications. Heterogeneous
MCIP represents a new approach to support micro-mobility in wireless network. This
chapter defines the general framework for Multi-hop Cellular IP and identifies some key
implementation issues. Also, the chapter presents some important experimental results
that show the applicability of MCIP to integrate multi-hop and single hop networks in
local domains. The design of heterogeneous MCIP could be further improved and some
of the open issues include: how to reduce control packet overhead and efficiently detect
available BS during data transmission; and how to efficiently support various connection
alternatives. We are currently looking at these problems.
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CHAPTER VI
SECURED MACROIMICRO-MOBILITY
PROTOCOL FOR MULTI-HOP CELLULAR IP
A Multi-hop Cellular IP (MCIP) network differentiates global and local domains in
terms of macro/micro-mobility in heterogeneous multi-hop communication. However, a
MCIP network is vulnerable to various attacks and compromises during macro/micromobility process in an adversarial environment. Existing MCIP protocol does not provide
macro/micro-mobility security protection for mobile stations. In this chapter, we
introduce and evaluate a secure macro/micro-mobility protocol (SM 3p). In the proposed
SM 3p, mobile IP security has been extended for supporting macro-mobility across local
domains through the process of multi-hop registration and authentication. In a MCIP
local domain, a certificate-based authentication achieves the effective routing and micromobility protection from a range of potential security threats. Our evaluation and
simulation demonstrates the effectiveness of the SM 3P.
The proposed secure macro/micro-mobility protocol (SM 3p) provides MCIP network
protection from various network attacks that could occur due to macro and micro
mobility in heterogeneous multi-hop communication. When a MS visits a MCIP network,
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it needs to execute the secure global registration and authentication only once. In the
MCIP local domain, the certificate-based authentication protects the multi-hop route
discovery and micro-mobility of a MS from one BS to another. In the SM 3p, we assume
that a MS and the visiting MCIP network don't have any prior security association. The
key contributions of the SM 3p are:
•

Secure single-hop and multi-hop registration and authentication in support of
macro-mobility;

•

Secure multi-hop paging/routing cache update for maintaining micro-mobility;

•

Secure multi-hop route discovery for micro-mobility.

The rest of this chapter is organized as follows: the background of macro/micromobility for MCIP networks is discussed in Section 6.1. Then the security threat model
for MCIP is presented in Section 6.2. After defining the security assumptions and key
issues in Section 6.3, Section 6.4 describes the details of the SM 3p for securing
macro/micro-mobility. The security achievements are discussed in Section 6.5. The
implementation and simulation results are also presented in Section 6.5. Some of the
related work is discussed in Section 6.6. Section 6.7 concludes the chapter.

6.1 Security Thread of MCIP
Security support is a key issue in deploying MCIP network for any application. In this
section, the macro/micro-mobility security threats for MCIP network are discussed. The
MCIP macro-mobility between local domains could be exposed to three types of attacks
including: forged BS, unauthorized network access, registration attacks. The micromobility within a local domain could also suffer from various attacks including multi-hop
paging/routing poisoning and multi-hop routing attacks.
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6.1.1 Macro-mobility Attacks
•

Forged BS

In a MeIP network, an attacker can attack the multi-hop wireless network by
advertising itself as a genuine BS using some forged messages or duplicate beacons
recorded from a correct BS or obtained by eavesdropping. When the MS hears the
fraudulent beacons from the forged BS, the MS assumes that it is within the radio
coverage of a genuine BS and then initiates a registration procedure. A registration
request is issued from the MS to the forged BS. Furthermore, the forged BS replies the
MS with a bogus registration reply carrying the acceptance of the registration request.
After receiving the registration result, the MS further assumes that it has obtained the
Internet connection through the forged BS and disconnects its communication from the
genuine BS. One by one, the forged BS could entice a number of MSs to disconnect with
the genuine BSs and establish connections with the forged MS either by single hop or
multi-hop route. However, the MSs cannot obtain any Internet service correctly from the
forged BS. For instance, in Figure 41, malicious MS3 (i.e., forged BS) advertises a highspeed connectivity to the Internet by sending bogus beacons to its neighbor. After hearing
the beacons from the forged BS (i.e., MS3) but without realizing the fraud, MS2 and
MS5 register with MS3 by a single hop. After registrations, MS2 and MS5 believe they
have connected with a BS with a higher speed, and thus disconnect the connection with
the genuine BS (i.e., BS1). An attacker using forged BS achieves the following:
•

The forged BS captures registration information of MSs such as their home IP
addresses, home network IP addresses. It can also break a proper Internet
connection and can cause unwarranted registration delay.
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•

The forged BS can act as the gateway to the Internet and can seize the data packet
or capture sensitive personal or network data of MSs.

4f"HA
,Q
MS3,·&·:···.,·.,·., ...... .
MS"\ 82 1. ./ / ~;i.:
D~., . . . . .~~. . ~
~ :Q
The connection between MS2 and the
FA may be corrupted by attacker

M~f:. . .:::::·::~.···/ BSI FAlIG~""""................ .. /.,,...CN
MS5

MS3

Internet

MS3 is a malicious MS that may act as a forged BS or
malicious intermediary node.

Figure 41. Macro/Micro-mobility Attacks in a MCIP Network.
•

Unauthorized Network Access

A malicious MS may access the MCIP network and enjoy free network usage by way
of single hop or multi-hop communication. After entering the Internet, the attacker may
use some techniques like Medium Access Control address spoofing to gain access to the
network infrastructure. For instance in Figure 42 attacker MS 1 connects to the Internet
and sends a malicious ARP (address resolution protocol) reply to the Router associating
MSl's Medium Access Control address with MS2's IP address. At this moment, the
Router thinks the MS 1 is MS2. Next, MS 1 sends a malicious ARP reply to MS2
associating MS l' s Medium Access Control address with the Router's address. In this
case, the MS2 believes MSI is the Router. Finally, MSI can access the session between
MS2 and MS3. In this case, all data packets from MS2 will be redirected to MSI and
MS 1 forwards the received data packet from MS2 to Router again. In the end, Router
forwards the packets to MS3. In the opposite direction, all packets from MS3 will be
forwarded to MSI and MSI sends the packets to MS2. MSI implements the man-in-themiddle attack. In this manner, MS 1 intercepts the traffic between MS3 and MS2.
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Figure 42. Unauthorized Network Access and Man-in-the-middle Attack.
•

Registration Attacks

The registration procedure imposes several senous security threats. Three typical
types of registration attacks include registration poisoning, bogus registration, and
registration replay.
•

Registration Poisoning

A malicious MS in the MeIP network can poison the registration procedure. For
example, in a MeIP network, a multi-hop MS registers with the MeIP network through a
multi-hop route with the help of some intermediate MSs. A malicious MS can entice a
multi-hop MS to choose it as an intermediate MS by claiming a short or fast route to a BS.
When a malicious MS is selected as the intermediate MS for a registration MS, the
malicious MS can modify or drop the MS's registration request/reply before forwarding
to the next hop. When the malicious MS modifies or rejects the registration request, the
MS cannot correctly register with the foreign network. If the malicious MS modifies the
registration result in a registration reply, the MS cannot access the Internet. For instance,
in Figure 41, when MS5 moves to the MeIP network, it initiates a registration by sending
out a registration request to MS3. When MS3 receives the registration request from MS5,
MS3 modifies the address of MS5' s home network in the registration request before
forwarding the request to BS. Based on the modified request, the FA will forward the
request to a wrong HA so that the MS cannot obtain a successful registration reply from
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the correct HA. Registration poisoning prevents multi-hop MSs from obtaining services
from the wired network.
•

Bogus Registration
It occurs when a malicious MS does a fake registration by masquerading itself as

someone else using a spoofed or invented IP address. The bogus registration causes a
wrong mobility binding at its HA so that all packets are tunneled to a illegitimate MS
instead of the correct MS. By a bogus registration, the attacker obtains the right to access
the Internet so that it can implement further attack on the MeIP network or the Internet.
For instance, in Figure 41, MS3 does a forged registration by masquerading itself as MS5,
and then all the packets coming from Internet for MS5 are forwarded to MS3. In this case,
MS5 cannot receive any packet from the Internet.
•

Registration Replay
In replay attack, an attacker records a legitimate registration packet and replays the

packet for the purpose of creating a false registration. In Figure 41, MS3 may repeatedly
forward a copy of registration request originated from MS5 and cause BSIFA and MS5's
home network to initiate the process of registration many times. Without protection, the
attacker could perform valid but unwanted operations afterwards by sending old
messages.

6.1.2 Micro-mobility Attacks
• Multi-hop Routing Attacks
Multi-hop route discovery is responsible for detecting the multi-hop routes between
MSs and BSs in the local domain. An attacker may exhibit its actions in the form of
refusing to participate fully and correctly in multi-hop route discovery according to the
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principles of integrity, authentication, non-duplication, confidentiality, and cooperation.
Therefore, multi-hop routing attacks can be grouped into five categories: anti-integrity,
impersonation, duplication, and anti-confidentiality.
•

Anti-integrity is the action of breaking the integrity of a message. Modification is a
typical example of anti-integrity. The malicious MSs modify, inject or delete some
fields of a routing packet, and then forward the packet with falsified values in the
packet fields. These fields may include the source or destination address, hop count,
sequence number, etc.

•

Impersonations are those actions in which a malicious station spoofs an existing or
forged IF address, or uses broadcast address to generate or duplicate one or more
messages, and then forwards them to other MSs. In Figure 41, MS3 may
masquerade itself by spoofing an invented address or an IP address of a MS. With
the spoofed address, MS3 could entice MSS to use MS3 as the shortest route for
reaching BSI. And then MS3 can compromise MSS's communication.

•

In a duplication attack, a malicious MS sends a legitimate message more than once.
These duplicated messages cause multiple receptions and processing overhead on
adjacent MSs.

•

In an anti-confidentiality attack, an attacker may reveal sensitive information, such
as private key. Stealing, eavesdropping, guessing, brute-force and cryptanalysis are
some ways for an attacker to identify sensitive information.

• Multi-hop Paging/Routing Cache Poisoning
The BS in a MCIP network suffers from multi-hop paging/routing cache poisoning
due to multi-hop communication. To support the micro-mobility and multi-hop
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communication, the routing cache is needed at each BS to record the multi-hop routes
between the BS and each attached multi-hop MS. When a MS moves from one BS to
another, the multi-hop paging/routing cache of the MS should be updated as illustrated in
Chapter 5. The multi-hop paging/routing cache of a MS may be poisoned in several ways.
For instance, when a multi-hop MS sends a multi-hop page/route-update packet for
creating or updating its multi-hop paging cache, the malicious MS may modify the packet
that could result in multi-hop paging/routing cache poisoning. Also, a malicious MS may
send a wrong page/route-update packet on behalf of a genuine one. And the IGW and BS
update the routing information for the genuine MS with the wrong information sent by
the malicious MS. To locate a multi-hop MS, the BS finds the first hop MS in multi-hop
paging/routing cache that can reach the destination MS. The data packet from the BS will
forwarded, hop-by-hop, to the destination in accordance with the multi-hop route. When
a multi-hop route is poisoned, the BS cannot locate the destination MS by following the
multi-hop route provided in the BS cache. For instance in Figure 41, MS3 sends a multihop page/route-update packet to IGW on behalf of MS5, and IGW updates the multi-hop
paging/routing cache from MS5-MS2-BSI-IGW to MS5-BSI-IGW. In this case, the
packets of MS5 from the Internet will be lost due to the incorrect routing information
until MS5 updates its multi-hop paging/routing cache next time.

6.2 Assumptions and Key Definitions
In a MCIP network, the infrastructure servers (i.e., HA, FA) act as the authentication
and key management center for the multi-hop wireless communication, which is
fundamental to MCIP mobility security. For a MS, its HA is supposed to be the most
trusted server [39] [40] [41]. Its HA has the capability to manage the MS's billing and
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credentials when the MS has any malicious action [74][75]. Due to mobility, we assume
that there is no a priori security association (SA) between the MS and the visiting FA.
Otherwise, it will impose heavy burden on the key management if each MS shares a
permanent key with each FA [41]. Table 7 depicts the notations used for describing SM 3P.
In the global domain, the SM 3p takes advantage of existing security associations (SAs)
and key management solutions:
•

A MS and its HA share a secret key: (SMS-HA) [39] [41] . This key establishes SA
between the MS and its HA.

•

The HA and the FA have their public-private keys (KHA/KIHA,

KFA/K-IFA).

These

keys establish SA between the HA and the FA [74][75].
In the local MeIP domain, the SM3p defines the following MeIP domain keys.
•

PubliclPrivate Key. Each BS or router in a MeIP local domain (e.g., BS1, BS2 in
Figure 43) has a pair of public and private keys. For instance, the BS1 in Figure
43 has its public and private keys, i.e.,

KBSI/KIBSI.

The private key is kept secret

by each BS or router, and the public key is wrapped up with its identification by
FA with a certificate (i.e., CertBs1-FA
Tissue

•

is the issuing time, and

Texpire

=«BSl id, FA id, KBS1,

Tissue, Texpire»

Kl FA).

is the expiration time.

Neighboring Shared Secret Keys: Each fixed component in a MeIP network,
including BS, router and FA, shares a secret key with its neighboring fixed
components. For example, in Figure 1, BS2 connects with BS1 and FA by wired
cable and shares the secret keys SBSI-BS2 and SBS2-FA with the two neighbors
respectively. The symmetric neighboring keys are used to calculate the message
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authentication code (MAC l ) during the exchange of control packets within the
local wired domain.
T abl e 7 Not atlOns use d f or descn mg
M,N

Concatenation of two messages M and N in the order specified

Rx, Rx'

A registering step with an issued message Rx. Rx' is the variant of Rx

A->B

A message is forwarded from A to B

MS HM

MS home IP address

HA'd, FA'd, IGW'd,

HA, FA and Gateway IP address

«M»K

Digital signature of the message M by using the private key K

<M>K

MAC value of the message M by using the secret key K

{M}K

Encrypt M by using the key K

Certx, Cert x.y

Certificate of X, Certificate of X issued by Y

SMS.HA

Shared secret key between MS and HA

KxK1x

Public and private key of X

N,

Nonce issued by X, e.g. HA, MS, FA

t

Timestamp

6.3 Secured MacrolMicro-mobility Protocol Design
The SM 3p has been designed to address macro/micro-mobility security including
mobile IP authentication for multi-hop MS, paging/routing integrity, and multi-hop route
discovery at MCIP networks. The security protocol requires that each MS provides
authentication information upon entering the local domain of a MCIP network. If a MS
does not have the security binding with the local domain, the MS must register with its
HA and the visiting FA to get its identity verified before using the MCIP network. At the
same time, during its registration, each MS also authenticates the MCIP network (i.e.,
FA). After the mutual authentication, each MS obtains a certificate from the FA. Each
MS discards the multi-hop control packets from a MS without a valid certificate. The FA
can filter data packets and discard those that don't belong to a registered MS.

1

In this chapter, MAC refers message authentication code
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Figure 43. Security Associations (SAs) in a MCIP Network
When MCIP control packets (mobile IP or MCIP packets) is transmitted between two
components in the local MCIP domain, the MCIP domain keys protects the integrity of
the packet as shown in Figure 43. There are two types of registration and authentication:
single hop and multi-hop, as shown in Figure 43. During registration, the single or multihop MS, FA, and HA authenticate one another. With a secured registration and
authentication, a MS can establish a pair of temporary public and private keys

(KMS/K'MS)

during the period of its visit to the MCIP domain. The computation of public and private
keys is performed by the HA when a MS registers with the HA through the FA. The
computed public key of the MS is forwarded to the FA and the MS with a signature of the
HA (R6 in Section 6.3.1 or 6.3.2). And the private key of the MS is encrypted and
delivered to the MS secretly (in Section 6.3.1 or 6.3.2).
When a single or multi-hop MS receives a successful registration reply from the FA,
the MS obtains an authenticated public key of FA (KFA). The public key of the
successfully registered MS is enveloped into the MS's certificate (CertMs-FA
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= «MSHM,

FA id, K MS, Tissue, Texpire»

KI FA) (R7 in6.3.1 or 6.3.2). The certificate may read: "it is

certified that the public key (KMS ) of the MS (MS HM ) is issued by FA (FA. id ) starting from
the issue time (Tissue) until the expiration time (Texpire). Each certificate has the signature
of FA. Since each registered MS has an authenticated public key of FA, they can validate
the certificate using the public key of FA (KFA). Before the expiration of a certificate, MS
requests to update its certificate if the MS is still in the MCIP local domain. The
certificate can be used as the security token for micro-mobility security. For instance, if a
registered MS (e.g., MS2, which is a neighboring MS of MS1 in Figure 41) receives a
control packet from the neighboring MS 1 such as: < <page-update packet> > KI MS1,
CertMsI-FA, MS2 first validates the legality of the certificate of MS1 (CertMsI-FA

< <MS1 HlI1, FA id, K MS1 , Tissue, Texpire»

=

Kl FA) by verifying the signature of FA with the

public key of FA (KFA ) and checking the issuing and expiration times of the certificate. If
the certificate is validated, the MS reads the public key of MS 1 (KMS1 ) from the certificate,
and uses it to verify the authenticity of control packet. In the next cycle, if MS2 receives
another control packet from MS 1 with the same certificate, the MS2 can verify the packet
directly using the public key of MS 1 without validating the certificate again.
During the MS's registration, the FA creates the multi-hop paging/routing cache to
record the single or multi-hop route between the MS and the lOW. Thereafter, when the
MS changes its Internet attachment in the MCIP local domain (e.g., MS3 moves from
BS1 to BS2), the migration is implemented by micro-mobility. The micro-mobility
maintains the multi-hop paging/routing cache so that the MS and the network can reach
each other when required. In the proposed SM 3p, the certificates of MSs protect the
integrity of paging/routing-update packets and prevent unauthorized multi-hop
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paging/routing cache poisoning. Figure 43 illustrates the need for following security
modules to be implemented for SM 3p protocol:
•

Secure single-hop registration and authentication in support of macro-mobility;

•

Secure multi-hop registration and authentication in support of macro-mobility;

•

Secure micro-mobility in local domain
o

Secure searching of BS by a MS and secure route creation

o

Secure multi-hop paging/routing cache update for micro-mobility

6.3.1 Secure Single-hop Registration

D

Rl
+t-

R3

R4

R5

~ .. ~L!§]~~
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Figure 44. Registration for a Single-hop MS.
The process of the single-hop registration implements the macro-mobility for single
hop MSs. The registration for a single-hop MS, which is under the radio coverage of a BS,
creates a secured macro-mobility binding at the MS's HA. At the same time, during the
process of secured registration, the FA issues a certificate for the single hop MS that is
valid in the MCIP local domain. A BS in the MCIP local domain advertises its presence
periodically to MSs with beacons. The FA on behalf of each BS creates the beacons and
each beacon has a certificate of the FA. If a single-hop MS has not yet registered with the
MCIP network, it follows the steps of registration and authentication outlined in
Figure 44. For instance, MS 1 in

Figure 44 uses this procedure for registration.

Beacon:
(Rl)

BS->MSs: «M]» K]FA, CertFA
Where M] is beacon, FA id , IGW id , BS id , Seq;
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Where FAid is the FA address; IGW id is the CoA address; BS id is the BS address; Seq is the sequence number

Registration for a single-hop MS:
(R2)

MS -> BS1: < M3> SMS-HA;
Where MFRegistration Request, FA id, IGWid, HA id, MS HM, NMS, NHA , R1

(R3)

BS1 -> BS2: < R2, BS1,,/>SBSJ-BS2

(R4)

BS2 validates R3 using SBSJ-BS2
BS2 -> FA: < R2, BS1 id,BS2 id >SBS2-FA

(R5)

FA validates R4 using SBS2-FA
FA records the route for the MS
FA->HA: R2, NFA

(R6)

HA (upon receipt of R5):
Validates R2 using SMS-HA
Checks whether FAid in MJ= FAid in M3
Validates CertFA based on existing PKI at HA
Validates «MJ» Ki FA using the authenticated KFA
Computes a pair of public and private keys (KMS' Ki MS)
Continues with the steps in [33] (34](Perkins, Mobile IP support), i.e., updating the mobility binding
HA->FA: M4, «M4» K i HA , CertHA;
Where M4 = M5, M6, N FA ;
Where M5 = Reply, Result, FA id, HA id, BSid, MS HM , KFA , KMSN' HA , NMS
J
Where M6 = < M5, {K MS} SMS-HA > SMS-HA

(R7)

FA (upon receipt of R6):
Validates NFA
Validates CertHA based on existing PKI at FA
Validates « M4» K JHA using the authenticated KHA
Creates multi-hop paging I routing cache at IGW for the MS
Issues a certificate for the MS: CertMs_FA = «MSHM, FA id, KMS, Tissue> Te:qJire» K JFA,
Logs this message as the history trace of the MS,
Continues with the steps in [33] [34] (Perkins, Mobile IP support), i.e., creating mobility binding
FA->BS2: <M6' CertMs_FA> SBS2-FA

(R8)

BS2:
Validates R7 by using SBS2-FA
Creates multi-hop paging I routing cache for the MS
BS2->BS1: <M(i, CertMs_FA> SBSJ-BS2

(R9)

BS1:
Validates R8 by using SBSJ-BS2
Creates multi-hop paging I routing cache for the MS
BS1->MS: M6, CertMs_FA
MS (upon receipt of R9):
Validates < M6> SMS-HA using SMS-HA
Obtains KFAfrom M5
Validates CertMs_FA using KFA
Obtains private key (K JMS) by decrypting {K JMS} SMS-HA using SMS-HA
Continues with the steps in [33] [34] (Perkins, Mobile IP support), i.e., recording the registration result

On receiving a beacon from a BS, the MS 1 compares the FA address, the CoA
address, the BS address, and the sequence number with those of previously received
beacons. The sequence number is incremented every time a new beacon is issued by the
BS. The MS discards the duplicate beacons. If it is a fresh beacon, the MS records the
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beacon. An unregistered MS cannot validate the authenticity of the beacon. This task is
left to registration and authentication process for unregistered MSs. First the MS creates a
registration request (R2) and then sends it to a BS (e.g., BS1 in Figure 45) directly. The
MAC, which is created by using the secret key

(SMS-HA),

maintains the integrity of the

registration request. Then the registration request (R2) is forwarded to the FA hop by hop
with the relays of BSs (R3 and R4). Each intermediate BS appends its address so that the
FA can construct the reverse route between the IGW and the MS. The FA then forwards
the registration request to the MS's HA after appending the FA's nonce (R5). While
receiving the registration request, the HA checks the integrity of the registration request
by using SMS-HA. Then FA is verified for preventing any camouflaged FA. After the series
of verifications, the HA computes a pair of public and private keys (KMS,

Kl MS)

for

securing micro-mobility of the MS in the MCIP local domain. The private key is sent to
the MS secretly with encryption (R6).
Upon receiving the registration reply from the HA, the FA validates the HA using the
HA's public key. After the authentication of the HA and the registration reply (R6) from
HA, the FA records the MS's public key. The FA now creates a multi-hop paging cache
for the MS. The FA returns a registration reply (R7) back to the MS. When the MS
receives the registration reply from the FA via the reversed route, the MS validates the
registration reply message using SMS-HA. The MS is then sure that the HA is valid and the
public key of FA (KFA ) is authenticated because of the authentication of the registration
reply message. In the end, the MS obtains the registration result, its private key computed
by its HA and certificate issued by FA. Once the MS receives a successful reply from its
HA, it is guaranteed that FA and keys are valid. The beacon is verified at its HA.
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6.3.2 Secure Multi-hop Registration
The process of a multi-hop registration implements the macro-mobility for a multihop hop MS. A multi-hop MS, which is outside the transmission range of all BS in the
MCIP local domain, obtains beacons with the help of other registered MSs. The beacon
forwarded by a registered MS carries the original beacon issued by a BS and, the home
address of the registered MS as well as its signature. For instance, MS obtains beacon
from MS1 in Figure 45, in which MS1 sends MS with (R1'), which is« R1, MS1» K
I MS1 ,

CertMsl-FA. However, as for an unregistered MS, it cannot verify the FA and its

neighbors because the MS does not have the authenticated public key of the FA and the
authenticated public key of the neighboring MS. The task is left to the process of the
secure multi-hop registration of the MS. The multi-hop registration can be used to create
a secured macro-mobility binding at the HA for the multi-hop MS. The steps of securing
multi-hop registration are illustrated in Figure 45.

Figure 45. Registration for a Multi-hop MS.
Beacon Relaying:
(RI)

BS->MSs: «MJ» KIFA' Cert FA;
Where M J is beacon, FA id , IGW id , BS id , Seq;
Where FAid is the FA address; IGW id is the CoA address; BS id is the BS address; Seq is the sequence number

(RI')

MSI->MS: «M2» K-JMSl> CertMsJ-FA;
Where M2is RI, MSI

Registration for a Multi-hop MS:
(R2)

MS -> MS1: < M3> SMS-HA, RJ'
Where M3 =Registration Request, FA id , IGWid, HA id, MS HM, NMS, NHA , R1

(R2')

MS1 -> BS1: «R2, MS1 HM »

K1MSbCertMS/_FA
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(R3')

BS1 (upon receipt of R2 '):
Validates R2' using KMSJ in CertMSJ_FA
Validates R1' using KMSJ in CertMSJ_FA
BS1 -> BS2: <R2, MS1 HM , BS1 id>SBSJ-BS2

(R4')

BS2 validates R3' using SBSJ-BS2
BS2 -> FA: < R2, MS1 HM, BS1 id, BS2 il,>SBS2-FA

(R5)

FA validates R4' using SBS2-FA
FA records the multi-hop route for the MS
FA->HA: R2, NFA
HA (upon receipt of R5):
Validates R2 using SMS-HA
Checks whether FAid in M J = FAid in M3
Validates CertFA based on existing PKI at HA
Validates «Mj» K JFA using authenticated KFA
Computes a pair of public and private keys (KMS, K JMS)
Continues with the steps in [33] [34] (Perkins, Mobile IP support), i.e., updating the mobility binding
HA->FA: M4, «M4» K JHA, CertHA;
Where M4 = Ms, M6, NFA ;
Where Ms = Reply, Result, FAilb HA id, BSilb MS HM , KFA , KMSN' HA , NMS
Where M6= < Ms, {KJMSJ SMS-HA > SMS-HA

(R6)

(R7)

FA (upon receipt of R6):
Validates NFA
Validates CertHA based on existing PKI at FA
Validates « M4» K JHA using authenticated KHA
Creates multi-hop paging / routing cache at the IGW for the MS
Issues a certificate for the MS: CertMs_FA = «MSHM, FA id, KMS, Tissue, Texpire» K' FA
Logs this message as the history trace of the MS
Continues with the steps in [33] [34] (Perkins, Mobile IP support), i.e., creating the mobility binding
FA->BS2: <M6' CertMs-FA> SBS2-FA

(RS)

BS2:
Validates R7 by using SBS2-FA
Creates multi-hop paging / routing cache at BS2 for the MS
BS2->BS1: < M6, CertMs_FA > SBSJ-BS2

(R10)

BS1:
Validates RS by using SBSj-BS2
Creates multi-hop paging / routing cache at BS1 for the MS
J
BS1->MS1: «M6' CertMs-FA» K BSb CertBSJ

(R9)

Validates RlO by using KBSJ
MS1->MS: M6, CertMs_FA
MS (upon receipt of R9):
Validates < M6> SMS-HA using SMS-HA
Obtains KFAfrom Ms
Validates CertMs_FA using KFA
Obtains private key (K JMS) by decrypting {K JMSJ SMS-HA using SMS-HA
Continues with the steps in [33] [34] (Perkins, Mobile IP support), i.e., recording the registration result

As seen from Figure 45, the basic operations in multi-hop registration are similar to
single-hop registration. The FA and HA has the same steps either in single hop or multihop registration (R5 and R6). Also, upon receiving the registration reply (R9), the multihop MS has the same operations as single hop registration such as verifying the
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registration reply and obtaining its private key. However, the multi-hop registration has
three differences compared to single hop registration:
1.

The registration request of the multi-hop MS is forwarded to a BS (BS 1 as shown in
Figure 45) by multi-hop. Each intermediate MS has a signature and its next hop MS
validates the signature before signing and forwarding until the request is received
by a BS (R2-R2'),

11.

Before forwarding the registration request to FA (R3'), the BS validates the
intermediate MSs and the beacon. If there is any error during the process of
verifying the beacon or intermediate relaying MS, the BS denies the registration
request, and

Ill.

The registration reply message is returned back to the multi-hop MS by the secured
multi-hop forwarding (RlO) with signature and verification.
Each MS only registers with MeIP network once either by single hop or multi-hop.

After registration, the migration from one BS to another and the change of multi-hop
route are implemented by the process of micro-mobility as explained in the next section.

6.3.3 Secure Micro-mobility
As a MS moves in local domain, it may experience low data rate at current
connection or lose the connectivity to the current BS. In such cases, the MS initiates a
route discovery to find a BS with better connectivity by issuing a search-request packet
with its signature and the attachment of its certificate. The search-request packet is sent
out on an available radio interface (e.g., cellular or IEEE 802.11). The certificate of the
MS acts as the security token during the forwarding of the route discovery packet. Upon
the reception of a routing packet, the intermediate MS verifies the MS from which the
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searching-request packet is received, and then forwards the route discovery packet again
after appending its address, its signature, and its certificate. When a BS receives the
searching-request packet, it verifies the intermediate MSs. Then it sends a search-reply
packet with its signature. The search-reply packet will be forwarded to the source MS
with the reversed route without modification. The MS initiated searching process for
locating a BS is depicted in Figure 46. Before moving, the MS has its multi-hop routing
cache (Path: MS-MS3-MS2-BS3-BS4-IGW) through BS3 with its cellular radio interface
(address: IPe ). When MS moves to the new location, MS detects a new BS (R11-R14)
with its IEEE 802.11 radio interface (address: IP w). In R11, MS HM is the address IPe. In
the end, BS1 replies with a route of (MS-MS1-BS1). When MS receives the search-reply
packet (R14) from BS1, the MS initiates the process of micro-mobility from BS3 to BS1
as illustrated in the next subsection.

Et@-@--~
""" ...
Move

RIJ
RI2
...• ~
S
SI
BSI
RI4
R13
IEEE 802.11
WLAN AP

Figure 46. Secure MS Searching Process for Locating BS.
Secure MS Searching Process:
(Rll)

(R12)
(RI3)

(RI4)

MS broadcasts: «M7» KI MS, CertMs
Where M7= searching-request packet, FA;d' lGW;d, MS HM, IP w, t, NMS
MSl validates Rll using KMS
MSl broadcasts: «Rll, MS1 HM >> K IMSh CertMsl
BSl validates R12 using K MSI
BS1->MS1:« Ms» K IBSh CertBsl
Where Ms= searching-reply packet, FA;d, IGW;d' MS HM , IP w, MSl HM, BShl, t, NMS
MSl validates RJ3 using K BSI
MS1->MS:« RJ3» KIMSJ, CertMsl

In a MCIP local domain, a MS implements the micro-mobility by updating its multihop paging/routing cache, from which a MS can change its network attachment from one
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BS to another in a heterogeneous multi-hop environment. Figure 47 shows the steps to
update a multi-hop route, which prevents unauthorized multi-hop cache update. The
private key of the source MS protects the integrity of the page/route-update packet. In
Figure 47, while communicating with its cellular interface (address: IPc), MS moves to a
new location and detects a new BS with its IEEE 802.11 interface (address: IPw). Due to
higher performance of IEEE 802.11, the MS initiates a micro-mobility switch from BS3
to BS 1 with a vertical handoff from its cellular radio interface with IPe to its IEEE
802.11 radio interface with IPw. The MS updates its multi-hop paging/routing cache
through BSl, which is a WLAN AP.
•

The MS issues a page/route-update packet (e.g., R15 as shown in Figure 47)
with the destination of the lOW carrying its migrating multi-hop route (lPw,
MSI HM , BSl id ).

•

The paging/routing update packet is forwarded to the FA via BS 1 hop by hop.
Each intermediate MS and BS validates the authenticity of the packet.

•

The FA authenticates the MS by using the MS's certificates. After
authentication, the FA finally updates paging/routing cache and replies with a
paging/route-reply packet (R16) to the source MS. The FA creates a mapping
between the two IP addresses (lPe and IP w) so that data packets from the
Internet with IPe can be redirected to IP w [76].

•

After updating the multi-hop paging/routing cache, the data packets of the MS
will be delivered according to the multi-hop route in the updated multi-hop
paging/routing cache.
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Figure 47. Securing Micro-mobility.
Secure Multi-hop Paging/Routing Update:
(RI5)

(RI6)

MS->FA: «M9» K 1MS' CertMs
Where M9 = page/route-update packet, FA id, IGWid, MS HM, IP w, MSI HM, BSh(,

N MS. NFA

FA validates « M9 » KI MS using KMS
FA updates the multi-hop paging/routing cache for the MS and creates a mapping from MS HM (IPe)
FA->MS:« Mj(»> KIFA
Where MJO = paging/route-reply packet, FA id, IGWid, MS HM, IP w, NMS. N'FA

10

IP w

6.4 Security Analysis
This section evaluates the security achievements and performance of the proposed
SM 3P. The computation overhead of the proposed protocol depends on many factors, for
instance, the algorithms of key creation, signing and verifying as well as the key length
and security level. Currently, there are a number of asymmetric key cryptosystems in the
literature, e.g., RSA, EIGamal and Elliptic Curve DSA [77]. An implementation of the
key creation, signature and verification based on the elliptic curve cryptography is
implemented for evaluating the performance of the proposed approach.
The proposed SM 3p achieves the goals of preventing the attacks in macro/micro-mobility
of:
1. Forged BS
2. Unauthorized network access
3. Registration attacks (registration poisoning, bogus registration, and registration
reply attack)
4. Multi-hop paging/routing cache poisoning
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5. Multi-hop routing attacks (anti-integrity, impersonations, and anti-confidentiality)
This section describes the above security achievements in detail.

Forged BS: After a forged BS broadcasts a fraudulent beacon (a forged Rl = «MJ»

K JFA CertFA) to declare itself as a genuine BS, the beacon could be received by either a
registered MS or an unregistered MS. The registered MS can identify that the beacon is
incorrect by validating the signature of the beacon since the genuine BS has an
authenticated public key of FA (K JFA), which is obtained during its registration and
authentication (Validates < M6 > SMS-HA using SMS-HA, Obtains KFAfrom Ms in Section
6.3.1 or 6.3.2).
An unregistered MS cannot verify the forged beacon. However, if the MS uses the
forged beacon to register with the forged BS, the forged BS cannot provide a correct
registration reply (R6 or R7) due to lack of SMS.HA. Therefore, the unregistered MS knows
that the registration reply from the forged BS is incorrect at the step: Validates < M6 >
SMS-HA using SMS.HA in Section 6.3.1 or 6.3.2. If the forged BS forwards the registration to

a correct FA, the correct FA will reject the beacon because the forged BS does not have a
legal public key. If the forged BS forwards the registration to the MS'HA, the HA
verifies the beacon in the step: "Validates CertHA based on existing PKI at FA" in
Sections 6.3.1 and 6.3.2 and will discard it. If the forged BS replays an outdated beacon,
it can be checked out by the registered MS, BS, or FA due to the non-duplication
protection at each beacon (timestamp). When a malicious intermediate MS creates a
fraudulent beacon (Rl': M 2=« forged-Rl, forged-MS»

K1MS, forged-CertMs-FA), the

registered MS will reject the beacon using the authenticated public key of FA. As for an
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unregistered MS, the fraudulent beacon will be identified in the step: BSl verifies the
CertMs-FA by KFA in Section 6.3.2.

Unauthorized network access: An unregistered MS cannot access the Internet and
MCIP network due to lack of proper certificate (CertMsl-FA =«MS1 HM,
Texpire»

FAd,

K MS1 , Tissue,

Kl FA) that is issued by FA (R7 in Section 6.3.1 and 6.3.2). Registered MSs will

discard all packets issued or forwarded by the unregistered MS.

Registration attacks (registration poisoning, bogus registration, and registration
replay):
(A) Registration poisoning: The secret key (SMS-HA) between a MS and its HA maintains
the integrity of registration against poisoning during the forwarding of registration
packets (registration request or registration reply). The MAC value at R2 (M3) and R6
(M6) prevents any modification.
(B) Bogus registration: When a malicious MS does a fake registration by masquerading
itself as someone else with an invented or spoofed address, the malicious MS issues a
forged registration request (forged R2). The forged registration will be identified by the
HA at the step: Validates R2 using SMS-HA in Section 6.3.1 or 6.3.2. This is because the
malicious MS has no knowledge of secret key (SMS-HA) which is associated with the
invented or spoofed address.
(e) Registration replay: Nonce (e.g., NMS , NHA , and N FA ) is used in all registration and

control packets to ensure that these packets contain a unique identification to prevent
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replay attack. Each registration or control packet issued by an originator has a nonce, and
a new nonce in the reply packet indicates the next nonce for the next request.

Multi-hop paging/routing cache poisoning: The multi-hop paging/routing cache for a
MS is created after its secured registration is carried out as discussed in Section 6.3.1 or
6.3.2 (Creates multi-hop paging / routing cache at IGW for the MS). Then, the

paging/routing cache is updated as discussed in Section 6.3.3 (R15-R16). The page/routeupdate packets are issued with a signature by the source MS. The signature of the source
MS protects the page/route-update packet from modification during the forwarding from
the source MS to the FA. The FA authenticates the source MS and the paging/routing
packet before updating the multi-hop paging/routing page (FA updates the multi-hop
paging/routing cache for the MS) as discussed in Section 6.3.3.

Multi-hop routing attacks (anti-integrity, impersonation, anti-confidentiality, and
duplication):
(A) Anti-integrity: The search-request packet is signed by using the private key of each
sender. The receiver verifies the certificate and the signature of the sender (Rll- R14 in
Section 6.3.3). Each registered MS keeps its private key secret. Therefore, the signature
and verification prevent anti-integrity attacks. The corresponding search .. reply packet is
signed by the destination, which maintains the integrity of the search-reply packet during
the forwarding from the destination to the source MS.
(B) Impersonation: The certificate, which is issued and signed by FA, prevents
impersonation during multi-hop forwarding through signing and verifying (Rll-R14 in
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Section 6.3.3). In the certificate, the MS's address and its public key are bound together.
The binding is unique because of the uniqueness of the MS' s IP address. The certificate
can not be forged because of the signature of FA in each certificate. All registered MSs,
which have the authenticated public key of the FA, can verify the certificate. Therefore, it
is difficult for any MS to masquerade itself by spoofing or inventing an address in multihop route discovery.
(C) Anti-confidentiality: Each MS has a pair of public and private keys after registration
and keeps its private key secret. Sensitive data can be transmitted after encrypting with
the receiver's public key at the sender. Only the receiver can decrypt the messages by
using its private key.
(D) Duplication: A nonce and timestamp in each routing packet prevent duplication.

6.4.2 Performance Analysis
6.4.2.1 Experimental Configuration
The experiments were conducted

III

the NS-2 simulator [73] to evaluate the

effectiveness of the proposed SM 3P. The configuration of an experimental MCIP network
is shown in Figure 48. A router in the global domain represents the Internet with certain
delay (0.01 seconds). The functionalities of BS1, the FA, and the IGW are integrated as a
node. A HA as well as an IGWIFAlBS1 is connected to the router. In the local domain,
seven BSs are connected by wired cable. The dimension of the local domain is 1770m x
1770m with 133 MSs, which are randomly located in the domain. All the functionalities
of above components are implemented under a Pentium IV 2.8 G with 516 MS of
memory.
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Figure 48. Experimental Configuration.
To simplify our experimental configuration, the experiments ignore the authentication
delay at PKI authorities (AAA) [74]. As for the asymmetric operations, the experiments
based on elliptic curve cryptosystem (ECC) [77] are carried out to evaluate the
computation overhead for key creation, signature, and verification. The elliptic curves are
usually defined over binary fields F2m (M 2: 1) or prime fields Fp , p> 3. The experiments
here implement the elliptic curves defined over prime fields. The implementation of ECC
is based on the software ECC library in [77] because of its portability and ease of use.
The HA and FA can generate system parameters, a prime P, elliptic curve E, base point
G

=(x,y), and order r of the point G so that they can compute a pair of public and private

keys as required. The prime P is generated based on security level. Since the size of P is
equal to 160 bits long, the ECC has the same level of security with RSA and DSA with a
1024-bit modulus [77]. The experiments choose P as 163 and 175 bits long. In the
following, let P = x donate the size of prime P. The HA and FA generate an elliptic curve
having suitable order r by using the complex multiplication method with a discriminant
D [77]. The value of Dis 40 in the experiments. In the stage of initiation, the FA and HA
and local domain BSs are configured with public and private keys according to the
3

proposed SM P. Each data point shown in the following figures is averaged over five
runs with different MS distribution. The number of hops in multi-hop communication is
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the key factor in increasing the transmission delay. Thus, the experiments are conducted
based on different number of hops from a MS to a BS (a single-hop or multi-hop MS).

6.4.2.2 Impact of Security on Macro and Micro mobility

The macro/micro-mobility delay is primarily impacted by communication and
computation delay. The communication delay of a packet includes all the latencies of
multi-hop wireless forwarding, MCIP local wired network, and the Internet. The local
network has less delay for a packet transmission than that of the Internet. In the SM 3p,
the computational delay is primarily caused by the cryptographic operations: symmetric
or asymmetric. The symmetric cryptographic operation is very efficient in generating and
verifying authenticator. In general, it is one-thousandth of the asymmetric cryptographic
operation [41]. For instance, an AMD Opteron 1.6GHz processor under Linux 2.4.21 can
perform a stream cipher encryption/decryption using Panama Cipher (little endian)
algorithm at 344.781 Megabytes/second [78]. It can perform a MAC computation (and
verification) with HMAC/MD5 algorithm at 152.381 Megabytes/second [78]. Based on
these observations, symmetric cryptographic operations are not considered for mobility
delay in the simulations.
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Figure 49. Macro-mobility delay for single hop and multi-hop MSs.
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Figure 50. Micro-mobility delay for single hop and multi-hop MSs.
The macro-mobility delay is the interval from the issue of registration request to the
completion of all registration and authentication operations. As shown in Figure 49, for
secured or unsecured macro-mobility, registration delays increase when the number of
hops from MS to network attachment (BS) increases. It is because the increase of hops
results in more wireless transmission and computation delay at the intermediate MSs.
Security never comes for free. The registration delays caused by security operations are
higher than that of registrations without security because the security feature involves
computation overhead during registration. The macro-mobility delay also increases when
the size of the prime field increases because the timings for ECC operations increase for a
larger prime field (175 > 163 bits long).
Micro-mobility delay for a MS is the interval from the initiation of paging/routingupdate packet to the verification of paging/routing-reply packet. During this period, the
MS updates its multi-hop paging/routing cache in a safe manner and migrates from one
BS to another. As seen from Figure 49 and Figure 50, the micro-mobility delay is less
than that of macro-mobility when the MS has the same number of hops to the BS. The
secured micro-mobility delay increases linearly and does not show significant additional
overhead of security. It is because the process of a macro-mobility not only has the
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communication and computation delay at multi-hop wireless network and local network,
but also has the delay in the Internet and the significant delay in the HA and FA
authentications. When a registered MS migrates from a BS to another in the MCIP local
domain, there is no need for the MS to registers with its HA again. Thus, the MCIP
micro-mobility protocol significantly reduces the delay.

6.4.2.3 Impact of Security on Route Acquisition Delay

Figure 51 shows the delay of MS search process for locating the neighboring BS due
to micro-mobility based on different hops from a source MS to BS. The delay is the
interval from the issue of searching-request packet to the moment of finishing the
verification of the searching-reply packet from a BS. It is clear from Figure 51, the
security authentication results in extra route discovery delay because of the computation
overhead at each intermediate MS for signature and verification. For single hop MSs, it
learns the BS information by listening to the beacon from the BS and checks the
authenticity of beacon by using the public key of FA. This is why the route delay is much
smaller when hop count is one.
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Figure 51. Routing Acquisition Delay for BS Detection.
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After the process of route discovery, MS obtains the route to the new BS, but it can
not use the route for internet connection immediately because of the stale mobility
binding. Otherwise, the packets from the Internet will be directed to the previous
associated BS rather than the new BS. As shown in Figure 50, the higher delay occurs if
the MS updates its new network attachment (new BS) with a macro-mobility process. In
the proposed SM 3p, the migration using the process of micro-mobility has lower delay
compared to the scheme using macro-mobility process as shown in Figure 51.
Meanwhile, some schemes such as packet buffering can be used to reduce the packet
drop during the period of link breakage and migration.
In the proposed SM 3p, instead of using secret key-based (symmetric) primitive, the
certificate-based scheme (asymmetric) achieves the scalability. There may be a large
number of MSs in a MCIP local domain but only a small percent of MSs are active
sending or receiving packets. In the case of symmetric cryptography, each MS should
have a secret key with every other MS, which makes it unappealing for key establishment
and management. In our protocol, each MS only need to maintain its private key, its
certificate, and the public key of FA. By using the public key of the FA, the MS can
verify all the certificates from other MSs, and further validate the authenticity of the MSs
and their packets.

6.4.1 Conclusion
In this chapter, we have presented the SM 3p to secure macro/micro-mobility for
MCIP network. The SM 3p extends the mobile IP security for registration and
authentication for single hop or multi-hop MS. During the process of registration, the
SM 3p prevents forged BS and registration attacks. After a mobile IP registration, each
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MS obtains a certificate for providing effective micro-mobility protection when the MS
moves from a BS to another in the MeIP local domain without re-registration and reauthentication at the migrating BS. During the process of micro-mobility, the SM 3p
provides

the

multi-hop

routing

prevention

in

accordance

with

anti-integrity,

impersonation, anti-confidentiality and duplication. The performance of the proposed
SM 3p approach shows that the macro-mobility delay is higher than micro-mobility delay.
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CHAPTER VII
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION
The secure Internet connectivity and mobility management are two crucial issues in
designing an integrated internet and heterogeneous multi-hop network. This chapter
summaries our contributions in this dissertation and discusses and future works for
secured communication for heterogeneous multi-hop networks. Section 7.1 illustrates the
conclusion drawn from our works, and Section 7.2 discusses the future research.

7.1 Conclusion
7.1.1 Secure Communication for Integrated Internet and MANET
In an integrated internet and heterogeneous multi-hop network, a multi-hop route
discovery protocol is required to support multi-hop wireless communication. At the same
time, as discussed in Chapter 3, the route discovery protocol should cooperate with
mobile IP protocol to provide the global internet connectivity. A multi-hop MS located
outside the coverage of the BS can effectively detect the availability of a BS by a process
of a route discovery. The route discovery protocol further enables the MS with capability
to reconfigure a new route to the Internet when current path is broken due to intermediary
node mobility. It can be seen from our analysis and experimental results in Chapter 3, the
effectiveness of such integration protocol should be:
•

Providing efficient bi-directional connection,
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•

Lower overhead and higher throughput,

•

Less connection delay for communication establishment and packet forwarding.

In an integrated network, an adversary may modify the routing packet from a
neighboring MS. As discussed in Chapter 2, many attacks may happen in an integrated
network. The security protocol proposed in Chapter 4 integrates mobile IP security and
ad hoc security for providing security protection for integrated Internet and MANET.
This security protocol requires that each MS provides authentication information upon
entering the multi-hop network. If a MS does not have the security binding with the
network, the MS must register with the HA and the FA to get its identity verified before
using the multi-hop heterogeneous network. This prevents unauthorized access to multihop network. At the same time, during registration, each ad hoc host also authenticates
the FA through the HA. In the proposed model, each MS only chooses the authenticated
MSs as ad hoc relaying stations. The FA can filter data packets and discard those that do
not belong to an authenticated MS. The security protocol achieves the following goals.
•

Multi-hop heterogeneous network provides services only to authenticated MSs.

•

Only authenticated MSs must be used in multi-hop routes. The route creation
process must only involve trusted and authenticated MSs.

•

Only authenticated routing information should be used in the updates of
paging/routing caches.

The first goal is achieved by requiring the registration of all MSs. During registration,
the MS, the FA, and the HA are authenticated on the whole. Our proposed mechanisms to
establish distributed trust relationship for a multi-hop MS have three steps (i) the multihop MS sends its credentials to the network (BS) so that the BS can authenticate the MS,
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(ii) the multi-hop MS validates the BS so that the MS can trust the BS for accessing the
network, and (iii) after the mutual authentication, the MS can create a security binding
with the integrated network. The second goal is achieved by enforcing signature and
verification along a multi-hop route during the construction of the route. The signature
verification prevents the attacks of the anti-integrity and impersonation. The third goal is
met by authentication of a MS before BS updates a paging/routing cache.

7.1.2 Secure Mobility Management in Heterogeneous Multi-hop Wireless
Networks
Since the standard mobile IP protocol suffers from limitations (e.g., latency, frequent
handoff) as illustrated in Chapter 5, the proposed MCIP protocol provides multi-hop
communication with micro-mobility support by integrating multi-hop communication
with Cellular IP. The MCIP divides a multi-hop wireless network into separate domains
and each domain has an lOW for providing internet accessibility. The BSs are connected
with each other by wired or wireless links. Because of lo(;al domain, a MS doesn't need
to register with its HA every time when it moves from a BS to another in a local domain.
In order to support micro-mobility, the MCIP includes three components: location
management, connection management and route reconfiguration. Location management
is responsible for maintaining location information for idle MSs in a local domain.
Connection management constructs an initial path for data transmission if a MS is
moving to active state for sending or receiving packets. In the active state, a route
reconfiguration mechanism is proposed to take advantage of various multi-hop
connection alternatives available based on terminal interfaces, network accessibility and
topology.
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In our secure macro/micro-mobility protocol, each BS has a security association with
its MCIP local domain (i.e., IGW) and shares a secret key with its neighboring BSs to
facilitate the process of authentication. The proposed SM3p for MCIP network includes
two components: secure macro-mobility and secure micro-mobility. Before obtaining
service via a local domain, the MS authenticates with the visiting local domain by a
secure macro-mobility protocol, and creates a security association with the domain. Then,
when the MS moves from a BS to another, a secure micro-mobility protects the process
of multi-hop paging/routing cache update of the MS.

7.2 Future Recommendations
7.2.1 Secure Communication for Integrated Internet and MANET
Each MS has limited power and computational capability. Thus, a security protocol
for interconnection between the Internet and MANET should be developed in a way that
a multi-hop MS can effectively authenticate with the visiting network or other MSs. The
private/public key-based protocols cause heavy computation delay compared to secret
key-based cryptosystem. However, it is hard for the secret key-based scheme to achieve
scalability due to key management. In the future, a hybrid scheme should be developed to
facilitate the authentication process with high efficiency and scalability. At the same time,
the selfishness is a key issue for multi-hop security that should be considered in the future.
During the data transmission phase, an adversary that acts as the intermediary relay node,
gets hold of the data packets and mistreats them. In a multi-hop network, the protection
for routing security cannot guarantee each intermediary MS to forward the data packet in
accordance with the routing table. It is possible to develop a collaborative scheme to
encourage packet forwarding in the heterogeneous multi-hop network.
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Meanwhile, protecting wireless and mobile infrastructure is anther topic that should
be addressed in the future work. The BSIAP protection for future work will primarily be
focused on:
•

Access control: As illustrated in Chapter 2, a BS may be accessed and
reconfigured according to the attacker's convenience. The sensitive information in
the BS such as routing information and keys may be captured. Thereby the BS
should be protected by some security policies to against unauthorized access and
operations.

•

Protecting personal information: The personal information of a MS should be
properly protected

III

the device or on the internet relevant databases. The

identification such as IP address, secret keys, certificates and other sensitive
information should be stored in a proper manner so as to prevent getting
compromised and running as a malicious MS.

7.2.1 Secure Mobility Management in Heterogeneous Multi-hop Wireless
Networks
The objective of mobility management is to provide a fast hand-off scheme for MSs,
which is supported by different layers of the network protocol stack, including (i):
network layer, (ii) link layer, and (iii) cross layer design for handoff management. In the
future, we can focus on the link layer and cross layer-design to improve our MCIP
scheme proposed in Chapter 5.
As a very important issue, the link layer provides crucial information (e.g., signal) for
a MS to determine whether it initiates a handoff or not. On the network layer, the
topology and velocity information can be helpful for mobility management. The future
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mobility solutions in the integrated network should be developed based all these
information

to

optimize

location

management,

connection

management,

and

reconfiguration scheme. More research should be done about the handoff management
protocols including horizontal handoff, e.g., from one IEEE 801.11 AP to another IEEE
802. 11AP, and vertical handoff, from an IEEE 802.11 AP to a cellular BS. A handoff
process can be facilitated by cross layer design for the purpose of reducing the handoff
delay by detecting the signal strength, or predicting the movement of the mobile station.
The secure macro-mobility and secure micro-mobility protocols can be developed in
several ways. The proposed SM 3p for MeIP network uses the HA as the authenticatilon
server. In some cases, the HA on the Internet may be bogus and thus cannot be truslted
for authentication. Therefore, new approaches (e.g., third party authentication) may be
developed with a stronger scheme of macro-mobility authentication. During a micromobility authentication, the domain IGW maintains the security information (i . e.,
certificate) for the MS roaming in the domain in a secure manner. Besides a secure
handoff process, a future work for secure micro-mobility is how to monitor and measure
the local domain information (e.g., the credit or reputation of a MS in the domain) to
prevent the attacks from inside or outside.
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APPENDIX
An integrated Internet and MANET with SIze of n nodes is considered. The
implementation of the key creation, signature generation and signature verification here
follows the ECDSA signature techniques as an example of a digital signature for the
integrated Internet and MANET. In the integrated Internet and MANET, the FA is
responsible for choosing system parameters, a prime P, elliptic curve E, base point G
(x,y), and order r of the point G.

kG

=

is a group-point obtained by multiplying the base-

point G by the scalar K. The system parameters are published by FA and shared within
the integrated Internet and MANET. If these parameters are not system-wide parameters,
each MS selects its elliptic curve and base point. In this case, these parameters are
included in the MS public key. Also let Hash (m) be the secure hash algorithm (SHA-l)
and know to all in the system.

Key Generation: A node MS chooses an integer, marked as 'l(1iJv{S, as its private key,
where 1:::; 'l(1iJv{S:::; r-l. Then MS calculates 'l0vfs= 'l(liJv{SG as the public key of the MS.

Signature Generation:
To sign a message (m), a MS generate a random number u, where 1:::; u :::; r-l and

computes,
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(i): V

=u G =(xv, Yv) and c =Xv mod r, where c is an integer I:::: c:::: r-1, if c =0,

the MS another random number u', and starts with the step (i) again.
(ii): d

= u- 1(Hash

(m) + 'l(11JvfS c) mod r. If d

= 0,

the MS another random

number u', and starts with the step (i) again.
MS outputs (c, d) as the signature of message (m). MS submits m, c, and d.

Signature Verification:
To verify the signature of a message (m, c, d) from a sender, the receiver calculates,
(i): h = d- 1 mod r.

(ii): hI = 9lasfi (m) h mod rand h2 = c h mod r
(iii): P

= fil G + fi2 'l0vf.s = (x p ' yp) and c' =xp mod r

If c = c', then the signature is valid. Otherwise it is invalid.
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